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## Discourse, Power and Subjectivity

Karen M. Smith

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# The Government of Childhood

## Discourse, Power and Subjectivity

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*This book is dedicated to my parents Tommy and Evelyn whose love and support for all of their children goes far beyond the call of duty and to my beautiful daughter Tamsin who provided the inspiration and the motivation*

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# Introduction

> Prudence! Prudence which is ever bidding us look forward into the future, a future which in many cases we shall never reach; here is the real source of all our troubles! How mad it is for so short-lived a creature as man to look forward into a future to which he rarely attains, while he neglects the present which is his? (Rousseau)[1]

I have had the privilege of being present for the birth of two children – my own cherished daughter and the son of a close friend. These have been among the most transcendent experiences of my life thus far, events that occurred 'out of time' which transported me far away from mundane concerns and worries. The experiences of giving birth to, and caring for, an infant demand a radical engagement with the present moment, however when one becomes a parent it is difficult to resist the societal pressure to attend to the future, rather than what is happening right now. To an extent this future-orientation is necessary, one of the primary tasks of parenting after all is to ensure that children are equipped with the necessary skills to live independently when the time comes. On the other hand, continually rushing towards the future places a great deal of pressure on parent and child alike, a continual balancing of present inclinations against potential future risks and rewards.

Such concerns are by no means novel of course – as the quotation from Rousseau above demonstrates. In recent years challenging the preoccupation with futurity has been one of the central concerns of theory and research within the relatively new field of 'childhood studies' or the 'social studies of childhood' which has explicitly challenged conceptions of children as 'apprentice adults' or 'becomings'.

The focus on children as 'beings' – and thus as subjects rather than objects of intervention – is echoed in the literature on children's rights and increasingly reflected in law and policy. Nevertheless it is probably accurate to say that children as a group remain of most interest to policy-makers in terms of what they are to become and while there have been many important and welcome developments in policy and provision for children in many countries in recent years, public expenditure on children is still typically framed in terms of investment, justifiable on the basis of the expected returns to flow from increasing 'human capital'.

Although generally not with expectation of personal return, much parental toil is directed towards maximising children's potential. Out of love and concern we encourage our children to 'succeed'. With success for many of us measured, at least, in part, in terms of examination results and third-level qualifications, it is understandable that other activities are frequently subordinated to educational goals and that the capacities and attributes we aim to foster in our children are those which will help them to flourish (or at least survive) in the school environment. Throughout their childhood children are continually being measured against their peers – parents must aim to ensure that their children do not 'fall behind' and ideally that they outperform their peers in the race to successful adulthood.[2] Parents who neglect such tasks – whose gaze is not sufficiently future-oriented – may be regarded as deviant or defective.

## Children, parents and power

The relationship between parents and children can be viewed as 'natural' and grounded in bonds of affection, but, of course, it is also recognised as a relationship of power, which is embedded in wider networks of power relations. The power which parents exercise over children is not best understood simply in terms of the power to command and exact obedience, but in terms of *care, support* and *guidance*. Exercising power in this way is conceptualised by Michel Foucault in terms of *governing*, which in its broadest sense refers to attempts to shape or 'conduct' the *actions* of oneself or others. In the seminal essay, *The Subject and Power* Foucault argues that,

> {Power is}…a set of a actions upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult…in the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely, but it is always a way of acting

> upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action.[3]

To think about power in terms of governing or conducting action is to recognise that those over whom power is exercised must to some extent *choose* to be guided or led – a relationship of power does not imply passivity on the part of the governed.[4] Foucault argues that power and freedom need to be seen as inextricably intertwined. While conventionally freedom is understood as antithetical to power, Foucault is emphatic that power can only be exercised over 'free subjects'.[5] By *free subjects* Foucault is referring to subjects who have a range of possibilities for action open to them. Thus while freedom can be regarded as the 'precondition and support of power', at the same time the dependency of power relations upon freedom leaves open the possibility of resistance.[6]

A key lesson from the Foucauldian literature on government is that in order to exercise power over the actions of others one must have some conception of what kind of beings they are and how they are likely to respond to direction[7] – in simple terms if we think about children mainly as 'little devils' we are likely to devise quite different strategies for guiding their actions than if we think about them as 'little angels'. In thinking about what kinds of beings children are, parents and other adults aiming to guide the conduct of the young rarely approach the question from first principles, but to some extent draw on the prevailing 'discourses of childhood' of their particular time and place. While there may be any number of overlapping and conflicting discourses of childhood at any particular point in time only some will be regarded as authoritative or 'true'.[8] These dominant discourses influence the way in which parents and other adults think about and act towards children, but they also shape ideas about how parents *should* think and act. Discourses of childhood, then, are thus associated with particular norms in terms of the parent-child relationship and these child-rearing norms provide a standard by which the conduct of parents can be evaluated and regulated – by themselves and by others. As Vandebroeck and Bourvene-de-Vie note, the interdependence of discourses of childhood and discourses of parenthood means that parents – particularly the less privileged – as well as children, are 'governed' by child-rearing norms.[9] Dominant discourses of childhood are also closely intertwined with the strategies and practices by which power is exercised over children in domains other than that of the family, of which the most significant in Western culture is the school.

This is not to imply a *unidirectional* relationship between discourses, norms and practices; ideas about childhood, child-rearing and education are shaped and reshaped *through* practices of governing.

## Overview of book

This book examines the government of childhood in the Western world from the sixteenth century up to the present. Covering such a broad time span necessarily leads to a selective approach, narrowed further by the author's linguistic limitations. What I have aimed to do is carry out a broad ranging survey of the discourses which have shaped ideas about childhood and norms around child-rearing and of the related policies and practices concerned with children and families over the time period. Throughout I have relied mainly on secondary and tertiary sources – drawn from the history of childhood and history of education, as well as the sociological literature on childhood, the literature on children's rights and wider literature from social history, philosophy, religion and politics as well as Foucauldian literature on government generally and on the government of childhood/education. The book is of course very much influenced by the work of Michel Foucault and by the work of those such as Nikolas Rose and Mitchell Dean whose concerns and approaches have been shaped by Foucault's writings on *governmentality*. The concept of governmentality was derived from Foucault's research on the genealogy of liberal forms of government, but it is fundamentally concerned with the exercise of power over 'selves' and intersects with the major strands of Foucault's work in terms of discipline, biopolitics and ethics or 'care of the self', all of which have informed the ideas and arguments presented in this book. In his writings on ethical self-care Foucault examined the teachings of Stoic and Epicurean philosophers in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. The 'cradle arguments' of Stoicism and Epicureanism have provided important resources for thinking about the nature of childhood in Western thought and the book draws on recent scholarship on the influence of Hellenistic philosophy in early modern Europe, in particular that of Pierre Force and Christopher Brooke, and on the general literature on Stoic and Epicurean philosophy.

The overarching framework informing the book draws on the ideas of Chris Jenks around childhood and social control, specifically the models of the Dionysian and Apollonian images of childhood, which he deploys in thinking about childhood and power relations. Jenks associates these images with the writings of Hobbes and Rousseau and

throughout the book I engage with the work of these political theorists and with associated scholarship in order to 'flesh out' Jenks's images. Something I found particularly interesting was the complex relationship of Hobbes and Rousseau to Stoic and Epicurean ideas. Informed by these ideas and the governmentality literature my presentation of the Dionysian and Apollonian 'children' diverges somewhat from that of Jenks. Drawing on the literature on the government of childhood I have also added a third model – the Athenian child – characterised in terms of competence and agency reflecting current child-rearing norms based upon agency and participation.

Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the concepts of governmentality and the 'governmentalization of the state' as a preliminary to the examination of the government of childhood which unfolds over subsequent chapters. Drawing mainly on Foucault's lectures on governmentality as well as on the work of those such as Nikolas Rose and Mitchell Dean who have extended the governmentality theme this chapter examines early modern 'arts of government', the rise of the liberal state and the forms of rationalisation which inform liberal government at the present time. Chapter 2 is focused on the relationship between discourse, power and subjectivity and provides an overview of Foucault's thinking on subjectivity, with a particular focus on his work on 'ethics', before examining the manner in which citizens in liberal democracies are discursively constituted as 'governable subjects' and how this has changed over time, with particular reference to the implications for children and childhood. The discussion on the government of childhood draws on the Dionysian and Apollonian images of childhood deployed by Chris Jenks and attempts to locate these images more firmly within a Foucauldian/governmentality framework.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 examine the government of children and families within particular time periods. The main focus of Chapter 3 is childhood in the early modern period. As a preliminary there is a discussion on the religious and philosophical ideas which shaped conceptions of human nature and the nature of childhood in the Middle Ages, drawing in particular on the work of Michael Gillespie on the impact of the 'nominalist revolution' on early modern ideas about human nature. This provides the background to discussion of the emergence of what Luke[10] refers to as a 'pedagogical discourse' in early modern Europe and the subsequent rise of schooling as arguably the most important technology ever deployed for the production of 'governable subjects'.

Chapter 4 looks at the emergence of the 'naturally developing child' in the late eighteenth century in the writings of Rousseau and the Romantics and also examines the utilitarian philosophies of Jeremy Bentham and J.S. Mill with regard to childhood and education. The chapter examines the development of mass, compulsory schooling systems and the increasing involvement of the state in the sphere of child welfare and drawing on the work of Rose and Danziger traces the rise of developmental psychology as privileged source of knowledge about children.

Chapter 5 examines the relatively recent shift towards the discursive image of the 'agentive child' in childhood theory and research. Drawing on recent governmentality scholarship on childhood this chapter argues that the model of the agentive child is connected to novel strategies of governing the young which resonate with the neo-liberal ideal of the 'entrepreneurial self'. As an addition to the Dionysian and Apollonian models of childhood developed by Chris Jenks this chapter presents the model of the 'Athenian' child as a symbolic target of strategies predicated on reflexivity and responsibility associated with 'neo-liberal' and 'advanced liberal' rationalities of government.

# 1
# Conceptualising Governmentality

The starting point for this book is that modern Western childhood cannot be properly understood without appreciation of the concept of governmentality. Equally it is difficult to understand the concept of governmentality and its importance to the analysis of the exercise of power in Western liberal democracies without also looking at childhood. The aim of this chapter is to set out in detail the origins and meaning of the concept of governmentality as it was developed in the work of Michel Foucault. While this chapter is thus not directly concerned with the government of childhood, it represents a necessary preliminary to the more focused discussion which unfolds over the remainder of the book. I first examine what is meant by the term governmentality and explore key terms such as 'rationality of government' and 'technology of government' deployed in the post-Foucauldian governmentality literature. The following sections examine Foucault's genealogical analysis of the 'governmentalization of the state' – the genesis of the concept of governmentality – in which he traces the emergence of liberal practices of governing, as well as his analysis of the distinctive characteristics of liberal forms of rule. To inform discussion I draw mainly on Foucault's published works and lectures given at the *Collège de France* as well as on the work of those governmentality scholars, in particular Mitchell Dean, Nikolas Rose and Colin Gordon, whose interpretations of Foucault's writings were among the most important resources on governmentality in the English language prior to the recent publication of translated versions of the relevant *Collège de France* lecture series.

## Governmentality

Dean writes that governmentality refers to any rational approach to the question of *how to govern*.[1] As noted earlier, to govern is not simply to command or prohibit, but is a means of exercising power which attempts to guide or 'conduct' human behaviour.[2] According to Foucault a distinctive aspect of the concept of governing is that it refers to the exercise of power over *people* rather than over a territory or state.[3] The concept of governing does not refer exclusively to the exercise of political power but is relevant to the dynamics at play in diverse forms of relationship in which attempts are made to shape the behaviour of others, including those between parents and children.[4] It is the interconnection between such relations of power at the level of the personal and particular and those at the centralised political level which is at the heart of the concept of governmentality.[5]

Rose writes that Foucault's genealogical studies demonstrate that the question of 'how to govern' has been posed with particular urgency at specific historical periods, leading to the emergence of political rationalities which represent distinctive modes of conceptualising the exercise of power.[6] Political rationalities or 'mentalities of government' are defined by Dean as characteristic ways of thinking about governing which are 'collective and relatively taken for granted'.[7] Rose is emphatic that governmental rationalities must be regarded as *practical* rather than ideological, suggesting that they can be regarded as tools or 'intellectual technologies' for guiding thought and action, making possible shared understandings of *what* and *who* is to be governed and for what purpose, as well as the means by which this is to be achieved.[8]

According to O'Malley[9] the development of rationalities of government can be regarded as encompassing two distinct stages: *formation* and *systemisation*. Rationalities are typically formed in relation to a particular issue or problem and assembled from whatever 'intellectual, social and material resources' happen to be available in a particular historical and cultural context.[10] Rose suggests that a distinctive feature of 'modern strategies of governmentality' is their close association with scientific or 'veridical' discourses. [11] Liberal rationalities of government depend heavily upon human sciences such as economics, psychology and sociology in apprehending the 'objects, processes and persons {to be} governed'.[12] According to Rose the forms of 'languages and techniques' which have been found to be most useful in informing governmental strategies have not necessarily been those derived from the cutting-edge of theory or research, but rather those developed at the

'vulgar, pragmatic, quotidian and minor level' as solutions to specific mundane or localised concerns.[13] Once formed rationalities undergo a process of systemisation. They are refined or polished as tensions between disparate elements are smoothed out in response to external or internal criticism and attempts are made to impose an over-arching unity.[14] This unified 'policy logic' can then be deployed in dealing with any number of disparate issues or problems in a consistent manner.[15]

The emphasis in the governmentality literature on rationalisation makes it clear, as Rose emphasises, that government must be understood in the first instance in terms of *thought*,[16] however the process of governing requires that 'thought…becomes technical'.[17] This is achieved through the deployment of 'governmental apparatuses'[18] or 'technologies of government'.[19] These are defined by Rose as technologies designed to act upon and shape human behaviour and capacities.[20] Rose stresses that such technologies are not the product of particular rationalities, but are 'assemblages' put together from multifarious resources, including for example methods of recording (for example a school register or patient record), calculating (for example, book-keeping), ordering time (such as a timetable or schedule) or space (a map or an architectural plan) which are brought together and deployed in order to achieve a particular end.[21] Miller and Rose are careful to dispel any notion of a straightforward realisation of the aims of government through technologies, pointing out that while '"governmentality" is eternally optimistic, "government" is a congenitally failing activity', hampered by the innumerable obstacles to be overcome in moving from the identification of issues to be addressed to developing, assembling and implementing programmes in order to do so.[22]

The government of childhood obesity provides a good example of the diverse means by which attempts are made to reshape behaviour along desired ends, as well as of the serious difficulties involved in such endeavours. In liberal democracies government acts upon the behaviour of the governed not primarily through diktat but by, what Rose calls, *translation* by which is meant the multi-directional diffusion of ideas, concerns, aims and objectives between various spheres such as the political, medical, educational, commercial and *personal*.[23] The construction of obesity in medical terms as an 'epidemic' has been taken up by policy-makers, health and educational professionals, media commentators as well as by individual parents and children. Numerous programmes of action have been devised in various countries to promote 'healthy eating'. Various technologies have been assembled in

developing and implementing these programmes, such as body mass indicators, calorie counters and 'food pyramids' in order to encourage children and parents to monitor food intake and weight gain. The discourse of healthy eating/lifestyle has also been taken up by various commercial media and manufacturing interests and deployed in marketing and advertising campaigns. At the same time there are also in existence multiple discourses, rationalities and strategies which encourage ways of being and acting which are at odds with efforts to promote 'healthy lifestyles', while many of those targeted by 'healthy eating' discourses actively resist the messages such discourses convey.

From a Foucauldian perspective relations of power are to be distinguished from relations of domination – there is always potential for action or resistance.[24] As stated above, to govern is not to attempt to coerce, neither is it to 'brainwash' or indoctrinate; in governing others we may seek to guide them towards choosing particular behaviours or shape them into particular ways of being but success – as any parent recognises – is never assured. To analyse the exercise of power from the perspective of governmentality is to recognise, following Foucault,[25] that although power 'infuses' every relationship this by no means implies that every relationship is oppressive, nor that such relations are fixed. Relations of power are to be understood as 'mobile, reversible and unstable'.[26] To take the example of parents and children, while parents generally seek to guide and shape children's behaviour, we can easily conceive of circumstances where children actively resist such guidance or even situations in which parental conduct is actively adjusted under the tutelage of their offspring.

It was noted above that from a governmentality perspective what is of particular interest in the analysis of relations between parents and children is the extent to which they are intertwined with relations of power at the wider, societal level, especially the manner in which the power which parents exercise over their children supports and maintains the political authority exercised by the state over its citizens. It is clear that over the last two hundred years the regulation of child-parent relations has come more directly under state control, however, as Rose[27] writes, the majority of families in contemporary liberal democracies are governed indirectly. As with the example of the government of child obesity above there are various channels through which parents receive advice, guidance and support on particular aspects of the child-rearing process from promoting the cognitive development of infants to curbing teen drinking or substance abuse. As long as the minimum child-rearing standards set out in legislation are

met parents are in theory free to adopt or ignore this advice as they see fit. Even where parents endeavour to follow the advice of experts to the letter, as noted above, they not infrequently meet with resistance from their offspring. What is more difficult to resist, however, are the ontological and epistemological assumptions embedded in the information, advice and guidance with which we subjects of government are daily bombarded. It is in illuminating and challenging these assumptions that Foucault's ideas on governmentality can come to our aid.[28]

## The 'governmentalization of the state'

The concept of governmentality emerged from Foucault's genealogical analysis of 'the governmentalization of the state'. This he defined as the transformation of the aims, strategies and apparatus of political power from those relating to rule over territories to those concerned with managing populations.[29] Foucault described his approach as a 'little experiment of method', an attempt to link the analysis of power at the micro and macro levels, by looking at the state not as a 'transcendent reality' but as a set of practices or mode of governing.[30] The 'governmentalization of the state', is outlined by Foucault in terms of the trajectories of three distinct 'mechanisms of power' *sovereignty*, *discipline* and *security*, which have as their targets *territory*, *individuals* and *populations* respectively.[31] Foucault is careful to stress that this should not be understood in terms of a succession of social orders – 'we should not see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of discipline, and then of a society of discipline by a society, say, of government'.[32] Instead we are bidden to think in terms of transformations in the exercise of political power as sovereign mechanisms were *supplemented by* and *adapted to* disciplinary mechanisms and mechanisms of security, shifts predicated on new ways of rationalising the aims and objects of power.

### Prince, Pastor, Pater

The starting point for the governmentalisation of the state is that juridical theories are inadequate for explaining *how* political power is exercised;[33] the question of governing is conceptualised as a distinct issue from that of sovereignty and is based on a completely different template. The concept of sovereignty is grounded in the 'right to rule' traditionally associated with kings or princes and Foucault reminds us that the juridical instruments of law and right were developed to either support or resist the authority of the king.[34] Sovereignty in

Foucauldian terms is rooted in the 'Machiavellian' struggle of princes to gain, maintain or resist control over territories.[35] In exercising his sovereign power the aim of the prince is to retain the right to deploy such power. The exercise of sovereign power is thus regarded as circular in that 'the end of sovereignty is the exercise of sovereignty'.[36] In medieval and early modern Europe princes were constantly on alert against external threats as well as those which arose inside their territory whether from ambitious nobles, over-reaching clerics or discontented peasantry. They were preoccupied with defending the throne against potential usurpers, winning back territory lost or extending their rule into new territories. Gaining and maintaining sovereign power depended upon the use of force – sovereign power is ultimately backed up by violence.[37] Foucault argues that sovereign power can be regarded as 'a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself'.[38] As noted above the concepts of law and right relate to either the right of seizure or the right to resist such seizure: they have been formulated in relation to the sovereign power 'to take life or let live'.[39]

By contrast *practices* of government are connected to 'power over life' or *bio-power*,[40] which Foucault conceptualised as the right to 'foster life or disallow it'.[41] 'Power over life' derives from an alternative model to that of sovereign power; that of the *pastorate*, rooted in the image of the shepherd tending to his flock.[42] Key concepts associated with the pastorate are salvation, obedience and truth. The shepherd takes a high degree of responsibility for the salvation of the flock, protecting them against external dangers and providing for their needs. This is understood individually and collectively – the shepherd is concerned with the salvation of each individual sheep and with that of the flock as a whole.[43] Unlike sovereign power, the exercise of 'pastoral power' is not self-interested, there is a fundamentally different kind of relationship between shepherd and sheep than that betokened by king and subject.[44] The pastoral relationship demands a form of obedience from the governed which goes far beyond that associated with sovereign power. It is not a matter of obeying occasional commands, but rather what Foucault describes as 'a kind of exhaustive, total, and permanent relationship of complete obedience'.[45] Every aspect of life is encompassed – including one's thoughts, dreams and desires.

Although the 'shepherd-flock' trope was frequently deployed in the Ancient world in connection with religious, philosophical or political guidance, Foucault writes that it is only with the coming of Christianity and the constitution of the pastorate in the form of a

church, do we find the institutionalisation of 'pastoral power', as a mode of exercising power which seeks to govern men in their day-to-day lives with the ultimate aim of leading them towards salvation.[46] Pastoral power is not a unitary concept – Foucault points to numerous 'pastoral' struggles, from religious wars to the Protestant Reformation, which have centred on the correct manner of governing men's souls[47] – but its characteristic feature is that of a form of power, which is targeted at men's *conduct*, at the manner in which they comport themselves in every aspect of their existence.[48] Foucault further distinguishes pastoral power from sovereign power in four important ways – it is directed towards salvation, thus it is ultimately concerned with the welfare of the 'flock' rather than that of the shepherd, it is self-sacrificing in contrast to power wielded by the monarch which *demands* sacrifice.[49] Pastoral power is individualising – it is concerned with the well-being of *each and every* soul (*omnes et singulatim*) as well as with the collectivity, and finally it depends upon an extensive knowledge of the interior lives of individuals.[50] It is a form of power, which regulates and produces subjects through the 'compulsory extraction of truth'.[51]

Foucault suggests the pastorate is

> …the origin, the point of formation…of the governmentality whose entry into politics at the end of the sixteenth and in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, marks the threshold of the modern state.[52]

Like the pastorate, the modern state, is both 'individualizing and totalizing'; it is concerned with the welfare of 'each and all', although welfare has been rearticulated to represent salvation in *this* world rather than the next.[53] Foucault stresses that the state has not 'taken over' the full range of pastoral functions; since the Protestant Reformation pastoral functions have 'spread out into the whole social body' to be taken up by medicine, philanthropy and the family as well as state agencies.[54] Accordingly he argues that the power of the state must be regarded as 'superstructural', that is, as predicated upon these 'already existing power relations'.[55] State authority is derived from and supported by, for example, the power of religious authorities over their congregations, the authority of parents over children and – perhaps most importantly – the power that individuals exercise over themselves. It is this which makes government of individuals and populations – as opposed to rule over territories – possible.

For Foucault the emergence of the modern state was not so much a matter of the development of institutions, but more a shift in the manner in which the ends and objects of rule were perceived. The plethora of treatises produced from the mid-sixteenth century concerned with 'arts of government', as distinct from the traditional 'mirrors for princes', is highlighted as a turning-point in this regard.[56] Within this literature Foucault sees the emergence of a conception of exercising power in which the ends of government are not simply related to retaining power over a territory, but are internal to what is being governed.[57] This form of exercising power utilises 'tactics' rather than the sovereign instrument of law – it concerns administration rather than the issuing of commands.[58] The individuals to be governed are not merely inhabitants of a territory, but beings embedded in a multiplicity of relationships and 'involvements' and engaged in a diverse range of activities.[59]

Treatises concerned with political 'arts of government' emerged in the context of an upsurge of interest in 'conduct' in each of its diverse aspects, moral, religious and pedagogical as well as political, which Foucault links to the social, economic and political changes being wrought by, on the one hand the decline of feudalism and emergence of centralised monarchical states, and on the other, religious schism.[60] Foucault highlights the education of children as perhaps the most important aspect of the literature on government which flowered from the sixteenth century, suggesting that the 'pedagogical problem' appeared at the intersection of the great questions of government, but more importantly that the government of children was the 'prism' through which these questions were comprehended.[61] While the images of paternal power deployed diverge somewhat, it is significant that early modern theories of sovereign power as well as 'arts of government' took the household or family as a key point of reference, with an explicit connection drawn between the authority of princes and the authority of fathers over children.[62]

In the unsettled context of early modern Europe, riven by religious and political rivalries which frequently broke out into armed conflict, one of the most pressing questions was the basis of political obligation. Oestreich notes that political and legal theory at this time cannot be regarded separately from theology – the Bible was a privileged source of constitutional and juridical principles – and draws attention to the particular significance accorded to the idea of 'covenant' in religious and political discourse.[63] The idea of covenant or contract between God and humanity or between ruler and ruled signified mutual obligations

with the dangerous implication that failure to uphold obligations by either party nullified the contract.[64] Such ideas were propounded in anti-monarchist literature in wide circulation in the sixteenth century.[65] Defenders of royal power grounded the sovereign power of the king in the *natural* (God-given) right of fathers over their offspring. As elaborated by the English absolutist Sir Robert Filmer, the right of kings derived from Adam on the basis of his position as father of the human race.[66] The authority of Adam was absolute – by God's will he exercised dominion over the whole earth and everything in it including his (inferior) helpmate Eve.[67] Authority was subsequently transmitted from father to eldest son, although Noah had broken with the tradition of primogeniture by dividing his dominion between his three sons – the basis for subsequent geo-political divisions.[68] For Filmer then, kings ruled as fathers to their subjects on the same basis as men ruled as fathers over individual households, with the unlimited and unassailable authority, associated with the Roman principle of *patria potestas*.[69]

The concept of *patria potestas* was central to the seminal theory of sovereignty developed by Jean Bodin, to whom Filmer is regarded as greatly indebted.[70] Bodin too grounded his model of sovereign power on the God-given authority of Adam, but there are differences in the manner in which Bodin and Filmer regarded Adam's mandate. In a recent paper Becker notes that Bodin's theory lays greater stress on Adam's power as *husband* rather than on his paternal authority, a power which Adam was granted by God in light of Eve's greater culpability in the fall from grace.[71] Becker writes that Bodin's commitment to a unitary theory of power led him to argue contra to Aristotle that the authority which the paterfamilias wields over his wife, his children and his slaves is of exactly the same kind.[72] For Bodin the power wielded by the monarch is continuous with the power wielded by male heads of households but also, according to Becker, in light of the association of Eve with unbridled desire and Adam with reason, with the power that individuals exercise over themselves.[73] At the heart of this continuum of authority is the very strong association between the female, the child and the emotional realm, each classified as inferior and hence subject to identical patterns of control.

Like Bodin, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes promulgated a theory of absolute sovereign power, but, as Foucault notes, his was a sovereignty that flowed from below, not above.[74] Hobbes was able to use the idea of the covenant or contract against the anti-monarchists based on the notion of a once and for all voluntary transfer of

sovereignty. Hobbes also retained the analogy between the dominion of the sovereign and the paterfamilias by representing parent-child relations as flowing from agreement rather than the act of generation or divine decree.[75] Per Hobbes children *consent* to be ruled in exchange for protection in the same way as the citizens of the commonwealth. Wedded to the indivisibility of sovereignty Hobbes insisted that the child cannot be subject to 'two masters' – one parent therefore exercises authority over the entire family.[76] In the state of nature dominion rested with mothers in the first instance (since it was only by their will that paternity could be known) whereas in civil society authority over both women and children was generally vested in men as heads of households.[77] The key point for Hobbes though is that in either context the authority of parents – like that of the Leviathan – rested upon the implicit consent of the governed.

Within the literature dealing with 'arts of government' the chief concern was the exercise rather than the basis of authority. Foucault writes that the Aristotelian idea of economy was central to how practices of government were conceptualised in the early modern literature as indeed it had been within early Christianity as a means of conceptualising the pastorate.[78] The Greek fathers referred to pastoral practices as *oikonomia psuchōn* or the 'economy of souls', which Foucault notes entailed a shift from concern with the management of the 'prosperity or wealth of the household' towards the salvation of the entire Christian community, individually and collectively.[79] The early modern 'arts of government' are associated with a 'second mutation of this notion of economy' as attempts were made to delineate principles for 'conducting conduct' in the temporal sphere, which transcended the 'Machiavellian' aim of holding on to power.[80] Economy, the 'wise management of a household' – safeguarding and increasing the prosperity of the family and its members – had a particular resonance in this context. Foucault draws attention to the image presented by the sixteenth century French writer Guillaume de La Perrière for whom the act of governing was analogous to the role of the care*ful* and car*ing* father who takes an active role in ordering the affairs of his household.[81] This image of fatherhood stands in contrast to the strong and domineering paternal figure, associated with the exercise of sovereign power, who responds swiftly and resolutely to threats to the household from without or insubordination within. For La Perrière the ruler is a diligent and patient father whose wisdom springs not from knowledge of abstract principles or laws, but from practical expertise and who regards himself as 'in the service of' rather than domineering *over,* 'his

household'.[82] The ideal of fatherhood set out by La Perrière is thus not based simply on filial obedience, but is grounded in parental solicitude – the father is the first to rise and the last to retire and his watch over his household – like the shepherd over his flock – is constant.[83]

**Ordering the early modern state**

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the weak, insecure, feudal type of monarchy embedded in a complex network of privileges and obligations was in Western Europe giving way to an increasingly centralised model of political authority grounded in the absolute sovereignty of the king.[84] Rhetorical devices of divine rule or social contract notwithstanding, in practical terms the authority of the early modern monarch rested upon the capacity to defend against external assault and promote internal harmony. In relation to the former Foucault points to the development of a 'military-diplomatic assemblage' – the establishment of permanent standing armies and deployment of diplomatic resources – as means of achieving a 'European Equilibrium', subsequently formalised in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).[85] According to Foucault the Westphalia accord reflects a shift in orientation in early modern thought away from the expectation of a reunified Roman Empire, which in the Middle Ages was viewed as the precursor to the Day of Judgement when Christ would return to Earth to divide the sheep from the goats. Thoughts of Empire had by this time faded and the future appeared open-ended.[86]

The 'arts of government' of the seventeenth and eighteenth century thus operated in the context of what Foucault refers to as 'an indefinite temporality';[87] in this context the ends of government were conceived in terms of 'reason of state', the aim of which was to 'maintain the state in good order' and whose guiding principles were derived from the state itself.[88] Foucault credits rationalities of reason of state with the re-inscription of the key pastoral themes of salvation, obedience and truth in secular form.[89] From the vantage of reason of state salvation is understood as the salvation of the state – as opposed to the flock/people – which occasionally necessitates the sacrifice of the few for the good of the whole. Obedience is reformulated in terms of the prevention of sedition. In discussing this transformation Foucault examines the writings on this theme of Francis Bacon, of which a few points are of particular interest.[90] Firstly Bacon perceived the masses and not the nobility as most dangerous to the security of the state. Secondly, Bacon differentiated between *material* and *occasional* causes of sedition. The latter referred to any number of potential events

within a state – changes in religion, taxation, prices, standard of living – which could spark revolt, however Bacon argued that sedition would only occur if one of two material causes were present – poverty/hunger or discontent – and these should be the focus of efforts to prevent unrest.[91] Thus Foucault suggests that for Bacon *economy* and *opinion* are two fundamental priorities of government, which he notes reflected political developments of the time in terms of the rise of mercantilism and the emergent art of *publicity* as instrument of politics.[92] In relation to the third pastoral theme of truth, in the context of reason of state, truth becomes knowledge of the strength of the state; the emergent branch of knowledge of 'political arithmetic' or statistics – literally knowledge of the state – thus becomes an essential element of statecraft.[93] Truth also relates to opinion – the importance of guiding the beliefs of the population, but also, according to Foucault, doing this in a manner which shapes the way people behave and how they view themselves.[94]

As noted above, Foucault defines the governmentalisation of the state as related to a shift in orientation of political power towards *populations*. He suggests that reason of state rationalities referred to, but were not targeted at, populations, at least not in the sense we understand the term today.[95] A key point for Foucault is that not until the concept of population was understood as a distinct, transcendent entity, was a rationality of government possible which broke free from the 'family' model associated with the traditional concept of economy which was 'too narrow, weak and insubstantial' to support it.[96] Only then could the exercise of governmental power be viewed as properly distinct from that of sovereignty.[97] Foucault views *police*, a mechanism adopted in many of the absolutist states which emerged in early modern Europe as the conduit for the necessary 'mutation' in thought.[98] As Foucault elaborates, the early modern understanding of police was not coterminous with contemporary usage, but in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries referred to a more generalised conception of the means by which *public* authority was exercised.[99] By the seventeenth century, Foucault suggests that police had come to take on a rather different meaning in terms of 'the set of means by which *the state's forces can be increased* while preserving the state in good order'.[100] It encompassed diverse forms of directive aimed at ordering the minutiae of social relations.[101] The distinctive aspect of police lay in the strong connection made between the strength and security of the state and the *happiness* and well-being of the subjects, the underlying rationale underpinning the diverse regulations to be found in police

ordinances.[102] The state's strength depended upon increasing economic productivity, so an important function of police was to inculcate the ethic of work and to optimise productivity,[103] thus operating in Gordon's terms as a sort of 'economic pastorate'.[104] Specific matters dealt with through police related to the regulation of food prices to ensure availability of the necessities of life; the regulation of urban space from a public health perspective; managing activity through preventing idleness and the regulation of professions, and ensuring 'circulation' of men and goods.[105] More generally police encompassed regulation of almost all forms of social relation,[106] including the education and care of children.[107]

**Disciplinary power**

Foucault writes that through police, intricate networks of surveillance were established to monitor and record the minutiae of everyday life.[108] These formal and informal networks served to connect the exercise of power at the societal level to the power of the monarch. According to Foucault this interdependence between relations of power at the macro and micro levels means that police, although part of the monarchical state apparatus, cannot be seen simply as a manifestation of sovereign power.[109] For Foucault police must be regarded primarily as a regulatory, *disciplinary* mechanism in that 'making the town into a sort of quasi-convent and the realm into a sort of quasi-town is the kind of great disciplinary dream behind police'.[110]

The rise of discipline in early modern Europe is connected to the increasing emphasis on the welfare and productivity of the people as the source of the state's strength.[111] Foucault describes disciplinary power as a means of extracting 'time and labour' from bodies.[112] While sovereign power 'subtracts' or 'deducts', discipline is primarily 'productive'.[113] It does not extract material goods from its targets, but effort. Hence it is a form of exercising power which demands rather than blocks activity; prescriptive, rather than prohibitive, it seeks to utilise bodies in a manner which fosters efficiency and obedience.[114] Discipline is fundamentally a means of individualisation, it functions to divide up the multiplicity, rendering each observable, knowable and manageable. Foucault identifies three distinct forms of disciplinary technique or 'dividing practice' through which categorising and 'ranking' of individuals is made possible.[115] The first, *hierarchical observation* signifies a continuous 'invisible' form of surveillance in contrast to the intermittent 'spectacular' deployment of sovereign power. Foucault famously used the example of Bentham's Panopticon to

illustrate a form of surveillance in which the observer remains hidden, so those observed must regard themselves as under continuous scrutiny. The second 'dividing practice' is *normalization*, which acts as a powerful disciplinary tool through the use of common standards or norms against which all must be measured. The response to deviation is *corrective* – aimed at producing conformity with the 'normal', for example, through repetition of exercises.[116] Finally the *examination* brings together techniques of surveillance and normalization. The examination – for example by doctors of patients – allows the 'normalizing gaze' to be brought directly to bear on the individual in order to detect any signs of deviation.[117] The object of examination is thereby transformed into a *case*, produced via techniques of documentation which set out individual attributes in elaborate detail.[118]

Foucault suggests that the increasing importance of disciplinary mechanisms of power in early modern Europe marks a 'reversal of the political axis of individualization' whereby the targets of power became increasingly visible and the knowledge produced in relation to them more extensive.[119] This 'descending individualization'[120] associated with the rise of discipline has clear implications for the government of children. In a regime buttressed primarily by sovereign 'spectacular' techniques of power authority is wielded in a highly visible manner – the spotlight is on the great, the noble, the heroic, those who inspire respect, admiration or fear. By contrast in a disciplinary regime 'power becomes more anonymous and more functional'[121] – the focus is on those who are targeted by power, rather than on those who wield authority. Consequently 'the child is more individualized than the adult',[122] representing both the focus and the *product* of the various forms of knowledge, expertise, techniques and practices which have been developed to monitor and manage individual well-being and development. It is therefore no coincidence that the 'invention' or 'discovery' of childhood' documented by Ariès roughly coincided with the rise of disciplinary mechanisms of power in early modern Europe.

Disciplinary mechanisms were not an invention of the early modern period. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault writes that discipline has no single point of origin, but that disciplinary practices developed in various disconnected locales, of which the most important are the military and the monastery.[123] During the 'classical age' (roughly from 1650–1800) Foucault suggests that discipline was in general, confined to enclosed settings 'on the edge of society' with essentially negative functions.[124] The general drive for order, which he views as characteristic of this age culminated in a mass rounding up and enclosure in

institutional settings of deviant members of European societies. Proceeding in parallel with this 'great 'confinement' were 'more discreet, but insidious and effective' forms of confinement, such as the development of secondary schools along the monastic model and the widespread development of army barracks and manufacturing workshops.[125] From the eighteenth century there was an extension of disciplinary techniques from closed institutions towards a generalised surveillance – 'panopticism' – of the entire social body.[126]

The rise of panopticism is related to what is described as 'the functional inversion of the disciplines', whereby discipline came to be deployed not merely in a negative manner to limit disorder, but primarily as a positive mechanism to increase utility.[127] Foucault discusses primary schooling as a key example suggesting that by the eighteenth century the positive functions of schooling – optimising potential and increasing productivity – had taken precedence over negative functions such as preventing ignorance, idleness and crime.[128] We will be looking at the development of schooling in more detail in later chapters, but it is important to state that the 'negative' functions of education which were such an important impetus to the development of popular schooling in early modern Europe were still regarded by utilitarian philosophers as the most powerful rationale for state intervention in education in the nineteenth century[129] and remain an important aspect of educational discourse to the present day. The functional inversion of the disciplines should therefore not be regarded as a complete reversal, but more in terms of a shift in emphasis which was gradual, uneven and incomplete.

Panopticism is associated with 'the swarming of disciplinary mechanisms throughout society', by which is meant both an increase in the number of disciplinary institutions, as well as the loosening of disciplinary functions from their institutional moorings and extension outwards towards the general population.[130] This can be understood in terms of the broadening of the reach of institutions beyond their target population: for example an enhanced role for schools in monitoring the parents of the children in their charge.[131] It also refers to the increasing numbers of 'centres of observation' by which disciplinary surveillance was carried out in community, rather than institutional, settings.[132] Regulation of the population was traditionally a function carried out by the religious.[133] Following the Reformation and Counter-Reformation surveillance and regulation of the laity intensified, as the fragmentation of the Christian Church increased the necessity for religious authorities to discipline and safe-guard their 'flocks'.[134] According

to Axtmann, the difficulties in inculcating religious conformity rendered the various churches increasingly reliant on state authorities to impose discipline and social order.[135] As discussed above, in many of the absolutist regimes, which took shape in the early modern period, a large part of this function – varying by country – was adopted by the state via the police mechanism.[136] Foucault writes that police acted to 'fill in the gaps' between the various disciplinary institutions – 'disciplining the non-disciplinary spaces'.[137] This is not to suggest that the regulatory role of the churches disappeared – as Hunter[138] writes, the social disciplining of populations in early modern states would have been impossible without the co-operation of religious authorities – but that increasingly moral and spiritual goals were tied to political and economic objectives.[139]

What emerges from the literature on the 'disciplining' of early modern populations is the high degree of collaboration between civil and religious authorities.[140] 'Policing' the masses required access to vast quantities of information; in many European countries religious functionaries were delegated to maintain registers of key events such as births, marriages and deaths.[141] According to Pavla Miller this rendered 'not only local households but their individual members more visible to state authorities, and consequently more open to interventions such as systematic taxation or conscription'.[142] In the context of the major 'pastoral struggles' of the early modern period children became a particular target of the religious pastorate, while the shift towards centralised political power is also associated with intensified interest in the education of the young. The religious – Protestant reformers in particular – were the primary movers behind what was perhaps the most important of the various disciplinary strategies deployed in the early modern period – schooling for the masses,[143] a theme we will return to Chapter 3.

### 'The birth of biopolitics'

Foucault suggests that discipline – referred to in terms of the 'anatamopolitics of the body' – represents one pole of bio-power or 'power over life'.[144] In the eighteenth century, the second pole of bio-power emerged, a totalising *biopolitical* mode of power,[145] which made possible the administration of pastoral techniques at the level of the 'species-body'.[146] Foucault characterised biopolitics as a 'series of interventions and regulatory controls' targeting the population as a unitary entity.[147] It is concerned with the 'administration of life itself'.[148] As Dean writes, this concerns such questions as fertility, health, morbidity

and mortality as well as the 'environmental, economic and geographic conditions under which humans live, procreate, become ill, maintain health or become healthy, and die'.[149] Of central significance to biopolitics is sexuality, which occupies a privileged position at 'the juncture of the "body" and the "population"'.[150] Hence, rejecting the view that sex was repressed in the Victorian era, Foucault reveals 'a veritable discursive explosion' around sexuality and intensified regulation of sexual behaviour.[151]

> In the eighteenth century, sex became a 'police' matter – in the full and strict sense given the term at the time: not the repression of disorder, but an ordered maximisation of *collective* and *individual* forces…[152]

Foucault suggests that the deployment of sexuality is just one – 'although one of the most important' – ways in which biopolitical concerns with the condition of the population were connected up with the regulation of individual conduct in the nineteenth century.[153] Chen makes the important point that child-rearing and *social* reproduction represents another point of intersection between individual and national concerns.[154] Since the nineteenth century numerous programmes of action such as mass infant immunisation have been introduced in many countries in order to increase the physical and moral 'fitness' of the child population. These biopolitical measures intersect at the micro level with the multifarious 'tutelary' means[155] by which states seek to regulate the conduct of individual parents.

Although rooted in the idea of the collectivity, biopolitical power can be deployed in ways which differentiate between different segments of the population. Rose writes that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries evolutionary biology underpinned the reconceptualisation of the concept of race in 'scientific' terms allowing the population to be conceived as a unitary race or made up of multiple different races.[156] Races could be further sub-divided, as particular elements were deemed deficient or substandard, making possible the 'discovery' of 'defective' or 'dangerous classes'.[157] Hence concerns about falling fertility among the white middle-classes can easily co-exist with anxieties around excessive reproduction among 'less desirable' elements. Dean writes that there is also an external dimension to biopolitics; eugenic concepts of racial fitness and protecting the race have frequently been deployed in immigration and citizenship policy to

restrict the right of entry to those nationalities deemed of superior genetic heritage.[158]

Biopolitical power is predicated upon a conception of population which only became available in the eighteenth century. As noted above, police-discipline was concerned with the relationship between welfare and happiness of each and that of all, but the notion of population deployed via early modern police referred merely to the aggregate of individual subjects.[159] The need created by police for large-scale and detailed information-gathering facilitated the constitution of new forms of knowledge and the conceptualisation of the objects and subjects of government in novel ways.[160] As Foucault writes, police both depended upon and made possible the development of *statistics*.[161] Advances in statistical techniques and analysis gradually made it possible to identify regularities in terms of patterns of births, illness and deaths.[162] These phenomena were no longer merely personal events and the 'population', no longer merely the sum of its individual components appeared as a unitary entity subject to intrinsic 'natural processes'.[163] It is this reconceptualisation of population which Foucault sees as making possible the freeing of practices of government from the model of the household or family which had dominated political thought in the early modern period.[164]

**Security: Regulating through freedom**

With the re-configuration of population the 'population-wealth' problem took on a new form.[165] Examining the ideas which the Physiocrat *économistes* developed in eighteenth century France, Foucault sees the emergence of the idea of the economy as another set of 'natural' processes with its own regularities.[166] Reflecting Rose's assertion that it is typically in the context of addressing everyday mundane problems that transformations in governmental thought occur, one of the key questions which exercised political thought at the time was that of the circulation of grain.[167] Foucault writes that under the mercantilist policies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the problem of guarding against scarcity had been dealt with through juridical and regulatory/disciplinary controls which could be applied to compel or restrict certain actions on the part of those producing, importing or distributing grain.[168] Such controls served to artificially maintain prices at a low level, an approach which though designed to preserve affordability had the perverse effect of discouraging production. The Physiocratic argument was that in the absence of price controls the result of the behaviours

freely adopted by producers, distributors and consumers of grain will tend to lead to 'natural' correction of imbalances in terms of supply and demand.[169]

The Physiocrats advocated abolition of serfdom, arguing that liberating peasants from feudal relationships would enhance productivity, a contention grounded in the assumption that the free individual working to further his own *interests* would be much more highly motivated than one whose efforts depended upon coercion.[170] It should be noted here that the concept of interest deployed in the eighteenth century was relatively novel. According to the seminal account of Albert Hirschman interest at this time came to be understood as a kind of amalgam of the classical concepts of 'reason' and 'passion'. Its meaning was informed by the notion controversially set out by Bernard Mandeville, although prefigured in Hobbes and accorded respectability by Adam Smith, that certain selfish passions – specifically those related to avarice or acquisitiveness – could be 'harnessed' for the greater good.[171] Informed by such thinking the Physiocrats argued that education rather than coercion was the means of producing dutiful subjects – the properly educated labouring man would be sufficiently enlightened to obey the law, love his country and be a good citizen 'on rational grounds', but most importantly he would work much harder than the resentful serf.[172]

Foucault writes that despite the emphasis on individual and market freedom the theories of the Physiocrats remained wedded to the idea of sovereign oversight and control of market relations.[173] With the publication of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* in 1776 and acceptance of the idea of the 'invisible hand' of the market, the possibility of control of the economy by the sovereign is called into question.[174] Like the Physiocrats Smith emphasised the strength of self-interest as motivating force, but he travelled even further than the Physiocrats in emphasising the necessity of free market conditions. For Smith economic processes were neither manageable nor discernible, yet once the conditions for free exchange were provided the overall outcome from the aggregate of unfettered individual decisions would tend towards the greater good.[175] Thus Foucault writes that for Smith 'economic rationality is not only surrounded by, but founded on the unknowability of the totality of the process'.[176]

The 'mutations' in thought by which 'economy' and 'population' acquired their 'modern' meanings transformed the role of the family from a model for government to an 'element within the population'.[177] As the fundamental element of population the family acquired a

privileged status as the means by which biopolitical goals could be achieved:

> …it is a segment whose privilege is simply that when one wants to obtain something from the population concerning sexual behaviour, demography, the birth rate, or consumption, then one has to utilise the family. The family will change from being a model to being an instrument; it will become a privileged instrument for the government of the population rather than a chimerical model for good government.[178]

These shifts signal the emergence of a distinct form of governmentality, which relies primarily, not upon juridical or disciplinary mechanisms, but on what Foucault calls 'mechanisms of security'.[179] In other words, with the emergence of the notion of population and economy as 'natural' domains, a mode of exercising power comes to prominence which seeks not to prohibit action, as in juridical mechanisms, nor to prescribe action, as in disciplinary mechanisms, but rather to facilitate and *channel* action.[180] Where sovereign/juridical mechanisms deal with actions that have taken place in the past, and disciplinary mechanisms seek to modify behaviour in the present, mechanisms of security operate on the plane of *probability*.[181] If we consider the government of child welfare as an example, we can identify three very different approaches. A juridical/sovereign approach operates through a binary mechanism of permissible and impermissible parental behaviour, and administers sanctions for those parents who have transgressed. By contrast a disciplinary approach seeks to reform the behaviour of deviant parents using tutelary methods. Finally a mechanism of security uses statistical methods to ascertain child welfare norms at the level of the entire population in order to plot an acceptable range. According to Foucault the approach is to 'establish an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and on the other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded'.[182] This allows for the development of interventions which target entire groups or sub-groups rather than individual parents and children.

Mechanisms of security operate via *normalization*, a concept familiar from *Discipline and Punish* as a means of regulating *individual* behaviour, but, which, in the context of mechanisms of security refers to regulation at the level of the population. During the 1977–1978 *Collège de France* lecture series, Foucault makes a distinction between disciplinary *norms* and normalization.[183] Discipline begins with an 'optimal model'

– the 'norm' – and on this basis 'divides the normal from the abnormal'.[184] Foucault suggests that discipline should thus more properly be seen in terms of *normation*. By contrast what we might describe as biopolitical normalization – that is normalization at the level of population – starts from the 'normal', it seeks to identify via statistical calculation what can be considered a normal range of behaviour within a given population in order to 'regularize' or 'normalize' the 'most unfavourable in line with the most favourable'.[185] By making such a clear distinction between disciplinary and biopolitical norms, Foucault emphasises that a 'normalizing society' cannot be reduced to a society of discipline. Instead 'the normalizing society is a society in which the norm of discipline and the norm of regulation intersect along an orthogonal articulation'.[186]

In the first volume of the *History of Sexuality*, Foucault suggests that a characteristic of the 'normalizing society' is that law comes to function 'more and more as a norm'.[187] As Dean explains, this can be understood in the sense that increasingly laws function not merely to prohibit actions, but to both *regulate* and *regularise* behaviour, and hence that law is 'produced with reference to the particular society it claims to regulate'.[188] Accordingly, law comes to rely less on transcendent principles than on scientific or 'veridical' discourses such as those of psychology or medicine which produce 'truth' in relation to the objects and subjects of government.[189] Similarly the disciplining of individuals increasingly occurs via the deployment of norms derived from science rather than religious or moral codes; as McGushin writes, the accumulation of large-scale data sets which provided the basis for the human sciences was made possible by disciplinary mechanisms such as the examination.[190] The deployment of discipline as a means of understanding and acting upon individuals was in turn transformed by the availability of scientific averages against which individual normality could be judged.[191]

Foucault suggests that there is a degree of compatibility between disciplinary and juridical mechanisms in that each operates to codify divisions, either between 'the permitted and the forbidden' or the 'obligatory and forbidden'.[192] By contrast, mechanisms of security are difficult to translate into sovereign instruments and hence mainly operate beyond or 'below' the law.[193] This is because the population – when understood as a transcendent 'natural' entity – cannot simply be ordered to behave in certain ways.[194] The population is not accessible to law, but to science, hence not only must serious consideration be given to changes in the law 'if the laws are unfavourable to the population'

but intervention must also operate in different ways, 'on a range of factors and elements that seem far removed from the population itself and its immediate behaviour'.[195] For instance if a government wishes to increase the birth rate in a population juridical measures which attempt to *enforce* an increase in reproduction may be seen as less effective than measures (such as family benefits) which seek to make child-bearing and rearing more attractive. For Foucault to govern populations rather than individuals is to operate *through* desire, hence he regards mechanisms of security as the complete opposite of sovereign measures; rather than seeking to oppose or 'say no to' desire mechanisms of security attempt to channel desire, hence compliance is 'designed in' to systems which seek to work through the interests and aspirations of the governed.[196]

Foucault emphasises that security has not supplanted sovereign and disciplinary mechanisms of rule. Instead 'security is a way of making the old armatures of law and discipline function *in addition to* the specific mechanisms of security'.[197] As Dean elaborates, the manner in which sovereignty and discipline are deployed is fundamentally transformed by the emergence of biopolitical forms of government.[198] The idea of 'government through processes' signals a loosening of the link between government and sovereignty, as governing is no longer dependent upon juridical instruments.[199] Mechanisms of security can only operate in the context of the liberty of the governed to make autonomous choices in pursuing their own interests; therefore law and sovereignty acquire new functions in relation to the protection of individual rights.[200] In this context the maintenance of social order depends upon rights-holders who are capable of exercising their freedom responsibly.[201] Discipline remains an important tool for shaping responsible subjects, however norms derived from science assume greater importance in the formation of individuals and subjects bear a much greater responsibility for disciplining themselves.[202] Finally, sovereignty operates to mask the 'element of domination' inherent in disciplinary and biopolitical mechanisms of government,[203] while at the same time operating as a check on their potential excesses, thereby helping to preserve the delicate equilibrium between 'governing too much' and 'governing too little' upon which liberal government depends.[204]

## Liberal governmentality: Governing the social

Positioning liberalism not as a political theory or ideology, but as a practice or 'way of doing things',[205] Foucault suggests that the distinctiveness

of liberalism lies in its posing the question of how to govern not as 'am I governing in proper conformity with moral, natural or divine laws?', nor 'am I governing with sufficient intensity, depth, and attention to detail so as to bring the state…to its maximum strength?' but as 'am I governing at the border between the too much and the too little, between the maximum and minimum fixed for me by the *nature* of things?'[206]

Liberal government is predicated on the notion of the population and economy as internally regulated by 'natural' processes which must not be disrupted by government intervention.[207] On the other hand, government must also create the conditions in which these processes can flourish.[208] Hence, according to Foucault, the classical liberal doctrine of *laissez-faire* does not necessarily entail a *lack* of intervention, but particular forms of intervention which seek to enframe 'natural' processes in mechanisms of security.[209] Foucault argues that, for liberalism, freedom is not merely the product of security but its *precondition*.[210] Freedom is not antithetical to governmental power, but, as Rose cautions, must be seen in terms of calculated attempts to organise human relations.[211] Hence to limit the freedom of the governed is not merely 'an abuse of rights', but 'ignorance of how to govern properly'.[212] As Dean explains, the representative democracy characteristic of liberalism derived, by Foucault's account, not from a recognition of the pre-existing rights of individuals, but rather because representative government functions as a way of safeguarding the economic freedom of the governed, and can also be seen, per Dean, as a means of restricting the involvement of the governed in day-to-day political activity while at the same time promoting consensus.[213]

Gordon writes that for Foucault liberal government is predicated upon two very different conceptions – juridical and economic – of the governable subject.[214] On the one hand, the individual is a political and juridical subject, who is integrated into the polity on the basis of a 'social contract' under which he has theoretically agreed to repudiate private interests, where necessary for the common good.[215] The desire of this subject is authorised or 'blocked' in accordance with the rights and limits established by the sovereign instrument of law. On the other hand the individual is an economic subject – *homo economicus* – whose desire must be *channelled* or *directed* rather than repressed since his private interests are the basis on which the common good is seen to depend.[216] Hence, Foucault suggests, *homo economicus* represents a challenge to sovereign power in that 'he is irreducible to the sphere of right'.[217] The division between the political/public and non-political/private domains that is characteristic of liberalism has been shaped by this essential disjunction between law and economy.[218]

For Foucault, *society* rather than the state represents the starting point of liberal government and he argues that the notion of 'civil society' constituted in eighteenth-century liberalism represented a break with the idea of a formally constituted 'juridical and political bond' hitherto denoted by the term.[219] Drawing on the work of Adam Ferguson, Foucault identifies the key characteristics of this emergent understanding of civil society. For Ferguson human beings were naturally social and thus had always lived in some form of society; society was not 'founded' by agreement or coercion but was the result of an organic process driven by instinct and impulse.[220] Foucault sees a strong analogy between this society and the liberal idea of the economy, contending that civil society is produced by interests, which encompass, without being wholly reducible to, *economic* interests and therefore 'can be both the support of the economic process and economic bonds, while overflowing them and being irreducible to them'.[221] Ferguson's idea of society did not allow for the possibility of a pre-historical egalitarian society – even without the establishment of formal structures or institutions, it was assumed that some individuals or groups would have exercised more authority than others by virtue of differentiated talents, abilities or attributes.[222] Finally societies were viewed as inherently evolutionary, passing through recognisable stages from savagery to barbarism and finally civilisation.[223]

The emergence of society as a distinct 'natural' rather than juridical domain allows the economic subject of interests to be governed indirectly.[224] Foucault describes society as a 'transactional reality', which although brought into existence as 'part of the interplay of relations of power' is nonetheless real[225] and which represents both the condition *and* the end of liberal government.[226] Dean writes that despite the break with social contract theory, liberalism 'retains the Hobbesian problem of *order*', however with society understood as 'a kind of naturalized reality' order was reconfigured as a 'social' question.[227] Throughout the nineteenth century the extension of statistical techniques to problems of the population as well as to the investigation of 'moral' questions such as poverty and crime facilitated the emergence of a distinct social domain 'with its own regularities, laws and characteristics'.[228] These regularities were not reducible to those of population, but, as Rose writes, were 'peculiar to society itself'.[229]

As Dean puts it, the 'liberal economy of government' makes social government not just possible, but necessary.[230] Nevertheless for much of the nineteenth century attempts to confront 'social' problems were *ad hoc* and localised, the majority of which derived from philanthropic

rather than state effort.[231] Nineteenth-century philanthropy sought to work on the social by encouraging workers and families to take responsibility for their own individual security, essentially encouraging the lower classes to discipline themselves through inculcating values of prudence and responsibility.[232] By the turn of the twentieth century there was a growing sense that the state should bear more direct responsibility for responding to social problems, leading to the emergence of the two great technologies of government which underpinned twentieth-century welfarism – social insurance and social work.[233]

In contrast to earlier forms of state welfare provision such as poor relief which was funded by rate-payers, social insurance relies heavily on horizontal forms of redistribution. With the advent of 'pay as you go' social insurance schemes resources flowed not only from workers currently in employment to those temporarily out of work, but also across the life-cycle, as those of working-age were accorded primary responsibility for funding the pension benefits of the retired. Responsibility for supporting the aged was thus transferred from individual families to the collectivity, bringing into being a new form of intergenerational 'contract'. Resources also flowed to the other end of the life-cycle, as the philanthropic efforts to 'responsibilize' families, characteristic of the nineteenth century, were supplemented or replaced in many countries by publicly provided programmes for the support and regulation of child-rearing.

The main focus of social work is the well-being of children – the aim is to optimise family functioning by intervening in ways which stimulate rather than supplant parental responsibility, nevertheless there is the possibility of dismantling the family unit should this be deemed necessary in the child's 'best interests'. The legal powers to supervise and sanction 'irresponsible' parents have been in place in most Western states since the late nineteenth century, the pioneering laws of Great Britain, the product of successful campaigns by philanthropic organisations.[234] Child protection laws legitimised a high level of incursion into the private domain of the family to the extent of permitting removal of children from parental custody. This level of intervention found justification in liberal thought on the basis that the parent-child relationship does not emerge from the voluntary agreement of equal partners.[235] While parental autonomy occupies a privileged position in liberal theory it is understood as conditional not absolute. Autonomy is deemed necessary in order to preserve the 'natural' inclination of parents to promote their children's well-being, however state intervention is permissible where parents are failing to

ensure that their child will develop the capacity to act as an autonomous being in the future.[236] In effect the parental right to autonomy is de-limited by the rights of the *future adult* to have been socialised in accordance with prevailing societal norms.

## Reconfiguring social government

The range and extent of provision varied widely but public expenditure on 'welfare' benefits and services increased steadily in OECD states in the decades following the Second World War,[237] under the influence of Keynesian economic theory, which argued for government intervention as a necessary tool in managing the highs and lows of economic 'cycles'.[238] In Keynesian terms welfare provision formed part of a 'virtuous circle', by which public expenditure produced a 'reflationary' effect on stagnant national economies stimulating demand and increasing employment.[239] Foucault characterises liberalism as a form of 'critical reflection on governmental practice'.[240] For liberalism the need to safeguard against 'excessive government' is omnipresent.[241] The Keynesian 'social' or 'welfare' state was therefore the subject of trenchant critique from inception from those such as Hayek who argued that state planning and provision beyond the minimum was a potential threat to the basis of the liberal-democratic order in undermining the conditions upon which a vibrant economy and a free society depend.[242] In what has subsequently come to be characterised as 'neo-liberal' thinking, state intervention in the economy potentially undermined the incentive to work and to invest – interfering with the 'discipline of the market', thereby eroding individual initiative.[243]

Foucault's analysis of neo-liberal thought foregrounds the concept of *enterprise* and the different ways in which it was taken up by German 'Ordoliberalism' and the American brand of neo-liberalism associated with the Chicago School. As Gordon writes, the *Ordoliberalen* invert the central problem of social government to problematise the 'anti-competitive effects of society', rather than the 'anti-social effects of the economic market'.[244] Here, market freedom is seen as the product of rational design, necessitating a certain degree of government intervention in the economy, as well as a 'vital policy' which would seek to imbue the logic of the enterprise *through* social government.[245] Within American neo-liberalism, the logic of enterprise is per Foucault, 'pushed to the limit', so that 'non-economic social behaviour' as well as political decision-making becomes comprehensible and hence manageable in economic terms.[246]

In exploring the deployment of enterprise within American neo-liberalism Foucault highlights the 'behavourial economics' pioneered by Gary Becker using two specific examples – crime and human capital theory. For Becker, the 'criminal' is no longer a pathological subject, but a calculating, profit-seeking economic actor; crime control thus becomes a matter of intervention at the level of potential gains and losses, rather than through attempting individual reform.[247] Human capital theory is an attempt to approach the analysis of labour from the perspective of the worker – transforming the wage-earner from 'object of supply and demand…{to} active economic subject'.[248] From this vantage wages no longer represent remuneration for labour, but are now seen as a 'return' on 'human capital', conceptualised as the sum of the worker's inherent attributes plus acquired knowledge and skills.[249] Similarly the individual as consumer is reconfigured as active subject – the 'producer of his own satisfaction'.[250] The 'subject of needs and interests' represented by the *homo economicus* of classical liberalism is thus reconfigured in American neo-liberal thought as an 'entrepreneur of the self'.[251] As Foucault writes,

> …what is *homo oeconomicus*, economic man, in the classical conception? Well he is the man of exchange, the partner, one of the two partners in the process of exchange. … In neo-liberalism – and it does not hide this; it proclaims it – there is also a theory of *homo oeconomicus*, but he is not at all a partner of the exchange. *Homo oeconomicus* is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself. …being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings.[252]

The formation of human capital is a process which begins at the very earliest stages of life; Foucault writes that advances in the study of human genetics raise the possibility that decisions around family formation – in terms of choosing our 'co-producers' of human capital – could in the future be based on assessments of genetic potential.[253] What is of more interest to Foucault is *acquired* human capital and he deploys the example of parental interaction with the young child as a perceived determinant of this. From the vantage of the human capital paradigm the effect of parental interaction is amenable to precise measurement both in terms of units of time, but also as regards the level of parental human capital, as more educated parents are seen as more likely to provide an appropriately stimulating environment.[254]

In holding up a model of family relations infused by economic rationality behavioural economics applies the logic of the rational economic actor to the most personal and intimate spheres of human activity.[255] The decision to have a child becomes reduced to a process of balancing the intangible gains received against the direct and indirect costs incurred. The child-rearing process now becomes an *investment*, with the love, care and attention which parents bestow on their children conceptualised in terms of inputs which will eventually produce a return.[256] Similarly publicly provided childcare and educational provision can be viewed as forms of productive expenditure which promise a net yield many multiples in excess of the initial outlay.[257]

According to Foucault the *direct* application of economic rationalisation to the political and social spheres marks a break between neo-liberalism and the classical liberalism of the nineteenth century.[258] As discussed above classical liberal theory perceived a distinction between the social domain and the economic sphere of the market. Within neo-liberal thought the social is viewed through an economic lens and 'government itself becomes a sort of enterprise', capable of being analysed and evaluated in economic terms.[259] Foucault writes that the form of economic rationality deployed in neo-liberal thought 'make[s] it possible to test governmental action, gauge its validity, and to object to its activities on the grounds of their abuses, excesses, futility, and wasteful expenditure'.[260] The logic of the market is deemed the appropriate basis for all government activity – the object of governmental endeavour to minimise costs and maximise returns.[261] Such is the logic which reduces political decision-making to cost-benefit analysis with the assumption that the outcomes of 'social' expenditure – such as increased future productivity or reductions in criminal or anti-social behaviour resulting from pre-school interventions – can be expressed in quantitative terms.

The embrace of neo-liberal ideas in the context of the breakdown of the economic upheavals of the 1970s is a familiar story. While the language of solidarity was supplanted by that of enterprise and self-reliance, Rose cautions that the strategies adopted by 'new right' governments should not be regarded as a straightforward application of the ideas of neo-liberal theorists, but rather that the language of neo-liberalism served as a way of instilling diverse schemes and strategies with an over-arching authoritative logic.[262] Rose writes that by the 1990s neo-liberal ideas had begun to be taken up in a manner which transcended right-wing politics, forming the basis for an approach to

government which he terms 'advanced liberal'.[263] Deployment of the concept of 'advanced liberalism' indicates that contemporary approaches to government share some basic premises – the most fundamental of these is the notion that a national economy has given way to a 'globalized' economy which transcends political borders.[264] The economic tasks of government have thus been reoriented towards boosting national competitiveness, with social government a matter of facilitating individuals and organisations to acquire the necessary 'flexibility' to adapt to a globalised environment.[265] While emphasising that the uptake of 'advanced liberal' forms of rationalisation should not be viewed as 'a simple succession', Rose nevertheless suggests that 'the "social state" has been supplanted by the "enabling state"'.[266] Any notion that this shift can be seen merely in terms of 'an inevitable response' to external economic changes, changing methods of production or demographic shifts is rejected by Rose who is emphatic that the 'enabling state' is contingent rather than necessary, dependent upon particular forms of rationalisation, which emphasise individual initiative rather than state provision.[267]

Dean suggests that once the 'social state' came to be viewed as problematic the realisation of social imperatives was no longer to be achieved through acting upon society directly, but through a kind of 'folding back of the objectives of government upon themselves' which drawing on Ulrich Beck's notion of 'reflexive modernisation' he conceptualises as the 'governmentalization of government' or 'reflexive government'.[268] In Dean's account reflexivity is conceptualised as a mode of governing, one in which the processes of government have themselves become the primary focus of governmental concern. Dean highlights two particular technologies of government – 'technologies of agency' and 'technologies of performance' – which aim to reform governmental processes in order to promote and utilise the self-governing capacities of individuals and organisations.[269] Technologies of agency include 'contractualism' which can refer to the 'contracting out of formerly public services', but also to the extension of the logic of contract to the regulation of individual behaviour at the level of the school (for example through contractually–based codes of discipline) or through the 'good-behaviour contracts' deployed in contemporary youth justice systems.[270] An important aspect of 'contractualism' highlighted by Dean, in which its 'dangerousness' is seen to lie, is the emphasis on consensus, which contracts both depend upon and reproduce.[271] Drawing on Cruikshank, Dean[272] writes that technologies of agency also incorporate 'technologies of citizenship' which he

suggests includes those technologies of 'voice' and 'choice' which seek to promote the rights of service users, as well as techniques and practices aimed at addressing individual dependency or disempowerment. Children and young people have come to represent an important target of such 'technologies of citizenship' in recent years.[273] The increasing emphasis on children's rights, particularly autonomy rights, in the wake of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is associated with a range of novel techniques for promoting participation of the young such as school councils and children's parliaments. Evidence from governmentality-inspired research suggests that such developments should not be seen simply in terms of increased freedom of expression, but that child and youth participation can be deployed as a means of shaping subjectivity in line with socially desirable outcomes,[274] underlining Dean's point that agency is not necessarily opposed to governmental power, but can be seen as *produced* through practices of government.[275]

While technologies of agency offer novel modes of activation, technologies of performance provide new means of *regulation*.[276] In this respect, 'the devolution of budgets, the setting of performance indicators, "benchmarking", the establishment of "quasi-markets" in expertise and service provision, the privatisation of formerly public services, and the contracting out of services' are all cited by Dean as technical means by which domains of expertise from the hospital to the university can be regulated "from above"'.[277] A second form of technology of performance allows for regulation from 'below' in terms of forms of evaluation, which intersect with technologies of agency predicated on 'user rights'.[278] An example of this would be the kinds of quality assurance mechanisms deployed in third-level institutions which ask the student 'consumers' of higher education to evaluate the content and delivery of the educational 'services' supplied.

Technologies of agency and performance position the governed as 'partners' or 'customers' in their dealings with public authorities, with increased responsibility for managing their own individual risks.[279] The rise in use of such technologies has coincided with a diminution of the direct role of state agencies in many countries and the emergence of increasingly diverse 'mixed economies of welfare' with the commercial, non-profit and informal sectors assuming a larger role in the delivery of welfare services. Dean suggests that the effect of these shifts is that government has 'become more multiple, diffuse, facilitative and empowering' yet paradoxically 'more disciplinary, stringent and puni-

tive'.[280] We can understand this in terms of the greater responsibility for managing risk which has devolved to individuals and organisations. This can bring more freedom and flexibility to those with the wherewithal to take advantage of opportunities for advancement, however, for those who lack the inclination or the capacity to become 'entrepreneurs of the self' the consequences of failure have become more severe.

## Conclusion

In elaborating the concept of governmentality Foucault attempted to demonstrate that practices of governing should be seen as distinct from the exercise of sovereign power. Foucault's account suggests that the problem of governing *people* became a live political issue in the sixteenth century in the context of religious schism and the decline of feudalism. With the gradual emergence of 'the state' – conceptualised by Foucault as a mode of governing – has developed increasing political concern with the *pastoral* question of the welfare and happiness of political subjects, individually and collectively; the rise of liberal forms of government is viewed as closely linked to the development of forms of knowledge which facilitated the exercise of pastoral power over *populations*. This has particular implications for the analysis of policy in relation to children: as the population came to be seen as the central focus of government, the welfare of children came to be linked ever more closely with the 'strength' and prosperity of the nation-state, a theme which will be addressed in more detail in subsequent chapters.

From a governmentality perspective liberal forms of rule govern through freedom, as this is the most 'economical' way of exercising power.[281] Foucault makes clear that freedom must be viewed as both product and precondition of government. The free market and the free society at the heart of liberal rule are artefacts of government, but the most important lesson from the governmentality literature is that so too is the free individual upon which liberal government is predicated. While governmental rationalities depend upon some conception of the nature of the subjects to be governed, Rose stresses that this does not mean that rationalities are derived from objective understanding of the human condition; no less than objects of government, 'governable subjects' are produced through 'practices of governing'.[282] This theme is taken up in Chapter 2 which has an explicit focus on the relationship between power, knowledge, freedom and subjectivity.

# 2
# Subjects of Government

As was discussed in Chapter 1, the concept of governmentality relates to a mode of exercising power, particularly relevant to liberal forms of rule, which is predicated upon the freedom of the governed. Liberalism depends upon the willingness and capacity of free individuals to *choose* to exercise responsible self-government – an important aspect of liberal government is therefore fostering responsible, self-directing subjects.[1] Rose tells us that this is to be achieved through a range of different strategies many of which are not directly connected to centralised political power.[2] There is a multifarious range of resources to be availed of to guide the 'government of the self', but within the governmentality literature particular importance is attributed to the forms of knowledge and expertise derived from the human sciences, especially those pre-fixed with 'psy'.[3]

At the heart of the concept of governmentality are the interconnections between power, knowledge, subjectivity and freedom, which are the focus of this chapter. The first part of the chapter looks at the relationship between power, knowledge and subjectivity, drawing mainly on Foucault's work on this theme, with a particular emphasis on practices of self-government and the Hellenistic philosophical schools from which they derive. This leads into a discussion on the manner in which citizens of liberal democracies are called upon to relate to themselves as what Rose[4] calls 'subjects of freedom' and how this has changed since the nineteenth century as conceptions of self-hood grounded in morality gradually gave way to those rooted in psychological concepts. This chapter is also concerned with the way in which liberal forms of government deal with 'ungovernable subjects', that is those individuals and groups deemed unsuitable to be governed through freedom. Dean's concept of 'authoritarian governmentality'[5] is

discussed as an important tool for exploring the element of 'despotism' intrinsic to liberal forms of government.[6]

The final section of the chapter introduces the topic of the government of childhood with a particular focus on the work of Chris Jenks.[7] Jenks' contribution to thinking on childhood and power is his distinctive deployment of the Dionysian and Apollonian motifs in setting forth contrasting images of childhood socialisation, which, drawing loosely on Foucault, he associates with divergent modes of discipline. Through engaging with the literature on discipline in early modern Europe as well as with the ideas of Hobbes and Rousseau with whom Jenks associates his images of socialisation, this final section builds on Jenks account of the Dionysian and Apollonian 'children' and attempts to locate these symbolic images more firmly within a Foucauldian/governmentality framework.

## Power, knowledge and subjectivity

One of the central assumptions underpinning governmentality work is that the governable subject does not pre-exist, but is constituted through, government.[8] As Dreyfus and Rabinow write, challenging the idea of an essential subject was the core of Foucault's project.[9] While the analysis of power has frequently been taken as his central theme, Foucault stressed that his primary interest lay in the constitution of subjectivity.[10] The central question in modern Western culture relates to uncovering the essential 'truth' about ourselves, the fundamental task of the human sciences. For Foucault, the more pertinent question is what are the 'games of truth' and 'practices of power' through which we are constituted as subjects.[11] Foucault's earlier 'archaeological' work was concerned with the constitution of subjectivity via the human sciences, while the 'genealogical' *Discipline and Punish* focuses on 'coercive practices'.[12] In his later work Foucault became interested in the various practices or 'technologies of the self' by which human beings seek to transform themselves as subjects. Hence, three 'axes' are identified – truth/knowledge, power, and ethics – along which an 'ontology of ourselves' can be developed.[13]

In *The Order of Things* Foucault argues that the human sciences both depend upon and brought into being a distinctive subjectivity – 'man' – the emergence of which signifies the shift towards the 'modern' *episteme*.[14] Foucault[15] acknowledges that human beings were afforded a privileged status within both Renaissance 'humanism' and Classical 'rationalism', however he argues that not until Kant, was there the

possibility of a 'science of man'.[16] The shift towards the classical *episteme* – signified by Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* – placed the subject at the centre of the universe as the locus of knowledge production.[17] While the classical *episteme* envisaged the subject as producer of knowledge, knowledge production was conceptualised in terms of a relatively straightforward process of *representation* via the *transparent* medium of language.[18] As Dreyfus and Rabinow explain, the emergence of the modern episteme is associated with a radically altered view of representation and the emergence of a subject – via Kantian idealism – who is both constrained by the limitations of his nature and yet is able to perceive these limitations and utilise them as the foundation for knowledge.[19] Man is thus conceptualised as 'a strange empirico-transcendental doublet' which contains the key to 'what renders all knowledge possible'.[20]

The manner in which the knowledge of man produced by the human sciences intersects with mechanisms of power in the constitution of subjects is the direct focus of *Discipline and Punish,* in which Foucault delineates the links between shifts in disciplinary practices, the emergence of the human sciences and the constitution of the 'modern soul'. The 'soul' of the 'man of modern humanism' is revealed as the product of power,[21] not in an ideological sense, but in the sense that the self is shaped through micro-processes of social regulation – penal, pedagogical, supervisory – which, while directly targeted at the body, serve to act upon the individual at the most intimate and personal level:

> This is the historical reality of the soul, which unlike the soul represented by Christian theology, is not born in sin and subject to punishment, but is born rather out of methods of punishment, supervision and constraint. … On this reality-reference, various concepts have been constructed and domains of analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.; on it have been built scientific techniques and discourses and the moral claims of humanism.[22]

Foucault famously described disciplinary mechanisms as the 'dark side' of the freedoms espoused during the age of Enlightenment and the buttress of the 'juridical liberties' extended at this time.[23] Traditional forms of authority – human and divine – came under sustained challenge during the Enlightenment. While human progress was viewed in terms of liberation, conceived as the triumph of rationality over the

shackles created by ignorance and superstition, such progress is associated with the application of instrumental rationality in order to improve productivity and more efficiently regulate conduct at the individual/moral and collective/political levels through what Foucault refers to as the 'utilitarian rationalization of detail'.[24] The classical age is characterised by preoccupation with order, to be achieved by precise systems of classification and distribution; an important aspect of this was the breaking down of units into their most basic components so that even the smallest 'cog' or most miniscule action could be manipulated, managed and measured.[25] Foucault uses the examples of manufacturing workshops, military hospitals and schools as sites where disciplinary techniques were refined in the classical age. In these disciplinary settings the exercise of power depended upon and made possible detailed knowledge regarding individual attributes and capacities. It was noted in Chapter 2 that the production of individuality through the deployment of disciplinary practices represents a 'reversal of the axis of individualization'.[26] Foucault suggests that this reversal – by which 'the calculable man' supplanted 'the memorable man' – represents the genesis of the human and psychological sciences.[27]

Discipline operates on the basis of a common standard which all must meet, individualising the masses through differentiating the 'normal' from the 'abnormal'.[28] The fundamental objective of disciplinary techniques is the production of self-regulating individuals who subject themselves to the normalizing gaze.[29] Thus, Foucault suggests that as well as differentiating *between* individuals, discipline also serves to divide people within themselves.[30] Through observing and measuring our 'selves' against norms of conduct, we experience a split in our consciousness between regulator and regulated, and learn to relate to ourselves in this way. It is this conception of self-hood which has underpinned empirical investigation of the individual, providing the basis for the shift towards a 'scientific' and psychological mode of subjectivity.[31]

Danziger writes that the source for the 'divided self' as object of empirical investigation is to be found in Locke's (1690) *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*,[32] the seminal text of the 'new humanism' of the Enlightenment period.[33] From the vantage of Locke's sensationalist epistemology consciousness represents the core of self-hood: our sense of personal identity arises from conscious *perception* of our thoughts, feelings and actions.[34] Danziger suggests that the notion of the divided self as observer and observed becomes fully developed in the late-Enlightenment moral philosophy of Adam

Smith.[35] In Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* the self is conceptualised as two distinct entities or 'persons': the 'I' as 'examiner and judge' and the 'I' 'whose conduct is inquired into'.[36] For Smith the standards to be applied in scrutinising the self were to be derived from the perspective of one's peers in the form of the 'impartial spectator',[37] (a concept which, according to Michael and Michael,[38] Smith derived from the Greek philosopher Epicurus by way of the Roman Stoic Seneca). Danziger writes that the shift laid bare in Smith's model of regulation towards monitoring of the *self* rather than of his/her *actions* and from religious standards towards norms derived from *society* is evident from about the late eighteenth century, underpinning the subsequent rise of the social and psychological sciences.[39]

The rise of psychology has facilitated the mapping of the human interior to bring new ways of conceptualising, categorising and managing selves and novel objects of inquiry have been constituted to form the basis of therapeutic intervention and empirical investigation.[40] In particular the discovery of the 'unconscious', associated with the development of psychoanalysis, has served to open up the interior for examination through deployment of confessional technologies,[41] while various technologies for measuring normality have been made possible through the aggregation of psychological statistics.[42] As developed in the early twentieth century intelligence testing permitted ever-finer distinctions between individuals, allowing demarcation of the 'feeble-minded' from the merely backward,[43] while the invention of 'personality-typing' provided the means to render the very essence of self-hood accessible to the psychologist's gaze.[44] Such technologies provide important examples of the intersection of biopolitical and disciplinary norms as statistical averages from large-scale data sets were deployed as normative standards by which the inner attributes and capacities of individuals could supposedly be gauged.

Foucault's research on practices of ethical self-formation in the Ancient Greek and Roman worlds throws into relief the modern Western preoccupation with the interior world of the subject. Whereas for us, the precept 'know your self' has overtaken all other forms of ethical injunction, Foucault suggests that the central principle for the Greeks, was *epimeleisthai sautou,* or 'care of the self', which encompassed, but was broader than, self-knowledge.[45] We should note here Danziger's[46] salutary reminder that care of the self in ancient Greek thought was not conceptualised principally in relation to individuality or uniqueness. Neither were an individual's public utterances and actions typically regarded as separable from some kind of authentic,

private self.[47] Hence what Foucault refers to as the 'ethical substance'[48] – the aspect of the self that is to be acted upon when individuals engage in practices of self-regulation – is for the Ancient Greeks or Romans of a radically different kind to that which informs practices of self-government today or indeed (given the mutability of ethical thought and practice) at any other time.

The starting point for Foucault's examination of ancient ethical practices is Plato's *Alcibiades*. The advice which Socrates delivered to his aristocratic young protégé serves as a basis for comparing the precepts and practices concerned with care of the self in Platonic philosophy with those of the Hellenistic and Roman schools, such as the Stoics and the Epicureans, which are in turn set against those of early Christianity.[49] In Foucauldian terms the mode of self-care presented by Plato in the *Alcibiades* is a *spiritual* practice, by which is meant that attainment of wisdom (or truth) is grounded in some kind of personal transformation or renewal rather than simply through communication of knowledge.[50] Indeed it is Foucault's contention that, with the notable exception of Aristotle, a common theme which runs through Greek philosophy, classical and Hellenistic, as well as through Roman and early Christian thought, is the interconnection between access to truth and transformation of the self.[51] The self to be cared for and transformed in the *Alcibiades* (and Platonic thought generally) is the soul and Foucault sees this particular Platonic dialogue as encompassing a shift from soul as *substance* towards soul as *subject,* in that care of the soul is not a matter of the soul being acted upon,[52] but of the soul turning towards God in order to apprehend the divine in itself.[53] Thus Foucault sees a double movement in Platonism – a simultaneous turn towards *and* from spirituality in that while care of the self is an essential prerequisite for wisdom or truth, *knowledge* of the self is privileged as the most important aspect of self-care.[54] By contrast the tendency in Hellenistic and Roman care of the self was towards activity – training and exercises – thereby focusing on the body as well as the soul, however the key point for Foucault is that regardless of how the precise relation between them was conceived, Greek philosophy viewed *care of the self* and *knowledge of the self* as inextricably intertwined, and this was the case also for the Romans and early Christians.[55]

As set out in the *Alcibiades* care of the self was a practice more or less reserved for the elite, those who would take the leading role in governing the city-state.[56] There was thus a direct link between the ethical question of care of the self and the political question of care of others, with ethical training viewed in instrumental terms as a prerequisite for

political responsibility. According to Foucault the Hellenistic schools of philosophy broke with this mode of caring for the self, positing self-care as a worthwhile activity in itself (a shift Foucault associates with Epicureanism[57]) and hence as something to be undertaken by all, or at least a wider section of society than the aristocracy.[58] Another significant modification associated with Hellenistic philosophy was the notion of the care of the self as a life-long activity rather than a form of preparation or training to be undertaken prior to the assumption of adult responsibilities.[59] Training remained a vital aspect of self-care, as evidenced by the importance of the concept of *paraskheué*, which related to preparation for the challenges of life, however Foucault finds that as preparation came to be seen as a task for all, rather than one reserved for the young, so the *corrective* or reformative aspect of training grew in importance.[60] These modifications are associated with a shift in the Hellenistic period by which 'care of the self' came to subsume the 'art of living' of which in classical Greek philosophy it had been merely one aspect; the self – or the cultivation of an appropriate relationship with the self – had become the end of existence.[61]

So what did 'care of the self' entail? Foucault identifies a variety of practices such as the acquisition of spiritual guidance or direction, writing activities including personal recordings or reflections and correspondence with others as well as the various exercises – *askésis* – characteristic of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, which were practices designed to bring about the spiritual transformation of individuals. A broad distinction is made between two forms of *askésis,* exercises in thought or *meditatio* and *gumnazein* – exercises which involved some form of extra-mental or 'real life' activity.[62] In the category of mental exercises are included practices such as examination of conscience, which had a long tradition as a form of purification rite before sleep; as deployed by the Stoics these took on the aspect of a tool for evaluation of one's actions, but crucially as a tool for self-improvement rather than instrument of penitence.[63] The peculiarly Stoic practice of formal anticipation of misfortune (as if it were certain to occur or was already in train) Foucault sees as reflecting the general suspicion with which the Ancient Greeks viewed the future; a means of 'neutralizing' the future (as a cause of anxiety or concern) rather than a preparatory exercise.[64] Foucault notes that this practice was heavily criticised by Epicureans who instead advocated practices focused on reminiscence or anticipation of pleasure, as a means of directing thoughts away from potential misfortune.[65] The practices signified by *gumnazein* are further sub-divided into exercises centred on abstinence (for example from

food or from sexual activity) and those classified as *tests*, examples of which supplied by Foucault include resolutions to practice a particular virtue such as justice or to desist from giving way to a passion such as anger for a fixed period of time.[66] Significantly Foucault sees a shift in the tests practised by the Stoics away from the sole concern with actions which characterised Platonic self-care towards concern with thoughts and intentions – it was not sufficient to curb behaviour, one should aim to repress desire.[67]

According to Foucault the spiritual transformation to be wrought through *askēsis* in Hellenistic thought can be understood in terms of the 'subjectivication of true discourse', by which is meant a form of self-fashioning involving the appropriation of 'truth' in such a way as to provide a kind of toolkit for ethical self-government.[68] In this way the subject at once takes ownership of truth and is transformed and saved by truth.[69] Within Hellenistic schools of philosophy such as Stoicism and Epicureanism ethical 'truths' and scientific 'truths' were complementary – standpoints on individual right living and the wider cosmological order were formulated in relation to each other.[70] Ethics was regarded by these schools as the highest branch of philosophy – physics and logic merely the handmaidens, of interest primarily as supports for ethical existence.[71] Stoicism and Epicureanism stand opposed to each other in respect of their views of the nature of the cosmos and the position of man within it, however they were united regarding the purpose of philosophy – to liberate individuals through 'truth' and promote the state of being most conducive to right living.

From the perspective of Stoic philosophy man is a rational creature living in a rationally ordered universe created by a rational deity.[72] Strict materialists, the Stoics believed that God's presence physically pervaded the entire universe to the extent that God and the universe were essentially a single, unified entity.[73] The deity and the cosmos divinely brought forth were understood in terms of three aspects – *pneuma,* the animating force, an admixture of the elements of fire and air; *logos* or rationality and *tonos* or tension which held everything in place.[74] There could be no random events in a cosmos infused by rationality; everything that happened occurred in accordance with the 'natural laws' which emanated from the divine reason.[75] For the Stoics reason was synonymous with virtue – a universe governed by rational principles was necessarily *well* ordered. How then to explain the presence of difficulty and vice? In Stoic philosophy much of what appeared to men to be evil was not so in actuality;[76] Foucault writes that a pervasive theme in Stoic thought is the idea of life as a test, a mode of

*askēsis* contrived by a benevolent God imbued with challenges which ultimately strengthened individuals.[77] It should be noted that the Stoics did not altogether deny the presence of evil in the world, but claimed that because it could not stem from God or nature, evil must emanate from man.[78]

For the Stoics humans could commit evil because although they were essentially rational creatures, unlike God, they were capable of thinking and acting irrationally, or more properly of utilising rationality mistakenly.[79] Perfecting the rational in the individual was therefore the chief concern of Stoic pedagogical and ethical doctrines. It is useful at this point to briefly consider the Stoic understanding of human rationality, particularly as it provides important insights into the Stoic conception of childhood, which is distinguished by its *developmental* approach to the maturation process.[80] According to Stoic belief humans were the only living beings possessed of *logos* – the *hegemonikon*, the higher part of the soul was the seat of rationality,[81] however at birth the *hegemonikon* was not yet rational; it was compared to white paper which over time is written over with information obtained through the senses.[82] While knowledge was not innate, individuals were possessed of innate predispositions or *prolēpsis*[83] (a concept which according to Brooke[84] the Stoics adapted from Epicurean thought). The predispositions (the 'seeds of virtue') had to be cultivated – only through exposure to the *logos* could they come to full fruition,[85] but there was an assumption of a pattern of development by which each individual moved from amoral, irrational, egoistic childhood to virtuous, rational, altruistic adulthood.[86] The mechanism by which development progressed was *oikeisosis* – in this context translated by Hellenistic scholars as attachment or appropriation.[87] The infant at birth is attached only to itself – the overarching impulse which drives his actions is self-preservation rooted in love of or attachment to self.[88] Following from this the infant develops attachments to or appropriates to himself particular objects, ideas or persons simply because they are essential to the overarching goal of preservation, but as he or she matures the child comes to value these objects, ideas or persons for their own sake.[89] In respect of reason/virtue the initial appropriation is because the dictates of reason ensure preservation, but the individual ultimately comes to value reason for its own sake and, as noted above, has an innate predisposition to do so.[90] If individuals were guided by reason they could not do ill, however they could – and frequently did – act irrationally by succumbing to harmful passions, disturbances of the soul caused by erroneous judgements or beliefs.[91]

Stoic ethical practices aimed at *apatheia* or the eradication of irrational passions (through correcting faulty judgements) and substitution with less intense emotional states or 'rational' passions (*eupatheia* or *constantiae*).[92] Freed from the influence of the irrational passions the rational will would invariably *choose* the good. Hence Corish suggests that Stoicism must be regarded as 'an ethics of *will*' as much as 'an ethics of *reason*'.[93]

The end goal of Epicurean ethical practices – *ataraxia* or tranquility/calmness of mind – was not too far removed from that of the Stoics. Unlike the Stoics Epicureans did not believe that tranquility could be attained by belief in a benevolent providence. Concerns about the gods and the 'afterlife' were the source of most of the anxieties and ills which troubled men.[94] Although not completely rejecting the concept of divine entities, the Epicureans sought to minimise their significance by rejecting the idea that the gods had had any hand in the creation of the cosmos or that they were in any way interested in human affairs.[95] If the universe was not created, how did it come to exist? According to the Epicureans, through a series of random collisions.[96] Epicurean physics was grounded in an atomism believed to be derived from the philosopher Democritus; the universe and everything in it – including human beings – were the product of atomic motion.[97] There were no natural laws to be obeyed, no punishment which would be inflicted after death, since at that point one would simply cease to exist.[98] Accordingly individuals should live for the present and devote themselves to happiness – the ultimate end in Epicurean thought – represented in terms of pleasure, defined negatively as the absence of pain. In justifying pleasure as the *summum bonum* or ultimate end Epicureans argued that infants are born with an innate predisposition or *prolēpsis* towards the pleasurable and away from the painful.[99] Some Stoics agreed with Epicureans on this point, but with the qualification that the impulse towards the pleasurable was derivative of and subservient to the preservation instinct.[100] For Epicureans pleasure was primary, not instrumental and reason and virtue (for Stoics the ultimate end) were simply the means of guiding individuals towards a pleasurable existence. The Epicurean emphasis on pleasure by no means represented endorsement of a sybaritic existence, since excessive amounts of luxuries (such as rich food) ultimately led to pain.[101] Epicurus famously recommended a simple 'barley cakes and water' existence – the greatest happiness was to be achieved by limiting one's desires to those easily fulfilled.[102] Thus freed by truth from concern about the afterlife as well as from ambition and avarice the Epicurean

could live out a simple, tranquil existence. Interestingly this trouble-free existence precluded marriage and child-bearing; whereas the Stoics regarded family life as a 'school for virtue',[103] for the Epicureans the pains simply outweighed the pleasures![104]

In elucidating the culture and practices associated with the care of the self, Foucault was concerned to demonstrate that austerity and asceticism were not an invention of Christianity.[105] At the same time it is made clear that although derived from Graeco-Roman culture the ascetic practices of early Christians were deployed in a fundamentally different way, with different ends in mind. As noted above, Foucault contends that the end of care of the self in Hellenistic and Roman thought was simply the self, or rather the attainment of a particular kind of relationship with the self. While Christian ethics looked to the life to come, Hellenistic and Roman practices were grounded in the idea of 'a beautiful existence' or 'living one's life as a work of art'.[106] Hence the decision to engage in care of the self was a matter of individual choice and in contrast to Christian monastic practices there were no precise prescriptions as to how and when spiritual exercises were to be performed.[107] Hellenistic and Roman practices were carried out with the end of achieving mastery over one's appetites and desires. For instance in renouncing 'the pleasures of the flesh and body' the Stoics aimed to *strengthen* the individual will.[108] For Christians obedience to God's commands was the ultimate end; the objective of Christian ascetic practices was to conquer the will itself.[109]

As in Graeco-Roman thought Christian care of the self established a particular form of relation between subjectivity and truth. Foucault writes that as a 'salvation religion {which aims to} lead individuals from one reality to another' as well as a 'confessional religion', Christianity imposes 'obligations of truth, dogma and canon' which are far more stringent than those of pagan traditions.[110] In addition to the obligation to *believe* certain truths is the obligation to *reveal* truths about oneself. In Christianity truth can only be accessed with a pure soul, derived from self-knowledge obtained through detailed examination and disclosure of one's *hidden* thoughts and intentions.[111] Whereas Stoic practices of self-examination and disclosure were tools for promoting self-mastery, Foucault points to a close association between Christian practices and self-*renunciation*.[112] Internalisation of truth in Christian monastic practices was essentially a form of rebirth – the old egoistic mode of relating to the self had to be destroyed – through identifying and neutralising the sinful impulses in the depths of one's soul – and a new mode of subjectivity established predicated

on subordination of the individual will.[113] In effect the Christian conversion process entailed a return to childhood.[114]

According to Foucault there is continuity between Platonic, Hellenistic and early Christian thought in that access to truth is a *spiritual* practice. In other words truth can only be obtained through self-transformation. Foucault suggests that medieval scholasticism can be regarded as an attempt to divorce truth and spirituality, a task undertaken more successfully by Descartes, (although Foucault stresses that there was no decisive break).[115] For Foucault, up to the sixteenth century 'truth always has a price; no access to truth without ascesis', but after Descartes immorality or lack of inner 'purity' was no longer a bar to knowledge; truth was to be accessed through *evidence* rather than ascetics.[116] Foucault regards the Kantian 'universal subject' as an attempt to bridge the gap between knowledge and ethics.[117] As McGushin elaborates, the Kantian subject must be understood as the product of *discipline* rather than ethics or spirituality; the legacy of Descartes and Kant is regulation of the body, a body 'no longer seen as an ethical practice, but rather as a biological process', an understanding made possible by the rise of disciplinary and biopolitical mechanisms of power/knowledge.[118] For Foucault, although the human sciences reconstituted practices of truth-telling and self-examination as tools for self-*fashioning* rather than self-*renunciation*,[119] the fabrication of the modern self via the human sciences cannot be understood as an ethical endeavour in the Hellenistic sense. The practices deployed in the production of modern self-hood are not associated with the idea of *living a beautiful life* but with strategies of *normalization*.[120] The emergence of the human sciences is inextricably intertwined with the rise of the two poles of bio-power – discipline and biopolitics – and the modern subject is produced at the intersection between the two.

Foucault's exposition of ancient ethical practices is not intended to imply that these can be readily adapted to the circumstances of modern societies, but he argues that studying these practices demonstrates that it is possible to disassociate ethical issues from scientific knowledge.[121] In other words it is possible to deploy 'technologies of the self' in ways which challenge rather than support normalization,[122] and which provide alternatives to what Rose[123] refers to as the 'psychologized, interiorized' mode of relating to the self that is characteristic of modern, Western, liberal societies. 'Technologies of the self' are defined by Foucault as technical means of self-transformation which operate on 'bodies, souls, thoughts, conduct and way(s) of being' – these representing the 'ethical substance' to be worked on – 'in order to

attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality'.[124] For Foucault, working upon the self in this way is not a means of *liberating* some essential, authentic, self, but a means of actively *creating* the self 'as a work of art'.[125]

While the notion of the ethical care of the self as a 'practice of freedom' implies resistance to power,[126] Foucault is also clear that technologies of the self can be implicated in relations of domination and control.[127] The interface between technologies of the self and technologies of domination is what Foucault attempts to convey through governmentality.[128] Rose suggests that we can think of this in terms of the various means by which we form ourselves as members of a liberal society, adopt personal desires and ambitions which align with broader social and economic goals and actively work upon ourselves – on our bodies, our minds – in order to achieve those goals.[129] In the process, we come to relate to ourselves as individuals of a particular kind. This is not, of course, simply a matter of individuals adopting the policy imperatives set out in government programmes. Liberal government of individuals operates primarily, not through laws or regulations, but, as Rose writes, through the 'infiltration of the dreams of authorities and the enthusiasms of expertise into our realities, our desires, and our visions of freedom'.[130]

## Subjects of freedom

Conceptions of freedom shift over time and thus the ways in which we are constituted – and constitute ourselves – as subjects of freedom are historically contingent. Rose traces a series of mutations in our understanding of freedom over the last century or so from the idea of freedom as discipline in the nineteenth century, to that of solidarity for much of the twentieth century to contemporary understandings of freedom in terms of personal autonomy, each of which are linked to different ways of constituting and acting upon the individual citizen.[131] These ideas are echoed by White and Hunt, who observe a link between shifts in 'the ethical requirements of effective citizenship' and the widely acknowledged transition from an understanding of subjectivity in terms of *character*, characteristic of Victorian thought, towards one grounded in *personality* in the twentieth century.[132]

White and Hunt associate the Victorian understanding of character with the last vestiges of an undemocratic political order, arguing that with the weakening of property and masculinity as qualifying conditions, character served as a means of de-limiting citizenship status.[133]

The idea of character as the basis for citizenship can be viewed in historical context as broadly continuous with the emphasis on individual restraint which accompanied state formation and the gradual development of citizenship in the early modern period. Drawing on the terminology of John Stuart Mill, Valverde refers to internal constraint as 'despotism over the self', which she views as the core of the liberal project.[134] As White and Hunt suggest, an important way in which 'despotism over the self' found expression in the nineteenth century was through the concept of 'character'. By their account, 'character' signified a form of self-regulation based upon *respectability*, a concept which encompassed virtues such as 'theological orthodoxy' and 'sexual probity'.[135] For Victorians, the idea of respectability had strong gender and class connotations; appropriate male attributes derived from bourgeois values such as a strong work ethic, self-control and the ability to delay gratification, while female attributes related to their domestic and maternal roles.[136] According to White and Hunt the idea of character must also be seen in the context of comparisons between nations in the formation of national identity: as an individual and national project, nineteenth-century 'character-building' drew on the discourse of 'degeneration' in emphasising the importance of the physical and moral 'uprightness' of each of the individual citizens 'who were the organic cells of the national body'.[137] Character was to be produced via a dual process of 'hardening' of body and mind, a task accomplished primarily in childhood through methods of socialisation, which would appear harsh by today's standards.[138]

The ascendancy of personality in the twentieth century is associated with changing practices of self-formation. The displacement of character by personality is associated by White and Hunt with the rise of psychology and the emergence of a form of 'care of the self' in which the aim of respectability was replaced by *individuality* and 'the quest for a unique self'.[139] They see this shift in the context of the emergence of consumer liberalism suggesting that the 'project of personality encourages the expression of individuality through the structured choices of the marketplace'.[140] Politically the rise of personality is associated with the shift towards a more pluralistic public sphere where citizenship is exercised in diverse domains for example in the sphere of consumption, or the level of local 'communities'.[141] In terms of welfare provision, increasing emphasis on enhancing the autonomy of individual citizens is exemplified for White and Hunt in the move towards private/voluntary rather than social/compulsory forms of insurance.[142] The project of personality is thus firmly located in the context of a

value-system in which 'flexibility' and 'reflexivity' have taken precedence over 'uprightness'.[143]

While the aim of 'character building' was to inculcate habits, which would develop into settled character traits, White and Hunt suggest that 'personality…does not involve a fixed set of attributes but focuses on self-realization, self-esteem and fulfilment'.[144] Rose supports this identification of contemporary subjectivity with conceptions of freedom in terms of self-realisation and choice.[145] Before discussing Rose's account, however, it is important to point out that the broad sketch offered by White and Hunt, as they themselves acknowledge, oversimplifies the break between character and personality. (For instance, in a more recent essay White[146] herself foregrounds the emphasis placed upon character as an expression of individuality in nineteenth-century thought, particularly in the writings of John Stuart Mill.) It could also be argued that White and Hunt pay insufficient attention to transitions in conceptions of citizenship, conflating the liberal citizenship of the nineteenth century with the form of social citizenship characteristic of twentieth-century 'welfare states'.

In associating the transition from character towards personality in terms of a broad shift from the Victorian self towards the self-maximising, subject of consumer capitalism, White and Hunt's work reflects the broad thrust of predominantly North American cultural history. As Heinze writes, this line of reasoning, particularly associated with the work of Walter Susman, depicts 'a linear shift from hypermoral verities to hypersocial vanities' at the turn of the twentieth century, as Victorian values of moderation and restraint gave way to the emergent consumerist ethos.[147] By contrast, historians of psychology present a more complex picture in which the distinction between personality and character appears as part of a conscious strategy on the part of psychologists to render the individual knowable and manageable on an 'objective', scientific basis.[148] In the shift from character to personality, we thus have a transition in terms of 'technologies of government', whereby the individual was to be rendered measurable in relation to scientific norms. These did *not* however, at least in the early decades of the twentieth century, necessarily represent a decisive break with the past.

Examining the work of the 'father' of personality psychology, Gordon Allport, Nicholson suggests that Allport's drive to displace character with the more modern and scientific sounding 'personality', was motivated by a desire to 'bridge the divide between science and ethics'.[149] Allport's work was related to the deployment of personality

as a practical tool which could transcend the 'moral baggage' associated with the idea of character and lend itself to objective analysis.[150] Nicholson observes a duality of themes in Allport's conception of personality. On the one hand, Allport was concerned with uniqueness and individuality, although paradoxically Allport's personality tests were designed to facilitate the identification of one particular type, the extrovert 'go-getter'. In this respect, Nicholson suggests that Allport's 'implicit valorisation of the 'go-getter' reflected his consciousness of shifts in the conceptualisation of self-hood in the rapidly changing cultural context of early-twentieth-century America.[151] On the other hand, Nicholson argues that in his elaboration of personality, Allport was also concerned to retain the Victorian values he had absorbed in youth, retaining in the concept of 'personality traits' the Victorian notion that individual action is driven by a 'relatively stable core of inner attributes'.[152] Personality formation was regarded as resulting from the successful integration of these traits, so that in early twentieth-century psychology, self-realisation referred to the *integration* of personality, rather than self-actualisation or self-fulfilment.[153]

As it developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, integration was a central concept in personality psychology, giving way in the 1920s and 1930s to the concept of *adjustment*.[154] Writing in the American context, Heinze argues that the differentiation between 'character' and 'personality' made in the early psychological literature had 'little to do with a rising consumer culture and much to do with a rising public awareness of personal and national identity as "split"'.[155] Heinze demonstrates an explicit correlation in the American literature from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century between concerns around the 'fragmented self' and anxiety around 'hyphenated Americanism' in the context of an ethnically divided society.[156] While centred on concerns around race and immigration in the American context, on a broader level the ideas of integration and adjustment signified the 'fit between the individual and his or her social roles'.[157] The mal-adjusted individual personality had its correlate in national instability; conversely, well-adjusted individuals contributed towards a 'unified national psyche'.[158]

The concern around the question of social integration that permeated psychological discourse in the first half of the twentieth century was reflected in the development of *social citizenship* which offered integration through the emergent welfare state and the associated concept of social rights. Predicated in Rose's terms upon a notion of 'freedom as solidarity', social citizenship is regarded as encompassing

duties as well as rights, signifying a particular mode of citizenly conduct.[159] In this respect, Rose suggests that T.H. Marshall's seminal essay on *Citizenship and Social Class* can be read as an attempt to set out the ethical *obligations* of the social citizen.[160] This reading of Marshall is fleshed out somewhat by Burchell who argues that Marshall's conception of social rights is closer to an elaboration of the *attributes* than *rights* of citizens.[161] Dean too adopts this line, suggesting that Marshall 'smuggled in' the concept of rights to an elaboration of the *pastoral* functions of the state.[162] Marshall argued that social rights accrued to *society as a whole* rather than to individuals.[163] In relation to this point Hindess suggests that the social services – in particular public health and compulsory education – can be regarded as the means to produce 'useful' citizens.[164] While he suggests that Marshall underemphasises this aspect of social rights it is interesting to note that in a later essay, Marshall makes clear that those without the capacity to become 'useful' citizens (such as people with disabilities) do not receive state benefits *as of right*.[165]

Marshall's conception of social rights was elaborated in an attempt to respond to the question of whether social rights could ameliorate the inequalities thrown up by the capitalist system. Marshall was optimistic that social rights could facilitate access to a shared civilisation which would cut across class divides. Social rights could serve as a form of social leveler, not so much through the obliteration of income disparities but through the harmonisation of living standards brought about by state provision of social services. As Hindess writes, Marshall is more concerned with the achievement of social integration than with socio-economic equality *per se*, that is, that citizens have equivalent status and live according to the same values, notwithstanding disparities of income and wealth.[166] It is thus not insignificant that education was the earliest 'social right' accorded in embryonic welfare states and that this 'right' was one which individuals were compelled to avail of.

An important theme in accounts of contemporary 'advanced liberal' or 'reflexive' forms of government is that the concept of social integration has to a large extent given way to an emphasis on diversity and concern with local rather than national allegiances. White and Hunt argue that this loosening of bonds between citizenship and the state has had the effect of accentuating individual autonomy, but in a form that extends the logic of consumer choice to the political domain.[167] Hence they contend that political decision-making predicated on the public good has been displaced by appeals to the interests of indi-

viduals or groups, and the logic of consumerism has come to permeate all aspects of civil society.[168] Rose's account of contemporary freedom suggests that we have come to relate to ourselves through the rubric of choice via 'two interrelated clusters of technologies', which are drawn from the domains of consumption and 'psychotherapeutics' respectively.[169] Writing that throughout the twentieth century, marketing techniques have drawn on psychological knowledge and expertise to encourage the association of identity with 'lifestyle' consumption, Rose argues that over time these mechanisms of relating to the self have been extended beyond the domain of consumer goods to govern realms of human behaviour previously regulated in terms of morality or tradition.[170] Thus, decisions in relation to personal relationships, marriage and child-bearing – and, as White and Hunt suggest, political preferences – are located within a conception of human behaviour framed in terms of 'lifestyle choice'.[171] The logic of choice is reflected in 'psychotherapeutic' knowledge and techniques, which aim to equip individuals to navigate the journey towards empowerment and self-fulfilment through reshaping the manner in which we relate to ourselves.[172]

Rose suggests that the spread of the psychotherapeutic to almost every domain of human existence means that many important aspects of human experience have been rearticulated in the language of 'personal growth'.[173] Today a vast range of resources such as self-help books, radio and television programmes (and more recently online resources and 'apps') are available to help us work upon ourselves – for example as parents, as workers, as lovers or as friends – in order to achieve self-realisation through the application of 'psy' expertise.[174] In a very real sense then, Rose contends that contemporary 'subjects of freedom' are called upon – via the marketisation of therapeutic expertise and the psychologisation of market choices – to actively strive towards perfecting the self. Writing at the turn of the millennium, Rose argued that an important factor in the durability and adaptability of the neo-liberal discourse of enterprise is its deep resonance with this 'new regime of the self'.[175] The emphasis on self-transformation is perhaps an even more pronounced feature of the politics of 'activation' associated with the Third Way as well as more recent austerity-driven rationalities of rule. Sharing the conventional New Right assessment of social rights as passive, the relationship between citizen and state in discourses of activation is reconfigured on the basis of 'reciprocity', forging a direct connection between access to state benefits and services and the willingness (and capacity) to actively (and continuously)

work upon one's own 'marketability'. The general effect is to shift responsibility for success or failure from society to the individual, creating the need for 'flexible' subjects, equipped with a high degree of reflexivity and willingness to adapt to rapidly changing economic conditions.[176] There is a certain resonance between the current emphasis on 'life-long learning' and the re-conceptualisation of *parakshué* in Hellenistic thought from a task to be completed prior to entering public life to a process spanning the entire life-course, albeit with maximising return on investment rather than creation of a 'work of art' the end goal.

## Authoritarian governmentality

A particular strength of the concept of governmentality is its utility in analysing the complex interrelationship between freedom and coercion and in highlighting the 'costs' endured by those who for whatever reason are deemed incapable or unworthy of exercising freedom responsibly.[177] In understanding the relationship between coercion and freedom, Dean's concept of 'authoritarian governmentality' is a useful tool. Dean makes a distinction between three distinct forms of non-liberal or authoritarian rationalisation – firstly, non-liberal forms that are integral to liberalism, secondly, non-liberal forms 'which gain a certain legitimacy within liberalism', and finally 'non-liberal forms of rule proper', that is forms of rule which are regarded as illegitimate from a liberal perspective.[178]

Taking these in reverse order, within what we might think of as illegitimate forms of authoritarian government the exercise of sovereign power is not limited by the rights of a juridical subject.[179] Drawing on Foucault's examination of German National Socialism Dean argues that the form of authoritarian government adopted in Nazi Germany had in common with liberalism the imperative to govern in the interests of the population, and hence can be regarded as a particular formulation of sovereignty and biopolitics.[180] In *Society Must Be Defended* Foucault traced the emergence of the counter-revolutionary discourse of state racism, which converted the revolutionary discourse of 'race struggle' to that of 'racial purity', redefining the function of sovereign power in terms of protecting the 'race'. This mandate was given expression in nineteenth-century liberal rule in terms of the problematisation of certain classes of the population as dangerous or deficient, however the approaches adopted centred on strategies of moralisation or normalization rather than annihilation.[181] While liberal forms of govern-

ment contain juridical limits against biopolitical excesses these are not shared by authoritarian forms of rule such as fascism or Stalinist-style socialism.[182] Hence the biopolitical imperative to protect the race against 'contaminatory elements' could be taken up to the extent of 'disallowing' life.[183]

The kind of murderous tyranny associated with twentieth-century fascist or communist regimes is repugnant to liberalism, however various forms of 'benevolent despotism' have nonetheless been found congruent with liberal rationalities at various times.[184] The idea of *benevolent* despotism relates to nations whose inhabitants are regarded as incapable of self-government and therefore must be subject to authoritarian rule 'for their own good'. The concept is derived by Valverde from the work of John Stuart Mill whose thoughts on the 'good despot' (i.e. the ruler who exercises power 'despotically' in order to bring about improvement of his subjects[185]) serve as a philosophical justification for colonial government.[186]

A central theme of the literature on governmentality is that 'despotism' is not confined to authoritarian/colonial forms of rule but is an integral component of liberal government.[187] Drawing on the work of Valverde, Dean notes that the fundamental form of authoritarianism integral to liberalism is self-tyranny or 'despotism over the self'.[188] Whether the Victorian subject of moral rectitude or the contemporary 'entrepreneur of the self', the liberal subject is expected to be capable of self-scrutiny, restraint and delayed gratification. As Valverde puts it, freedom of choice is reserved for those who deploy their reason to make the *right* kind of choices.[189] Even within liberal societies, however, there exist many who are deemed incapable of conducting themselves in this manner. Thus, as Dean suggests, a fundamental issue for liberal forms of government is distinguishing between those who possess the capacity for self-government and those who must be regulated by coercive means.[190]

Rose writes that in the nineteenth century the idea of 'character' served as a mode of differentiation between those capable of self-government and those who were not; disciplinary enclosures or 'colonies' served an important function in relation to the normalization of those 'who lacked or refused this moral character'.[191] Institutions such as workhouses, asylums, reformatories and homes for 'fallen women' each dealt with particular categories of deviant, while those such as industrial schools acted as a kind of prophylactic technology designed to defend society against the 'pre-delinquent' by transforming them into 'useful citizens'. As discussed in Chapter 1, the spread of discipline has

not been confined to enclosed institutions. The 'swarming' of disciplinary mechanisms described by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* refers to the extension of techniques of surveillance and regulation throughout the general social body. Over the course of the twentieth century, the importance of enclosures declined somewhat with a corresponding rise in the importance of forms of regulation such as social work which sought to work on individuals and families in their own environments, operating through what Donzelot describes as the 'tutelary complex'.[192] Tutelary modes of social regulation have not *replaced* the carceral. For example, despite the development of a range of alternative strategies such as probation and community-based sanctions detention remains an important mechanism in the government of youth crime.

Staying with the example of youth crime recent years have seen the development of techniques which target the self-regulating capacities of young offenders as through programmes of restorative justice. Analogous developments can be observed in the management of individuals with mental health issues, the homeless and other 'deviant' or marginalised welfare-dependent groups.[193] An important theme in the contemporary literature on governmentality is that the increased autonomy these 'self-activating' measures promise cannot necessarily be seen unambiguously in terms of 'progress' since implied in these kinds of responses is the allocation of an increased burden of responsibility to marginalised individuals.[194] The current era of austerity is marked by an intensification of the activation agenda as governments seek to reduce the numbers of recipients of 'passive' welfare benefits, with greater willingness apparent to apply sanctions against those who fail to comply. Increasingly personal autonomy is seen as the preserve of those equipped with the resources to adapt to fluctuating labour-market conditions, while coercion of the less fortunate can be justified, in Valverde's terms, as a necessary form of benign 'despotism'.[195]

## Governing childhood

Historically and today, children represent the largest group within the population who are deemed incapable of exercising responsible citizenship and who therefore must be subject to a high degree of external constraint.[196] Drawing on Boswell, Kennedy notes that for much of Western history full 'adulthood' was the preserve of a privileged elite, in the sense that a large proportion of pre-modern populations remained subject to a high level of external regulation or 'mastery' for

their entire lives.[197] Liberal democratic forms of government are premised on equality of entitlement to the basic freedoms guaranteed by law upon attainment of the age of majority. Gradually since the nineteenth century citizenship rights – civil, economic, political – have been extended to all adults in liberal democracies, irrespective of class or gender. Hence, in theory at least, the end-point of childhood for *all* children is becoming a responsible citizen capable of exercising control over the self.

Drawing on archetypal images of childhood the work of Chris Jenks provides an interesting take on the changing patterns of socialisation associated with the apparent shift from external to internal forms of control in the modern West. Jenks argues that two particular images of the child – the child in terms of innate goodness and the child as innately evil – have a potency that transcends the religious, political or scientific discourses, which have variously reflected and reproduced them.[198] Referred to by Jenks as the Dionysian and Apollonian models of childhood, he suggests that they belong to no particular culture or historical period but are so pervasive that they can be regarded as 'mythological'.[199] Jenks argues that representations of childhood are 'always revealing of the grounds of social control' in the sense that dominant constructions of childhood 'reflect the changes in the organization of our social structure'.[200] The Dionysian and Apollonian 'children' are thus regarded as representative of models of social relations premised on contrasting modes of control.

Named for the Greek God of wine and revelry, the Dionysian child is characterised in terms of wildness, willfulness, sensuality and self-gratification.[201] In Western culture this view of childhood has been shaped by the Christian doctrine of 'original sin', which emphasises the innate propensity towards evil with which infants are born. As Gittins points out, from this perspective childhood innocence is *achieved* or 'enforced' (via baptism and 'training') rather than inherent.[202] Coming into the world as intrinsically flawed, children are in need of careful training as a remedy for the inherent weakness in their nature, a perspective which according to Wall is typically associated with prioritisation of the paternal role in child-rearing and an emphasis on community involvement.[203] The potentially dangerous aspects of the child must be repressed and opportunities for transgression limited.[204] The object of socialisation is to stifle rather than nurture the child's natural instincts. This image of childhood serves as the touchstone for a model of child-rearing, whereby adults exercise tight controls over child behaviour; control over children is backed up by force,

if necessary, the act of physically chastising the recalcitrant child serving, per Jenks, as an affirmation of collective values.[205]

The Apollonian child represents the dominant, modern, Western conception of childhood. Named for the Greco-Roman sun god, the Apollonian child is 'the heir to the sunshine and light, the espouser of poetry and beauty'.[206] The Apollonian child signifies a view of the child as symbolising goodness and purity, associated with valorisation of the 'nurturing' role of mothers.[207] As Jenks puts it, 'this is humankind before Eve or the apple'.[208] Represented as otherworldly or angelic, children are to be cherished and safeguarded. Exercising control over children is to be achieved not through domination, but through encouragement and guidance.[209] The Apollonian child underpins 'child-centred' approaches to care and education in which the child is accorded the freedom to develop his or her own interests and talents; this model is reflected in the development of 'special' toys, games and resources designed to appeal to the young, and in the expectation that children should be free from cares or concerns of any kind.[210]

The model of child-rearing signified by the Dionysian image, whereby adults exercise strict controls over children, is associated by Jenks with 'the old European order', governed by rigid codes of behaviour with little opportunity for individual expression.[211] Jenks associates the philosophical formalisation of the Dionysian child with Hobbes's *Leviathan* – drawing a parallel between the exercise of parental authority and the all-powerful monarch of absolutist government.

> The power of the monarch, and thus the power of the parents, is absolute and stands over and above the populace or children who have no rights or power. ... The powerful ogre of the state or the parent is omnipotent and the individual is saved from the worst excesses of him or herself by contracting into the society or the family. The life of the child without parental constraint is anarchistic; indeed its childhood would surely be 'solitary, nasty, brutish and short' without such control.[212]

The Apollonian image of childhood is linked to 'the new order of modern industrial society' in which an emphasis on shared values is displaced by a premium on individuality and uniqueness.[213] According to Jenks the formalisation of the Apollonian child is represented by Rousseau's *Émile* and the model of 'regulated liberty' contained therein. In what Jenks refers to as the post-Rousseauian order children

are no longer 'beaten into submission', but they are subject to more wide-ranging and continuous, if less visible, forms of supervision.[214] The Apollonian child belongs to a different economy of power than the Dionysian, to a mode of social control, at once more individualised, subtler and more insidious, and here Jenks draws an explicit parallel between the Apollonian child and Foucault's account of the rise of disciplinary power.[215] For Jenks, the Apollonian child symbolises the rationalisation of social control, as the primarily repressive, *external* means of exercising power of pre-modern regimes gave way to the productive, *internal* disciplinary mode.[216]

Jenks's Dionysian and Apollonian images of childhood provide an elegant way of representing models of socialisation grounded in divergent understandings of the nature of children and, by extension, human nature itself; on the one hand is a model of socialisation in which externally-validated values and norms of behaviour are inculcated into the morally suspect child, on the other an approach to child-rearing which is aligned with the inherent qualities of the virtuous child. These images provide useful tools for conceptualising the links between constructions of childhood and child-rearing and wider patterns of social and political relations, however a note of caution is necessary. A particular danger of using models of childhood in this way is that complexity and contingency may be sacrificed for a cohesive narrative. In this respect Jenks' account risks reifying two distinct 'social orders' – the pre-liberal/authoritarian order of pre-modern Europe and the liberal capitalist order of modern industrial societies – characterised by conceptions of childhood and practices of child-rearing which stand in direct opposition to each other. Although Jenks acknowledges that the Dionysian and Apollonian images have been deployed within the same time periods,[217] his emphasis on 'social orders' tends to elide the wide variation both in strategies of social control and in constructions of childhood (for example by class or gender) at various points in time, as well as the significant differences to be found in individual child-rearing practices. Arguably an analogous criticism could be levelled at Foucault's analysis of disciplinary power[218] (somewhat modified in Foucault's later work on governmentality), however a key point of differentiation is that Jenks' account of childhood and social control, although drawing loosely on Foucault's account of discipline, appears to be grounded in divergent social structures rather than the close scrutiny of the inter-relationship between knowledge and power which is the hallmark of a Foucauldian/governmentality approach.

From a governmentality perspective the Dionysian and Apollonian images of childhood can be regarded as symbolic targets of configurations of disciplinary power/knowledge which have their own history, but whose deployment is not confined to any particular historical period and which are not rooted in social structures. By engaging with the literature on governmentality, as well as that on the history of childhood it is possible to arrive at a slightly different interpretation of the manifestations of disciplinary power which these images can be seen to represent. Returning first to the image of the Dionysian child Jenks's account links this with the 'spectacular' mode of exercising power associated with the eighteenth-century public execution described in the opening passages of *Discipline and Punish*.[219] The torture and dismemberment of 'Damiens the regicide' is a particularly 'spectacular' instance, not of *disciplinary* power, but of the *sovereign* power of life and death. This seeks not to reform the wrongdoer, but to administer punishment. Such ritualistic displays of power aimed to instil obedience through fear. Here the violence upon which juridical power is founded is nakedly displayed; those who threaten the authority of the sovereign will be severely dealt with. Arguably such a model of power is inadequate as a tool for illuminating child-adult relations even in the supposedly 'brutal' past. Evidence from the historical literature suggests that while obedience may have been the leitmotif of early modern parenting, even Puritan parents, who Jenks associates with particularly harsh child-rearing methods, did not habitually use violence to 'break' the wills of their children.[220] Despite the connotations of external violence the practices associated with breaking the will are concerned with guiding behaviour from the *inside* and even the most fervent advocates of 'will-breaking' generally regarded corporal punishment as a last resort.

In elucidating the model of the Dionysian child, Jenks follows Ariès in noting increased concern with the moral susceptibility of children in the sixteenth century. This he associates with a model of parenting which emphasised 'distant and strict moral guidance, through physical direction'.[221] It is widely accepted in the literature that the sixteenth century represents a turning-point in terms of attitudes towards children with a greater emphasis placed on the need for protecting children from corrupting influences and guiding them towards appropriately moral behaviour. This is not necessarily associated with adult violence or brutality towards children; rather it is connected to efforts to shape young souls in accordance with moral and religious strictures, reflecting the increased emphasis on individual and social

discipline in the early modern period, a phenomenon which has been examined from a variety of different perspectives and levels of analysis. While the interpretations differ, there is a shared assumption that in parallel with the rise of 'modern' political and economic institutions the locus of social control has gradually shifted inwards,[222] a shift with far-reaching implications for children.[223]

For Weber the shift in *mentalité* brought about by the Protestant Reformation and *Calvinism* in particular was the main force behind the model of acquisitiveness and self-discipline peculiar to capitalism and, as elaborated more recently by Gorski, ultimately the rationalisation of Western society, of which the innovation in administrative and regulatory practice associated with the early modern state are among the most significant aspects.[224] In *The Civilizing Process* Norbert Elias's analysis privileges the state itself, pointing to the increasing importance of etiquette and manners as a means of status differentiation in early modern Europe as the exercise of power became increasingly centralised.[225] By contrast, Foucault's account in *Discipline and Punish* foregrounds the role of techniques and practices of power/knowledge in both the constitution of the state as well as the fabrication of subjectivity. The lectures on governmentality extend the analysis towards the rationalities of rule associated with the emergence of the centralised state in the early modern period, with a nod to the political, social and economic context (specifically the Protestant Reformation and break-up of feudal structures) in which these rationalities were refined, taken up and deployed.

A number of commentators have remarked upon the intersection between the work of Foucault on discipline and governmentality (as well as the respective theses of Weber and Elias) with the writings of the much less well known German sociologist Gerard Oestreich on Neo-stoicism.[226] In his lectures on governmentality Foucault makes brief reference to the links between the revival of Stoicism in the sixteenth century in the context of the burgeoning interest in 'conducting conduct'[227] and notes a reorientation of early modern philosophy towards concern with the government of the self, characteristic of Hellenistic thought.[228] While highlighting the common concern with 'conduct' which permeates early modern discourse on government, whether of selves, of souls, or of states, Foucault does not explicitly explore the influence of Stoicism on political government, a question which is directly dealt with by Oestreich who views Neostoic thought, in particular that of Justus Lipsius, as one of the most important influences during the process of early modern state-building.

According to Oestreich the development of the standing armies, bureaucratic methods of administration and police ordinances which were fundamental aspects of the early modern state were directly influenced by Lipsius's brand of Christianised Neostoic political philosophy and the emphasis therein on *virtue* (understood in terms of discipline/self-restraint) in respect of ruler and ruled.

In his recent study of the influence of Stoicism on Western political thought Christopher Brooke notes that Oestreich's work has come under fire of late, from commentators arguing that Lipsius's political philosophy, owes far less to Stoicism than Oestreich supposed.[229] In particular critics have pointed to Lipsius's tolerance of duplicity on the part of political rulers.[230] Reviewing the various critiques, Brooke argues that rather than seeing 'Machiavellian' elements of Lipsius's philosophy as deviations from Stoicism, their incorporation can instead be regarded as an attempt to shore up the 'mirror for princes' genre (Senecan in origin and orientation, according to Brooke) in the face of the challenge posed by Machiavelli.[231] Brooke writes that Lipsius's prince must be distinguished from that of Machiavelli in that his actions and commands aimed at the good of the *state*, conceived not in terms of the interests of the prince but as 'an integrated unity of the prince and the people'.[232] The sacrifice of a modicum of princely virtue was a necessary evil, permissible for the sake of the 'greater good'. Brooke notes, however, that, while Lipsius moved away somewhat from the Stoic conception of virtue as it pertained to rulers – specifically with reference to the virtue of constancy – he placed a particularly strong emphasis on the constancy of the ruled.[233] Lipsius's treatise on moral philosophy *De Constantia* was intended as a contribution to the promotion of virtue among subjects.[234] Written against the background of political upheaval and military conflict *De Constantia* enunciates the conventional Stoic position that while one cannot control external circumstances one should aim to control oneself.[235] The precepts set out by Lipsius emphasised virtues acceptable to Christianity such as patience, endurance and self-discipline. This would enable vicissitudes to be borne with fortitude and courage and promote obedience to the will of the Prince.[236]

While the philosophy of Lipsius has received a great deal of attention in the post-Foucauldian governmentality literature,[237] van Krieken makes the salutary point that perhaps the most fruitful exploration of the disciplined subject would take Stoicism rather than *Neo*stoicism as its starting point.[238] Certainly it can be argued that, whether examined at the level of rationality or technology, the exercise of power in early

modern Europe was influenced in multifarious direct and indirect ways by Stoic thought and practice. As noted in Chapter 1 Foucault posits the monastery and the military – each shaped by Stoic practices – as the inspiration for early modern disciplinary mechanisms of power. Stoic philosophy indirectly entered into Western thought through writings of Christian thinkers from Augustine to Aquinas, but by the late Middle Ages much of the surviving writings of Roman Stoics had been recovered (Osler and Panizza write that Seneca's works had been recovered by the late thirteenth century).[239] It is mainly through Roman Stoicism, in particular Seneca's writings, that Medieval and Early Modern Europeans encountered Stoic ideas.[240] Editions of Seneca's works were produced by the humanist scholar Desiderius Erasmus, as well as by the Reformed theologian John Calvin.[241]

Stoicism was not the only Hellenistic school in which there was a revival of interest in the early modern period. In particular we must note the importance of Epicureanism to early modern philosophy and science generally and to the thought of Hobbes and Rousseau in particular. For obvious reasons Epicureanism had always been condemned by Christian thinkers (as it is today),[242] remaining on the margins of Western thought throughout the Middle Ages. In any case until the fifteenth century few original Epicurean texts were available.[243] Among the many manuscripts unearthed by the endeavours of Renaissance scholars was the text of *De Rerum Natura*[244] by the Roman philosopher Lucretius, an exposition of Epicurean philosophy in poetic form which exercised a profound influence on early modern thought. Lucretius's poem provided an account of the nature of matter and the creation of the cosmos grounded in atomism. It also offered an evolutionary explanation of the origins of life and the rise of civilisation, which emphasised the arbitrary, random manner in which life had taken shape.[245]

Despite the popularity of Lucretius's poetry the core tenets of Epicureanism were on the surface at least no more acceptable to early modern Christians than they had been during the Patristic Age. A number of scholars have noted, however, that a degree of common ground existed between Epicurean thought and that of the most influential of the Church Fathers, Augustine. This was rooted in a common antipathy towards Stoicism, particularly Stoic teaching on virtue. Following Lafond, Pierre Force writes that the Augustinian view of post-Lapsarian human nature as inexorably driven by self-interested passions – in direct contradiction of the Stoic view of the essentially rational basis of human activity – is to a large extent congruent with

the Epicurean emphasis on pleasure as sole motive force.[246] Indeed the resurgence of Augustinian doctrine associated with the Jansenist movement is regarded as a significant factor underpinning the acceptance of Epicurean philosophy in the seventeenth century.[247] There is no neat divide to be made between Epicureanism/Augustinianism and Stoicism in the early modern period. For instance Lipsius's Neostoicism is regarded as having been shaped by (or at least by a need to conform to)[248] Augustinian doctrine; Waszink writes that Lipsius presents coercive political authority as a necessary mechanism for the promotion of peace and order in the context of man's corrupted nature.[249] Nonetheless, Lipsius's thought was grounded in a concept of virtue, which, according to Brooke, encompassed an understanding of human potentiality which was at odds with that presented in the Augustinian or Epicurean traditions.[250]

Largely through the efforts of the French philosopher, scientist and Catholic priest Pierre Gassendi, Epicurean ideas were in the seventeenth century reformulated in a manner which rendered atomism compatible with the concept of a divinely created universe by reconceptualising atoms as particles created by God, who was also represented as the original source of the motions that propelled atoms – a cosmology held by among others Descartes and Hobbes.[251] Gassendi's exposition of Epicurean thought also created a space for the deity in the school's ethical teachings, a radical reorientation considering the teachings were explicitly designed to exclude the divine. At the heart of Epicurean ethics is the notion of happiness – in this life – as the ultimate end; virtue is subordinate to happiness, the means by which happiness is obtained.[252] Gassendi's neo-Epicureanism introduced changes that rendered Epicurean ethics more acceptable to Christian doctrine by linking happiness to 'natural law' or divine providence; by God's design virtuous action was *inherently* pleasurable.[253] Force writes that in this Gassendi was following Augustine who argued that post-lapsarian man could only be guided by *pleasure* not by *reason*.[254] As Michael and Michael[255] note, the introduction of providentialism brings Gassendi's neo-Epicureanism closer to Stoic thought, however Force emphasises that the manner in which providence operates to order human affairs is viewed very differently within the Augustinian tradition from which it was imported than by the Stoics. Where Stoicism is grounded in the idea of an inherent harmony between instinct and reason, individual and cosmos, the Augustinian position was one by which evil (the selfish passions of individuals) was providentially transmuted into good (orderly commerce and law-based government).[256]

A related, if much more controversial perspective, was set out in Bernard Mandeville's *The Fable of the Bees* which from its appearance in the early eighteenth century brought forth a deluge of (predominantly critical) responses.[257] Mandeville – whom Force positions firmly within the Epicurean/Augustinian tradition – set out a vision of society in which the self-interested actions of vice-ridden individual 'bees' nonetheless contributed to the overall good of the 'hive'.[258] Hundert writes that in elaborating on his thesis in subsequent volumes Mandeville foregrounded the Epicurean foundations of the *Fable*, presenting an evolutionary (as opposed to providential) model of the origins of society in which competition for resources was represented as the motor of progress.[259] Individuals were motivated by self-interest – their passions and instincts, though not necessarily virtuous, could yet contribute to the greater good.[260] The subsequent re-evaluation of the passions associated with increased acceptance of this view[261] was closely linked to the rise of the Apollonian model of childhood.

**Hobbes and Rousseau on childhood**

Commenting on the influence of Stoicism and Epicureanism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Osler and Panizza write that in different ways early modern thought can be understood in terms of 'the interplay of one set of ancient models with another'.[262] What is most relevant regarding this interplay of ideas in relation to the government of childhood are the divergent conceptions of virtue inherent in these models and their relationship to different ideas of self-love. The ideas of both Hobbes and Rousseau were shaped by this dynamic interaction of Stoic and Epicurean philosophy, as was the manner in which their writings were received.[263] In various ways then, the images of the Hobbesian/Dionysian and Rousseauian/Apollonian 'children' were directly and indirectly shaped by Hellenistic ethical thought.

Like the Stoics and the Epicureans Hobbes looked to the cradle to gain perspective on the innate nature of man and his 'cradle argument' resonates with that of the Epicureans in that from birth children are driven to pursue pleasure although what they are driven to avoid is *danger*, rather than pain. These instincts or 'affections of the mind' in themselves were not evil, although they could lead to evil actions.[264] Infants could not commit evil acts because they lacked reason. In Hobbes's view evil could be regarded simply as the lack of reason and discipline in those who had reached an age by which both should have been attained,[265] which, as various commentators have noted, was a view not unlike that of the Stoics.[266] While humans could not be

regarded as inherently evil, in the absence of proper education and training, the unbridled passions would inevitably lead to wickedness. Hobbes famously rejected the contention that human beings were 'born fit' for society, arguing that such a view sprang from 'our too slight contemplation of human nature';[267] he believed that men must be '*made* fit' for society.[268] Noting that in the original Latin version of *De Cive* it is via *disciplina* that citizens are produced, a term which most English translations have rendered into education, Burchell (along with others such as van Krieken[269]) contends that Hobbes should be understood as referring to discipline in its broadest sense.[270] Discipline encompasses, but transcends education, to include the various means by which individuals learn to regulate their conduct in accordance with particular ends or as Burchell puts it are 'made fit' for citizenship, an understanding of citizen formation which he argues is indebted (either directly or indirectly) to Lipsian Neostoicism.[271]

Where virtue must be inculcated into the Dionysian child, the Apollonian child is inherently 'good', but in line with Rousseau's prescriptions must be preserved from the corrupting influences of society. The Rousseauian vision of humanity stands in contrast to Hobbes's view of human nature and is associated with a quite different conception of social and political relations. There are nonetheless strong points of agreement between Hobbes and Rousseau, which Melzer argues, that, although widely acknowledged, have tended to be underemphasised in the literature.[272] Hobbes and Rousseau each deploy the ancient trope of the 'state of nature' to represent conditions prior to the establishment of formal political structures. Although there are significant points of divergence in how Hobbes and Rousseau viewed the state of nature, they were agreed that anarchy and misery were ultimately likely to reign.[273] The means of escaping the wretchedness of the state of nature is the creation – via the 'social contract' – of a civil society in which political authority was derived from the sovereignty of each of its individual members.[274]

At this point I want to turn briefly to the analysis of Carol Pateman on the *gendered* nature of the social contract set out in the writings of Hobbes, Rousseau and other contract theorists such as John Locke. Pateman argues that the social contract which is conventionally understood as an instrument for the defeat of patriarchy in fact substitutes a *fraternal* form of patriarchal rule for the previous *paternalistic* model.[275] Social contract theorists were writing in opposition to patriarchal theories such as that of Filmer in which sovereignty was grounded in the 'natural' right of fathers. It is Pateman's contention that while social

contract theory refuted the *paternalist* elements of patriarchy by substituting the natural liberty of (adult) sons for the natural right of fathers, the second dimension of patriarchy – the dominion of husbands over wives – was left relatively untouched. Fundamental to the social contract is the separation of the public political sphere from the private sphere of the family in which women (and minor children)[276] were subject to male authority.[277] It is important to bear this in mind in thinking about the implications of the respective ideas of Hobbes and Rousseau for thinking on childhood; their concerns lay chiefly with the political sphere and their writings on education directed primarily towards the education of the *men* who made up the commonwealth.

The essence of the commonwealth envisaged by Hobbes and Rousseau is the rule of law to which all men are equally subservient.[278] Melzer argues that Hobbes and Rousseau both perceived the chief threat to stability in most societies as lying in the potential for 'political subversion by the ambitious few' made possible by the 'misplaced obedience' of the masses, a threat which could be countered by insistence on the supremacy of *positive* law over any 'natural or supernatural' claims to authority.[279] Political sovereignty – the right to legislate – was grounded in the agreement of autonomous equals, since all were equal and autonomous in the state of nature.[280] Foucault writes that the sovereign, for Rousseau, as much as for Hobbes, was in essence what he was in medieval juridical theories – 'the person who can say no to any individual's desire'[281] – but within social contract theory each individual has *consented* to this negativing of desire.

Foucault reminds us that questions related to the legitimacy and limits of political authority were framed very differently in the respective epochs in which Hobbes and Rousseau were writing,[282] a change related to the emergence of the 'naturalised' domains of 'population' and 'economy' discussed in Chapter 1 and, of course, the material and intellectual contexts in which these new ways of conceptualising the objects of government took place.[283] For Foucault the Hobbesian social contract can be regarded as an attempt to delineate principles of *government*, but one which 'remained at the level of the formulation of general principles of public law'.[284] At the time Rousseau was formulating his ideas, governmental reason had, in Foucault's terms, been 'unblocked', released from the inadequate models of sovereignty and family which framed governmental thought in the seventeenth century by the reconceptualisation of population and associated emergence of political economy as instrument of government.[285] Foucault

emphasises that this did not lead to the 'elimination' of 'the problem of sovereignty' but rather rendered it 'more acute than ever'.[286]

The key problem to which eighteenth-century theorists were responding related to the juridical limits to be placed on governmental power, having regard to the 'natural' limits associated with the domains of population and economy.[287] Foucault identifies two approaches to this problem, which he represents as distinct but not necessarily opposing.[288] The 'radical' approach which starts from government conceptualises limits in terms of the usefulness or utility of government intervention, while the 'revolutionary' approach, of which Rousseau is the foremost proponent, takes law as its starting point and conceptualises limits in terms of rights.[289] Where the radical/utilitarian approach is premised on 'saying yes to' and *channelling* desire, Foucault suggests that Rousseau, like Hobbes, must 'legitimize {the} "no" opposed to individual's desire and found it on the will of these same individuals'.[290]

For Hobbes the individual citizens who make up the commonwealth were driven by potentially conflicting personal interests and desires. They must be educated to appreciate the duty to *subordinate* individual desire to the will of the Leviathan, whose laws act as the most effective check to threats to peace and prosperity from within or without.[291] Rousseau conceptualised law, not as the will of the legislator, but as an expression of the 'general will', understood in terms of the *public interest*.[292] His educational programme aimed to produce citizens whose 'particular wills' were *in alignment with* 'the general will'.[293] This was to be accomplished by preserving, perfecting and mobilising the *inherently* good qualities of the individual.

Explicitly rejecting the Augustinian doctrine of original sin, Rousseau famously argued that in society rather than man's inherent nature was to be found the source of evil.[294] The solitary 'natural man' presented in Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality* was innocent of vice. Possessed only of basic needs which were easily satisfied the man of nature was completely self-sufficient and thus was lacking in envy or malice. As has been frequently noted in the literature Rousseau's account of the state of nature follows a trajectory close to that set out by Lucretius[295] – 'natural man' moves from a state of solitary self-sufficiency to a peaceful primitive society which is eventually corrupted by the introduction of technology and private property.[296] Rousseau's account of the state of nature has also been linked to the myth of the 'Golden Age', an ancient trope, beloved by the Stoics, which Reckford argues, Lucretius has ostensibly rejected, but inadvertently incorporated into his

account of the origins of civilisation.[297] Roche writes that in the prehistorical Stoic 'Golden Age' the earliest people were characterised by a childlike innocence and an innate understanding of the dictates of perfect reason (*recta ratio)*, an image of humanity which resonates strongly with the model of the Apollonian child as *naturally* virtuous from birth. Like Adam and Eve the people of the Golden Age ultimately lost their innocence; avarice and ambition undermined the peaceful, egalitarianism of this early society leading to the debasement of reason to *ratio quidem* (reason of a sort) and consequent need for coercive forms of government.[298]

The myth of the Golden Age underlines one of the key themes of Hellenistic thought – the dangers associated with over-reaching. In different ways Stoic teaching as well as that of the Epicureans emphasised the importance of limiting desires to the attainable.[299] The idea of tempering the will is an important aspect of Rousseau's educational programme, the aim of which was to avoid debasing dependency. Rousseau speaks of two kinds of dependency – dependence on *men* and dependence on *things*.[300] The first was to be avoided as the source of 'every kind of vice'[301] as once children feel that their needs are to be met by other people this leads to attempts at manipulation or coercion and ultimately frustration and resentment.[302] Conversely if they come to believe that satisfaction of their needs depends upon the laws of nature (what is physically possible) the desire to control others does not arise.[303]

Rousseau advocated a pedagogical approach based on 'regulated liberty', a discovery-based approach to learning, aimed at achieving what Melzer[304] views as his ultimate goal – freeing men from misplaced subservience to authority.[305] This approach was designed to ensure that boys would become adults who were capable of governing themselves, rather than ending up as the 'credulous dupes' which methods grounded in authoritative knowledge and rules would produce.[306] Ultimately Rousseau wished to produce men who would be governed by reason, however he did not accept that it was either possible or desirable that reason should fully conquer the passions,[307] a position he shared with Hobbes. Where Hobbes saw utility in appealing to the lower passions such as fear and acquisitiveness, which he regarded as the underpinnings of civil society,[308] Rousseau's method of education emphasised and supported the natural goodness of the passions,[309] reducing (although not eliminating) the necessity to curb them through reason. The product of Rousseau's educational methods would thus possess qualities which were neither superficial nor easily

dislodged by a change in circumstances since they sprang from the child's nature rather than externally-derived precepts.[310]

Rousseau famously opposed the use of reason as a pedagogical tool, arguing that since reason was the *end* of education it could not also serve as the *means*.[311] A child educated through Rousseau's experiential methods would gradually *develop* the capacity to reason. Until that capacity had developed, the use of reason with children was self-defeating.

> Nature would have them children before they are men. If we try to invert this order we shall produce a forced fruit, immature and flavourless, fruit which will be rotten before it is ripe; we shall have young doctors and old children. Childhood has its own ways of seeing, thinking and feeling; nothing is more foolish than to try and substitute our ways; and I should no more expect judgement in a ten-year-old child than I should expect him to be five feet high. Indeed what use would reason be to him at that age? It is the curb of strength, and the child does not need the curb.[312]

Rousseau's model of maturation echoes that of the Stoics in that childhood is regarded as *qualitatively* different from adulthood and that children do not simply grow they develop.[313] Rousseau did not carry out his own investigations of child development, but in significant ways his work anticipated the key concerns of subsequent scientific inquiry. In her examination of the nascent 'science of childhood' of the Enlightenment Benzanquen highlights two important themes emerging in the late eighteenth century, 'the developing child' as object of empirical knowledge and pedagogical intervention and the notion of childhood experience as the key to adult identity, both of which, as she suggests, are prefigured within Rousseau's writing.[314] These two themes were of course central aspects of the more formalised study of childhood of the nineteenth century which presaged the advance of developmental psychology. The idea of the 'child as father to the man', so central to the Romantic Movement which claimed inspiration from Rousseau, was at the heart of Freud's schema of psycho-sexual development. The quest to apprehend the developmental process was a key concern of the first generation of psychologists studying children, a quest addressed more systematically in the large-scale psychological studies of the early twentieth century from which were derived standardised norms against which individual development could be benchmarked.[315] If we follow Jenks in viewing the Rousseauian 'natural' child as the genesis of the Apollonian image of childhood in modern

Western thought we can therefore see the Apollonian child as the symbolic target of a mode of power/knowledge tied to a form of 'truth' which is rooted in the 'nature' of things and thus grounded in science, rather than morality or religion.

## Conclusion

The central lesson from Foucault is that there is no essential subject, subjectivity is contingent, produced through scientific knowledge, relations of power, and also through the various ways in which we seek to transform ourselves. From a Foucauldian perspective changing conceptions of subjectivity are thus not merely the consequence of cultural shifts, but are shaped by changing practices of government, understood broadly in terms of the various forms of strategy and tactic by which the conduct of individuals is shaped by themselves or others. Drawing from the work of Foucault and Rose this chapter has presented a broad sketch of changing relations towards the 'self' in Western culture. Foucault tells us that Greek ethical practices emphasised *care* of the self as a means of promoting self-mastery – a matter of freeing the will from the influence of erroneous thoughts and feelings. Within Christian practices of government the willing self was itself to be renounced, a notion which gave way to the more positive evaluation of self-hood of the human sciences. The need for renunciation was retained to an extent, in the Enlightenment belief in the subjugation of the passions to reason as a prerequisite for knowledge and freedom, although the view that certain passions could be usefully *channelled* or *harnessed* was increasingly influential. The rational 'disciplined self' was an important aspect of nineteenth-century liberalism and is reflected in the idea of character, associated with practices of self-formation grounded in morality. Between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries character was gradually displaced by personality. With this shift the norms by which we shape ourselves are increasingly derived from science – from our 'nature' – rather than from externally-derived religious or moral codes.

As we have seen Jenks associates Hobbes and Rousseau with two contrasting models of socialisation which the Dionysian and Apollonian images of childhood are used to represent. While Jenks associates these images with divergent social orders I have argued in this chapter that from a Foucauldian perspective the Dionysian and Apollonian models of childhood must be looked at in terms of shifting relations of power/knowledge. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, the

shift from the model of socialisation represented by the Dionysian child to that associated with the Apollonian child in the Western context is connected to a gradual transition in the forms of knowledge through which the target of disciplinary practices was comprehended, that is, from norms grounded in religion and morality to those derived from empirical knowledge of our 'nature'. This transition is thus linked to the transformation of discipline brought about by the emergence of biopolitical mechanisms of power/knowledge.

The Dionysian child represents a mode of socialisation which is aligned with the Hobbesian conception of human nature, which as we have seen, was not that man is *inherently* evil, but of virtue as acquired, a perspective which resonates with what Pierre Force refers to as the Epicurean/Augustinian conception of human nature. The idea of acquired virtue has a strong affinity with the idea of socialisation in terms of *character* formation, which, as discussed above, is associated with inculcating habits which conform to socially approved standards of conduct. The Apollonian child represents a distinct break from models of socialisation aiming at inculcating virtuous habits and in the modern Western context resonates with a more 'scientific' conception of human nature associated with the rise of psychology and an understanding of subjectivity in terms of personality. Grounded in the notion of the *inherent* goodness of the child and of maturation as a natural process of *development* this image of childhood resonates with the cradle argument of the Stoics. It would however be misleading to suggest that either Hobbes or Rousseau could be read as straightforwardly Epicurean or Stoic; rather the Dionysian and Apollonian images of childhood can be viewed as influenced by the interaction between Stoic and Epicurean, as well as Augustinian (among other) ideas.

In this chapter we have looked at shifting conceptions of childhood and child-rearing in broad, schematic terms. We know from the literature that there have been significant changes since the sixteenth century, however it is important to stress that there was no sharp transition but, as Foucault would say, a series of mutations in prevailing ideas about childhood and child-rearing which were closely connected to developments in practical techniques for governing children. Over the chapters which follow I will explore in more detail the (gradual, uneven and incomplete) changes in the government of childhood which have occurred in the Western world from the sixteenth century to the present.

# 3
# Disciplining Childhood

This chapter is primarily concerned with early modern childhood, the period roughly from the beginning of the sixteenth century until the eighteenth century, when the image of the Dionysian child was at its zenith. We tend to think of this period as an era of innovation and discovery, a time when gateways were opened from Europe to new worlds, literally and figuratively. According to the once startling, now overly-familiar contention of Philippe Ariès it was in the early modern age that childhood – a concept unknown to the Middle Ages, at least in terms of how we understand it – came into view. There was, of course, no single model of childhood in the early modern period no more than had been the case in the Middle Ages. The experience of childhood has always been mediated by such differences as socio-economic background, gender, race/ethnicity and regional location.[1] Nevertheless it is possible to identify some common features which distinguish early modern childhood from childhood in medieval societies. As Ariès suggests, among the most salient of these is participation in schooling.[2] In the Middle Ages only a minority of children attended schools. For most young people preparation for adult life did not rely heavily on formal instruction, instead knowledge and skills were acquired through observation and experience. Hence Ariès argues that boundaries between the world of children and that of adults of the kind we take for granted today were not so much a feature of medieval life.[3] Instead of being confined in dedicated children's spaces the young were integrated into the wider community from a relatively early age. Gradually over time the socialisation process was 'disciplined', with ever finer demarcations made on the basis of chronological age underpinning the development of specialised knowledge and institutions for the guidance and supervision of the young.[4] This

occurred in the context of a more generalised drive to discipline and moralise European society which, according to Ariès, emerged from around the fifteenth century, within which the question of the education of the young was accorded particular prominence.[5]

The aim of this chapter is to explore what we might call the 'problematization' of childhood in early modern discourse and the implications for the manner in which children and families were governed. Given the prodigious importance of Christianity generally, and the doctrine of original sin, in particular, to constructions of childhood in the West an examination of the doctrine and its broader theological context is provided as a preliminary to the main discussion. This introductory section draws on the work of Michael Gillespie on the influence of nominalism on the reconceptualisation of divine-human relations in the late middle ages in a manner which he argues had a profound impact on early modern thought. This is followed by discussions on Renaissance humanism, religious schism and the natural and moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes with reference to children and education. The remainder of the chapter is concerned with the government of children and families with a particular emphasis on schools and schooling.

## The conceptual building blocks of early modern childhood

Ariès suggests that the emergence of a 'new' concept of childhood was first apparent in the sixteenth century in terms of increased private sentiment of adults towards their children in the family domain.[6] This attitude ('coddling') referred to the amusement and enjoyment adults derived from childish attributes. While drawing on a few sources reflecting this attitude towards children, Ariès writes that 'coddling' is 'better known to us from the critical reactions it provoked' from contemporary observers.[7] In the eyes of the moralists and educators – lay and religious – who recorded their disapproval children required strict discipline and moral guidance rather than sentimental indulgence.[8] It is of course highly possible that it was *criticism* of coddling rather than coddling itself which was novel in the sixteenth century, or as Wilson has argued, it may simply be the availability of sources from this period which brings the suggestion of novelty, evidence regarding attitudes towards childhood prior to the invention of the printing press being much more difficult to access.[9] According to Luke printing technology was itself an important factor in the transformation of attitudes towards children, permitting the rapid dissemination and exchange of

ideas on topics such as education in a manner not previously possible.[10] In tracing the emergence of what she refers to as the 'pedagogical discourse' Luke is particularly interested in the role of printing in spreading the educational ideas of Protestant reformers, but at least as important were the contributions of humanist scholars, in particular those of Erasmus whose *Handbook on Good Manners for Children* was one of the most popular publications of the sixteenth century.

For Ariès the reconceptualisation of childhood connected with the rise of the pedagogical discourse was associated with an emphasis on childish *innocence* which he claims was hitherto lacking.[11] Ariès argues that up to the seventeenth century children were not generally sheltered from knowledge of sexual matters. Drawing on the diary of Heroard, physician to the young Louis XIII (born in 1601), in support of this claim, he notes that the young dauphin was positively encouraged to participate in sexual ribaldry until he reached the age of seven, after which he was shielded from allusions to sex until puberty.[12] Contra to Ariès, it is possible to argue that children under the age of seven (the age of reason) were exposed to sexual banter as they were deemed unlikely to grasp its full significance, certainly concern to shield the dauphin *after* he had turned seven[13] points to that conclusion. Consequently the growing preoccupation with sexual modesty which Ariès finds traces of from the fifteenth century might better be seen in terms of growing recognition of the *corruptibility* of children, a shift associated with the humanist emphasis on the malleability of childhood, rather than reflecting a *novel* conception of childhood innocence.

Historians have demonstrated that the idea of innocence was strongly associated with childhood throughout the Middle Ages,[14] although there is no denying that the perceived relationship between childhood and innocence, shaped as it was by Christian doctrine, was neither straightforward nor uncontroversial. Throughout the history of Christianity there has been an ongoing dialogue between those who argue that children come into this world tainted by the original sin of Adam and those who regard young children as symbolic of man's prelapsarian idyll in the Garden of Eden. The former view is most closely associated with Augustine who held that sinfulness is transmitted through generation: the act of reproduction itself contaminates its fruit.[15] By contrast, St. John Chrysostom, while agreeing that sin was passed on through the generations, nevertheless believed that *infants* were inherently innocent, born free from the effects of inherited sin.[16] Ultimately it was the Augustinian view which prevailed, endorsed by

the Council of Carthage in the early fifth century and attaining the status of official dogma of the Catholic Church on the authority of the Council of Trent in 1545.[17] While not even new-born infants were regarded as free from original sin this was cleansed by the rite of baptism.[18] While sin was washed away, baptism could not undo the corrosive effects of original sin on human nature. This was understood by Augustine in terms of *concupiscence*, an inherent tendency towards evil caused by the ascendancy of the passions over the rational faculty.[19]

The question of childhood innocence had such deep significance for Augustine and the Church Fathers because of its perceived relevance to understanding the essential characteristics of human nature.[20] Augustine was wedded to a view of human nature as inherently sinful since the necessity of Christ's sacrifice – the major theological question of the time – would otherwise have been very difficult to comprehend.[21] Nevertheless, while he drew on observations of very young children displaying signs of 'greed' or 'jealousy' as evidence that sin is present from birth, Stortz contends that Augustine did not view children as 'evil' or 'depraved'. Noting that the literal meaning of innocence is 'not-harming' she argues that the concept of 'non-innocence' is most apt in apprehending Augustine's understanding of the moral status of infants.[22] Although he saw them as imbued with sinful impulses, infants were physically incapable of harmful action.[23] While infants could not personally commit sin, from Augustine's perspective this was not sufficient to save them from the fires of hell if they had not been baptised. Committed as he was to the idea of corrupted human nature he saw no alternative but eternal torment for those who died without receiving the sanctifying grace of baptism.[24] This view was deeply distressing to many (including Augustine himself, according to Stortz[25]) since on a practical level infants were clearly innocent of wrongdoing and thus undeserving of punishment. A solution to this dilemma was put forward by St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century – unbaptised children were henceforth presumed by Catholics to have been consigned to an eternal half-way house referred to as 'limbo'.[26] Although deprived of the bliss of the divine presence, these 'non-innocents' were at least spared the torments reserved for the damned.

Aquinas built on Augustine's teachings in other ways too, deploying the Aristotelian four-fold conceptualisation of causality in elucidating the doctrine of original sin.[27] As Wiley explains, the formal cause of original sin in this schema was the loss of the 'original justice' or the

capacity to will good, which God had bestowed on Adam through his sanctifying grace. Following Augustine, Aquinas understood the material cause of original sin as concupiscence, the disorder of the soul which elevates passion over rationality.[28] The agential (or efficient) cause of original sin was human willfulness, while the instrumental cause was sexual reproduction, the means through which each of the descendants of Adam inherits a nature tainted by sin.[29] Wiley writes that the emphasis on loss of 'original justice' as formal cause means that Aquinas (following Anselm) adopted an ontological perspective on original sin – associated with lack or deprivation of what had been an aspect of prelapsarian human nature – in contrast to the *moral* conception associated with Augustine.[30] The ontological conception of original sin associated with Thomas was later adopted by the Council of Trent, the Augustinian 'moral' doctrine by Protestant reformers.[31]

**The freedom of the will**

The doctrine of original sin was formulated in the context of wider questions about the relationship between God and the highest of His creations, serving as a means of negotiating various tensions within Christian thought which were exceedingly difficult to reconcile. As Gillespie explains, the problem of the origins of evil in the world was closely connected to the question of free will versus predestination,[32] a problem grappled with by the Stoics in the pre-Christian era[33] and which is perhaps the defining question of Western thought. Scripture presents Christians with a picture of 'an omnipotent and omniscient God' who created man 'in His own image', however if humans were not merely creatures, but enjoyed free will, they were obviously capable of *choosing* evil.[34] These issues were aired in debates between mainstream Christians and adherents of Gnosticism; the doctrine of free will provided an important counter-argument against the belief of Gnostics in the *inevitability* of sin.[35] There were serious challenges, however, in squaring free will with divine omnipotence.[36] Early Christianity was riven by conflicts over this dilemma, which were never entirely resolved, although the extreme of each position – Manichaeism and Pelegianism – were condemned as heretical.[37]

Originating in the third century as an offshoot of a Christian sect, Manichaeism was a dualistic belief system rooted in the Gnostic division between spirit and matter and evincing stern disapproval of the – sinful – material world.[38] Manicheans posited the existence of two deities, representing the forces of light and darkness respectively, a worldview which left little room for human agency, representing man

as a weak, ineffectual creature, a site in which the battle between good and evil was played out.[39] The obvious problem was that humans were effectively absolved from accountability for sin.[40] Gillespie writes that in denouncing this view, Augustine – a former adherent of Manichaeism himself – deployed a somewhat novel concept of free will.[41] The prevailing understanding – inherited from Stoic thought – was that the will could not act independently of reason; if the will erred it was because the rational faculty itself had gone astray.[42] Augustine was committed to the view that evil was the product of *active* human choice.[43] He understood the capacity for reason as divinely imbued – the 'image of God' in Man.[44] By definition sinful behaviour offended against rationality, but since it was the result of an act of volition, will and reason must be considered as distinct.[45]

In later years Augustine came to modify somewhat the conception of free will which he had deployed against the Manicheans, as a consequence of his evolving views on the question of grace.[46] In his anti-Manichean writings Augustine had held that while Man was capable of choosing evil, due to the corrupting effects of original sin he could not will good.[47] He had, however, suggested that individuals possessed of the *aspiration* to will good would be assisted by God's grace.[48] McGrath points to correspondence with Simplicanius (395–396) as the first enunciation of a shift away from this position. In responding to the query of Simplicanius in relation to God's 'hatred' of Esau, Augustine concludes that salvation is predestined; the gift of grace was not linked to human endeavour.[49] These ideas were deployed in Augustine's subsequent confrontation with Pelagianism.[50] A contemporary of Augustine, Pelagius rejected the idea that human nature had been corrupted by Adam's sin, holding that sin was transmitted through *imitation*, rather than *generation*.[51] Clearly of a more optimistic bent than Augustine, Pelagius argued that possession of free will implied the potential to choose good as well as evil, a position potentially at odds with the Christian emphasis on the necessity of divine redemption,[52] (and which early modern Augustinians viewed as continuous with Stoic thought).[53] In his debate with the Pelagians Augustine emphasised that postlapsarian man cannot but choose ill, although with divine assistance he can yet be redeemed.[54] According to Stump Augustine's position was rooted in the idea that man's corrupted will was unable to satisfactorily command itself – the ego or self is a 'willing being' torn between competing 'first order' inclinations and unable to complete satisfactorily the 'second-order' task of willing itself to will the good.[55] Since Augustine held that it was impossible for humans to

choose the good without grace, human beings could not obtain grace through desert; the decision to bestow grace – and thereby grant salvation – was thus entirely at the discretion of the almighty Creator.[56]

**Dualist divides**

The Church Fathers did not derive their ideas about the respective natures of God and Man exclusively from scripture, but were strongly influenced by contemporary interpretations of Greek and Roman philosophy.[57] Passmore writes that the influence of Platonic ideas (filtered through Neoplatonism) during the Patristic Age contributed to a model of Divine perfection at an almost impossible remove from the Christian conception of sinful human nature.[58] Loosely inspired by Plato's theory of forms the Christian God came to be seen as a simple, eternal, indivisible, perfect, being, the epitome of all that is whole, beautiful and good.[59] The Platonic view of *human* nature rested upon a division between a sensual body and a rational soul which represented the divine or god-like aspect of man.[60] This dualism has been linked to the influence of Orphic beliefs on Plato's thought. Grounded in a creation-myth by which the human race emerged from the ashes of the Titans, who suffered the wrath of Zeus for murdering and *eating* his son Dionysus, the Orphic religion viewed human nature as an admixture of the divine and the earthly.[61] Ascetic practices were advocated in order to promote the ascendancy of the divine element over the mortal body, represented pejoratively as the 'tomb of the soul'.[62] Like the Orphics Plato viewed the soul as constrained and corrupted by its 'imprisonment' in the body.[63] Represented as a 'form-like' substance the Platonic soul could not be regarded as perfect while connected to a body, but as an incorporeal, eternal substance (like all forms) it was *capable* of perfection.[64]

As noted in the previous chapter Foucault observes a 'double movement' in Platonism – in that while there is an emphasis on 'spiritual' practices or care of the self as essential prerequisites for knowledge, those practices are fundamentally concerned with *knowledge* of the self rather than *care*.[65] The aim is to grasp the divine through a turning in of the soul upon itself. According to Foucault Platonism served as the 'leaven' for various 'spiritual movements', including those associated with Gnosticism,[66] which centred on knowledge (*gnosis*) as a means of apprehending and liberating the 'divine spark' entombed in tainted flesh.[67] An offshoot of Christianity Gnosticism propounded an eschatology centred on the knowledge Jesus Christ came to share, rather than on his physical sacrifice.[68] Gnostic asceticism was rooted in a deep

suspicion of the corporeal – the body was evil and so therefore was the sexual reproduction of bodies, beliefs shared by the Manicheans.[69] Foucault argues that the ascetic practices of Christian monks in the fourth and fifth centuries were consciously developed in opposition to Gnosticism and thus the Platonic mode of spirituality which underpinned Gnostic ascetics.[70] Christian asceticism looked instead towards the alternative model of spirituality represented by Stoic *askēsis* in which the aim was not 'recognition of the divine element' but a continual testing or evaluation of the self.[71] These were practices underpinned by 'suspicion of the self'[72] rather than suspicion of the body. Colish[73] writes that early Stoic philosophy was rooted in concern with challenging the dualism of mind/soul and matter. In the unitary theory of the Stoics the cosmos, God, the body and the soul were all material substance; Colish writes that for the early Stoa, at least, there was no perceived division between intellectual and sensory processes, each under the control of the *hegemonikon,* although she notes that a form of 'psychological' dualism in terms of a demarcation between irrational and rational parts of the soul was a feature of some later Stoic writings.[74] Although the Stoics did not regard body and soul as constituted from different substances, they did perceive a division between the two[75] and certainly among the Roman Stoics there is evidence of negative attitudes towards the body. For instance Synnott finds particularly pejorative terminology in the writings of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius,[76] while Seneca advocated severe treatment of the body so that it would *obey* the soul.[77]

Dualism has lingered throughout Western history as a source of controversy and conflict, ostensibly rejected by mainstream Christians who, like the Stoics, were nonetheless unable to completely shake off its influence. Kelly emphasises that the positive account of creation contained in the Book of Genesis meant that 'Christians simply could not accept the Hebrew Bible and simultaneously consider the world or material things such as the body to be evil'.[78] Nonetheless, as Synnott demonstrates in his historical survey of the social construction of the body, Christian attitudes towards the body have traditionally been characterised by an ambivalence shaped by dualist ideas.[79] St. Paul taught that the body is the 'temple of the Holy Ghost', but yet evinced a preoccupation with the theme of 'flesh' versus 'spirit', which Synnott associates with the possible influence of Platonic or Stoic ideas.[80] Early Christians condemned the dualist doctrines of the Gnostics and the Manicheans and the rejection of sexuality and reproduction contained therein,[81] however many adopted ascetic practices including celibacy as a means of advancing their spiritual progress.[82]

Synnott suggests that in representing the will, rather than the body, as the locus of sin, Augustine instigated a more positive view of the body.[83] (Colish notes that, despite the strong influence of Neoplatonism on Augustine's thought, the urgent imperative to counter the Manichean heresy precluded acceptance of the notion of the material as evil, against which Augustine frequently deployed Stoic-derived arguments).[84] At the same time the disorder of the will which is the legacy of original sin is closely (although not exclusively) linked in Augustine's thought to the desire for *physical* gratification, in particular sexual desire, the prototypical expression of concupiscence.[85] Augustine's attitude towards sexuality reflects his emphasis on the will; the main focus of his condemnation was lust – the disorder of the will by which *men* have been deprived of mastery over themselves and made slaves to unwholesome passions.[86] Of course the *corporeal* act of sexual reproduction was given a central role in Augustine's theodicy as the conduit by which sin and concupiscence are transmitted, resulting in a perspective on sex and reproduction which still contains an echo of Manichaeism.[87]

Augustine's interpretation of Pauline dualism broadened out the conception of 'flesh' beyond the body.[88] This move, according to Brooke, allowed him to argue that the 'virtuous' Stoics as much as the 'sensual' Epicureans were following 'the way of the flesh' understood as living 'according to his own self' rather than 'according to God'.[89] As discussed in Chapter 2 Stoic ethical practices aimed at self-mastery – underpinning these practices was a presumption of the possibility of moral perfection (becoming a sage) through human endeavour. Brooke argues that for Augustine the attainment of sage-like serenity or *apatheia* and associated freedom of the will was only a possibility prior to the Fall and he goes so far as to suggest that Augustine may even have viewed this state as conducive to pride and thus as instrumental in the first sin.[90] For Augustine postlapsarian man was driven solely by the desire for pleasure, as discussed in Chapter 2 an implicitly 'Epicurean' conception of human nature,[91] and from Augustine's vantage inimical to the exercise of free will, reason or virtue.

**Reason versus revelation**

In *The Theological Origins of Modernity* Gillespie[92] argues that attempts to assimilate ancient philosophy generated irresolvable tensions within Christianity, between revelation and reason, which have profoundly influenced the direction of Western thought and civilisation. The relationship between God and man derived from philosophical systems such as those of Plato, Aristotle or the Stoics was directly at odds with

that which Judaism had bequeathed to Christianity.[93] The God of the Old Testament was a jealous, vengeful God who demanded unquestioning obedience rather than rational assent. Passmore[94] reminds us that, most importantly, the Hebrew God was a *person,* not an expression of various abstract qualities. One could not deploy reason to gain understanding of this God, this was entirely dependent on revelation. In any case the proper relation of man to God was subjection; overreliance on human rationality could lead directly to the sin of pride.[95] Too strong an emphasis on rationality led perilously close to Pelegianism, however denying a role for human rationality altogether had implications for moral accountability.[96] As discussed above, the doctrine of original sin represented an attempt to strike a middle ground – man is inherently rational, but tainted by inherited sin, but this could not completely reconcile the tension between the radically different conceptions of divine and human nature which underpinned Christianity.

Gillespie points to the 'nominalist revolution' in the fourteenth century as a pivotal moment when the tension between the God of Reason and the God of Revelation was laid bare, contributing directly to Renaissance Humanism, the Protestant Reformation and the emergence of the 'new' science of the seventeenth century, each of which led to a reconsideration of the nature of the Divine, human nature[97] and most importantly for the purposes of this book – the nature of childhood. Nominalism (the *via moderna*) developed in direct opposition to the *realism* hitherto dominant in medieval scholasticism.[98] Scholastic realism posited the actuality of universals – from this perspective individuals, whether cats, dogs or men had in common a universal quality or essence which shaped their nature as a cat, dog or man.[99] Inherent in this view was the idea of an orderly, rule-governed, rational universe which raised the important and controversial question of whether God was somehow constrained by such order.[100] Pointing to the scriptural emphasis on the omnipotence of the divine, nominalists such as William of Ockham argued that God could not be bound by universals, rational or otherwise.[101] As Gillespie notes, the alternative was a God who was subject solely to his own arbitrary will, a frightening prospect when taken to its logical conclusion in that there was no way for humans to be absolutely certain of what God's will was and thus how to live in accordance with it.[102] According to Gillespie these ideas had a particular resonance because of the particular circumstances of the fourteenth century; in the context of poor harvests, bubonic plague as well as the religious and political instability

affected by the establishment of rival papacies during the 'Great Schism' (1378–1417), the cosmological order of nominalist thought appeared more convincing than it might have done in less 'interesting' times.[103]

At the heart of the nominalist position was the belief that universals are merely mental concepts. Thus from the theocentric perspective of the late middle ages every single thing in the universe – rock, flower, bird, beast and child – must have been created by God on an individual basis.[104] There was thus no necessary pattern or order to God's creations – they were merely the realisation of his will at a particular moment.[105] As Brient explains, the implications of this position were that 'the created world is the expression not primarily of God's goodness or of his wisdom…but first and foremost, of his absolute power'.[106] The radical emphasis on divine omnipotence meant there were serious issues in relation to applying values of goodness or wisdom to God; according to Gillespie the most unsettling aspect of the nominalist position was that the existence of a God of unlimited power meant that there could be no absolute, rationally discernible standards. Good and evil were whatever God deemed to be pleasing or displeasing to his will.[107] The nominalist God was out of reach of man's ken and there was limited correspondence between the nature of the Divine and that of his creatures. Ozment argues that in nominalist thought God and man were viewed as connected by ties which were 'covenantal and not ontological, based on willed agreements and conventions, not on common natures'.[108] From this perspective what God and Man did share was the capacity to *will* and Gillespie writes that nominalism is associated with an emphasis on the will rather than reason as the defining characteristics of human as well as divine nature.[109] The crux of Gillespie's argument is that Renaissance humanism, the Reformation and the 'new' science of the seventeenth century can be viewed, at least in part, as shaped by the nominalist emphasis on God and man as fundamentally *willing* beings. What is of interest in relation to the government of childhood is how this view was related to child-rearing theory and practice. As will be explored in the sections below, in different ways, the pedagogical prescriptions put forward by humanists and religious reformers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as well as those of Hobbes, took the will of the child as their target – the 'ethical substance' to be worked upon.

Before we leave the Middle Ages, so to speak, I want to briefly note the importance of another fourteenth-century development which is of significance in the genealogy of childhood. The *devotio moderna*

(only loosely connected to the *via moderna* of nominalism[110]) was a religious movement which emerged in the Low Countries closely associated with the lay sect *The Brethren of the Common Life* founded by Gerhard Croote in 1387,[111] credited with having played an important role in the 'secularization' of monastic practices in early modern Europe. The movement which is viewed as an influence on both Christian humanism and Lutheran theology placed a heavy emphasis on living a godly life on the pattern of Christ's; *The Imitation of Christ* produced by a member of the Brethren Thomas à Kempis was a key text.[112] The movement also took inspiration from Stoic teaching – specifically that of Seneca – who is regarded as one of the chief influences among the classical authors admired by Croote.[113] The main activities engaged in by the Brethren were pastoral care, book-copying (later printing) and teaching.[114] While there is debate in the literature about the extent of their teaching activities, the Brethren are acknowledged to have established at least a few schools, but mainly provided lodging for boys attending schools administered by others.[115] What seems to have distinguished the Brethren was the emphasis placed on moral guidance and example – their aim was to bring about 'spiritual renewal' – of individuals and of the Church itself by focusing on religious expression in terms of lived experience (importantly, *inner* as much as, if not more than, outer), rather than doctrine.[116]

## Humanism and the rise of the malleable child

The impact of Renaissance humanism on childhood can be regarded as double-edged, on the one hand the particular emphasis which humanists placed on human potential and perfectibility is associated with a more positive view of childhood and a more thoughtful, humane approach to education, on the other, with more intensive regulation of the young. What we term Renaissance humanism was grounded in a revival of the classical 'human arts' – a programme of study promoting a model of human dignity rooted in Graeco-Roman civic culture.[117] Conventionally a distinction is made between the 'civic humanism' of the Italian city-states and the 'Christian humanism' of Northern Europe, which derived from Italian humanism but which is regarded as having been shaped (although to what extent is hotly debated) by the assumptions and aspirations of the *devotio moderna*.[118] It is generally emphasised that the distinction should not be interpreted as implying a rejection of Christianity on the part of civic humanists, but rather that Christian humanists were *explicitly* engaged in a project of utilis-

ing the fruits of humanist scholarship for religious and spiritual purposes.[119] Graeco-Roman ethical teachings were combined with Christian doctrine in an attempt to elevate moral standards – Christ was represented 'as sage as well as saviour' with at least as much emphasis placed on his exemplary conduct as on his sacrifice.[120] Humanism, and Christian humanism in particular, thus played an important role in the shift from 'the eschatological to the moral' which Ariès sees as the main driver of the shift towards a new, more disciplined conception of childhood in early modern Europe.[121]

The humanist programme has been seen as a reaction to the abstract logic prized within medieval scholasticism in its embrace of practical rather than theoretical knowledge.[122] Grammar and rhetoric were prioritised over logic and poetry, history and moral philosophy were studied as guides to virtuous living, providing precepts and exemplars applicable to everyday life.[123] Renaissance humanists saw themselves as living at the dawn of a new, or more properly *restored*, era of enlightenment, the revival of classical scholarship had led Europeans out of the 'dark ages' which had followed the fall of the Roman Empire.[124] Graeco-Roman literature had not been forgotten or ignored during the Middle Ages, but texts had become corrupted in the course of multiple translations and interpretations. Humanist scholarship emphasised the importance of reading classical and biblical texts in their original language and with reference to the cultural and historical context in which they had been produced.[125] The willingness of humanist scholars to master Greek and Hebrew made available more accurate translations of familiar texts (including the work of Aristotle and biblical literature) as well as opening up access to a wealth of previously inaccessible material,[126] including important sources on Hellenistic philosophy,[127] which formed the basis of humanist scholarship and education.

As Kelley[128] writes, humanism cannot be viewed separately from the political, economic and cultural context in which it took shape. By the late middle ages Italian city-states were becoming increasingly important centres of trade and finance and many were republics; humanist educational ideas appealed to a different group than the clerics and aspiring professionals who dominated medieval universities, people who required practical guidance in how to live a virtuous, secular, existence.[129] Scholasticism was increasingly regarded as too removed from the concerns of everyday life; Nauert writes that the dispute between traditional scholastics and nominalists in the fourteenth century was viewed by humanists as a typical example of pointless posturing on probably unanswerable questions.[130] Nonetheless Gillespie makes a

convincing case that humanism was shaped by nominalism in certain respects – like nominalists humanists were in search of a 'purer' Christianity and there was a shared recognition of the limitations of human rationality;[131] humanists also emphasised revelation rather than reason, albeit with a conception of revelation that permitted a shift in emphasis away from scripture and eternal salvation towards more worldly concerns.[132] Most importantly, although there was wide divergence in humanist thought, there was broad agreement that the defining characteristic of man was the will.[133]

At the heart of Renaissance humanism was a distinctive conception of human beings and their place in the cosmological order. This was not entirely original but built on pre-existing ideas, combined in a way which led to an emphasis on the *individual*, generally understood to be lacking in medieval thought.[134] In the oft-cited words of Jacob Burckhardt[135] it was in Renaissance Italy that a conscious awareness of the individual self became possible of a kind that went beyond definition by membership of some general category such as race or family. Kristeller argues that the Renaissance emphasis on individuality is of a very different kind to the metaphysical individualism which informs nominalism, but rests instead on 'the importance attached to the personal experiences, thoughts and opinions of an individual person'.[136] Certainly it is accurate, as Kristeller argues, that the nominalist insistence on metaphysical individuality is not directed at human beings *per se*, however this does not obviate its relevance to human beings. Gillespie quotes the fourteenth-century Florentine philosopher Petrarch – the father of Renaissance humanism – 'what in truth can I say about all men, or who could enumerate the infinite differences which so mark mortals that they seem to belong neither to a single species nor to a single type',[137] arguing that it is from this starting point that sprang Petrarch's concern with personal thoughts and feelings. Gillespie sees a strong resonance between Petrarch's emphasis on 'radical individuality' and the nominalist rejection of a necessary rational order; without a rational order man has no 'natural ends', each man must choose his own path in line with his own particular attributes and preferences.[138]

In the humanist literature man was viewed as an autonomous creature, granted the freedom to choose his own path and even his own nature. There was a strong assumption that the 'self' is not simply given by God, but in some ways produced through human endeavour. What Greenblatt calls 'self-fashioning' was not a novel concept, but he notes that prior to the Renaissance it was something generally met

with suspicion, citing Augustine who was unequivocal in his disapproval of any human encroachment in the divine task of self-fabrication.[139] By contrast humanists stressed individual responsibility for making the most of the raw material with which each was endowed. These ideas were given perhaps their strongest expression in the Oration of Pico della Mirandola, which can be read as an explicit rejection of the pessimistic view of human nature bequeathed by Augustine.[140] Here Pico argues that man alone of all God's creatures was granted no peculiar attributes.[141] Lacking any essential qualities man has been given the freedom to fashion his own being, an unambiguously 'wilful' conception of human nature which Gillespie[142] argues is directly indebted to nominalism. Belonging to 'neither heaven or earth' man could choose to rise or descend.[143] Pico[144] writes that 'God bestowed seeds pregnant with all possibilities'; man was therefore perfectible, but not perfect. The gift of infinite potentiality carried enormous responsibility. It was up to each individual to strive hard to cultivate the 'seeds of possibility' and raise himself up to the level of the angels, however the risk was ever-present that he would fall to that of the brutes. Thus Pico had God advise Adam:

> We have made you a creature neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, in order that you may, as the free and proud shaper of your own being, fashion yourself in the form you may prefer. It will be in your power to descend to the lower, brutish forms of life; you will be able, through your own decision, to rise again to the superior orders whose life is divine.[145]

Gillespie suggests that Christian humanists would not have fully endorsed Pico's sentiments,[146] but there is nonetheless a strong emphasis placed on human malleability and potentiality by writers such as Erasmus, who argued that 'no one can choose their own parents, or where they come from, but everyone can shape their own character and behaviour'.[147] In the context of highly stratified early modern European societies, the implications were quite radical. From a humanist perspective 'true nobility' was derived from education not aristocratic lineage.[148] This did not, of course, completely negate the importance of 'gentle birth', however it did imply that the aristocracy could not take their privileged status completely for granted, while also holding out the possibility of upward mobility for those of (slightly) humbler origins.[149] As Rice states, humanist educational ideals and practice fitted well with the political and economic conditions of early

modern states. Increasingly skills other than the martial prowess traditionally valued were demanded of the sons of the nobility, while the rising mercantile classes saw the value of education in the liberal arts in instilling the attributes their offspring required to move within (and marry into) the highest levels of society.[150]

The particular emphasis which humanists placed on the capacity of education to elevate and transform is associated with an intense interest in the early years of life. Burchell writes that the humanist conception of the malleable self had a dual aspect – the self is at once the artisan who fabricates and the matter or substance to be worked upon.[151] Having not yet acquired the capacity to actively work upon themselves, Burchell suggests that children were viewed as 'raw materials', to be shaped and moulded by others.[152] Parents and pedagogues were thus possessed of awesome power and responsibility; as the most malleable of beings, children could be moulded into nearly any form. Shahar's seminal work on medieval childhood suggests that the notion of childhood malleability was familiar in the middle ages, however the emphasis which humanists placed on human potentiality represented somewhat of a departure from the medieval view.[153] With the advent of humanism the *perfecting* of children's characters through human agency had become a distinct possibility: children became *governable* in a manner hitherto unachievable.

Humanists drew heavily on horticultural analogies in elucidating the means by which the young were to be educated and trained, positioning children as young plants whose growth could be directed in a particular pattern or alternatively representing the juvenile mind as fertile soil in which the 'seeds of virtue' could be sown.[154] This kind of imagery had been frequently deployed in the Graeco-Roman literature from which the humanists drew inspiration. For instance Plutarch's highly influential treatise on the education of boys compared the *nature* of the child to the soil, the teacher to the farmer or husbandman and verbal instruction to seeds.[155] The notion of the 'seeds of virtue' was an important theme for Stoics like Seneca who believed that these seeds were present in every soul waiting to be 'awakened and activated' by *logos* or truth.[156] Although these roughly contemporaneous authorities clearly diverge somewhat in their use of horticultural tropes, there is a common understanding that the potential of the individual could not be realised without education. According to Plutarch without appropriate cultivation even the most promising ground would be wasteland; conversely a good education could compensate for the deficiencies of those not abundantly endowed with natural ability.

Plutarch's views on the power of education are echoed in the writings of the foremost humanist pedagogical theorist Erasmus. Although children were viewed as individuals with a unique set of aptitudes and inclinations bestowed by nature,[157] Erasmus argued that while 'nature is strong, education is more powerful still'.[158] Erasmus identified three dimensions to self-formation, firstly the qualities inherent in an individual's *nature*, in Erasmus's terms 'man's innate capacity and inclination for the good', secondly *method* or instruction in the principles of right living which served to shape the individual's innate qualities to create a virtuous *disposition* and finally *practice* which referred to the exercise of the individual's disposition.[159] Erasmus placed particular emphasis on method – wisdom through experience was too dearly bought; better to be equipped in advance with the knowledge on which to base actions, rather than to acquire judgement on the back of setback or loss.[160] Erasmus thus favoured didactic education for the young over experiential learning; he argued that because children lacked experience they were particularly amenable to instruction since 'nothing clings more tenaciously than that which is poured into empty minds'.[161] As essentially rational beings, children were naturally inclined towards the good.[162] Erasmus argued that the bias towards evil complained of in the young had more to do with environmental influences than inherent corruption.[163] It was therefore imperative that children were not exposed to immorality of any kind (for this reason Erasmus cautioned that infants should not be put out to nurse, children's care should not be entrusted to servants and that their education begin as early as possible).[164]

Erasmus broadly accepted the doctrine of original sin, but he rejected Augustine's assumption that the entire human race had literally partaken in the sin of Adam. Based on his own translation of scripture from the Greek Erasmus put forward an alternative interpretation of Romans 5:12 to that relied upon by Augustine (and similar to that of Pelagius) which suggested that original sin was transmitted by imitation rather than generation.[165] While he never denied the necessity of grace, his view of postlapsarian human nature allowed for the possibility (indeed insisted upon the necessity) of virtuous works as means to salvation.[166] Although he acknowledged that man was morally frail and could by no means exercise virtue without divine assistance, Erasmus was committed to a view of human beings as endowed with the capacity, albeit very limited, to *choose* good (a position elaborated in his famous exchanges with Martin Luther on the question of free will).[167] Drawing on the Stoic trope Erasmus argued that there were

'seeds of virtue' inherent in every soul from which came the original impetus to turn to God and salvation, but they could only come to fruition with the further assistance of God's grace.[168] The image he deployed to represent man's moral status was that of a stumbling child assisted by a benevolent father, without divine assistance man could achieve nothing, but one who turned his will towards God would be guided to salvation.[169]

For Erasmus one of the fundamental aims of education was to instil in children 'a moral sense' or conscience which would serve as 'a check against wrongdoing'.[170] This was seen as something lacking in prevailing pedagogical practice which prioritised punishing wrongdoing – typically by the application of physical violence – over inculcating a proper appreciation of right and wrong.[171] Beating children produced either servility or obstinacy, neither of which was conducive to good conduct or to learning – internal motivation rather than external force being judged more effective in the long run.[172] Writing in reference to early modern humanist pedagogy Bushnell writes of the particular resonance with Foucault's admonition that power can only be exercised over subjects in so far as they are free.[173] It is only possible to teach and guide a *willing* subject. Humanist education as elaborated by Erasmus emphasised harnessing the will of the child by rendering the educational process as pleasant as possible, adapting content to the age of those being taught and by deploying pedagogical practices designed to make instruction 'fun'.[174]

An appropriate education would not only promote a love of learning and instil a moral compass – it would prepare a young person to comport him or herself appropriately in society. Physical deportment was a reflection of inner character and learning to exercise control over bodily expression an important means of shaping character. Of the plethora of guides for children among the early modern conduct literature, among the first and most influential was the handbook of manners for children produced by Erasmus. Dealing with topics such as cleanliness and modesty in dress and decorum in social interaction, particularly at table, the comprehensive prescriptions contained therein are underpinned by a strong assumption regarding the interconnection between control of the physical body and inner virtue.[175] Erasmus provided detailed advice as to appropriate facial expressions, noting that 'the cultivated mind of a child is most evident from his expression',[176] and that 'a relaxed and smooth forehead indicates a mind with a clean conscience and a gentle nature'.[177] Every facial feature is comprehensively dealt with and advice offered in relation to

how bodily functions from sneezing to passing wind were to be managed when in company. Ozment notes the emphasis placed by Erasmus on the avoidance of 'animal-like' behaviour – children should not 'whinny' like horses or pick their teeth like a cat or a dog. According to Ozment the maturation process was viewed in early modern Europe as a matter of transcending the 'bestial' nature which characterised the childhood state via the gradual acquisition of reason and morality.[178] Unfortunately this was not assured – a great deal of effort was required from parent and child to ensure that the rational dominated the bestial and not the other way around.[179]

## Childhood and religious reform

The image of the Dionysian child, per Jenks's account, is closely linked to the renewed attention to the doctrine of original sin in the wake of the Protestant Reformation and the particularly heavy emphasis which Protestant Reformers placed on corrupted human nature. From Foucault's perspective the Protestant Reformation can be viewed primarily as a 'pastoral revolt' or 'insurrection of conduct', the most important of the succession of such insurrections in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, not simply because it was 'the most radical form' of such insurrections, but because it was 'the form in which they were brought back under control'.[180] The fault lines exposed by the sixteenth-century schism related to the appropriate means by which men could attain salvation – by trusting to faith alone or by insisting on the complementary efficacy of works, but the impetus for 'insurrection' (as had been the case for previous 'insurrections' such as the *devotio moderna*) stemmed in large part from the perceived deficiencies of the Christian pastorate itself. The match that sparked the Protestant Reformation was provided by Martin Luther's '95 Theses' published in 1517. The main target of the theses was the remission of sins through the sale of 'indulgences'. Luther contended that only inner repentance could lead to the cleansing of guilt; hence it was iniquitous to take money from the poor for something which they could access freely if they felt genuine remorse for their sins. At the heart of his critique was the firm belief that salvation could not be earned – humanity could achieve nothing of value without *direct* divine assistance; this belief underpins the three '*solas*' of Lutheran Reformist doctrine – faith, grace and scripture.[181]

For Luther faith was not simply *belief* – it involved a relationship of complete trust in and dependence on God.[182] Whereas mere belief

might be attained through the application of reason, faith could not be attained through human action or choice – it was completely dependent on divinely infused grace, understood in Augustinian terms as a gift rather than a reward.[183] It was solely through God's will that individuals were justified (made just) and solely through His revelations that individuals could come to apprehend God's will.[184] Hence scripture rather than tradition was the fount of religious authority. Luther's *solas* reflected the strong emphasis which Reformist doctrine placed on divine omnipotence, which has been linked by Gillespie[185] and Passmore,[186] among others, to the influence of nominalism. Gillespie writes that nominalists shied away from the full implications of divine omnipotence for moral accountability, with many arguing for some role for human endeavour, a position which rendered them vulnerable to charges of Pelegianism.[187] Christian humanists like Erasmus were also anxious not to relieve individuals of responsibility for their spiritual welfare; while human frailty was acknowledged, a strong emphasis was placed on human potentiality, thus allowing a role for the will in salvation. According to Ozment, Erasmus perceived his approach as steering a middle path between what he regarded as the Pelegianism of the nominalists and the perceived Manichaeism of Luther and his followers.[188] In contrast to what he regarded as the Pelagian position of Erasmus, Luther vehemently rejected the idea that humans were capable of freely choosing to live virtuously. Where Erasmus argued that humans could *choose* to accept God's grace (a position linked to nominalism),[189] Luther held that free will 'was a divine term…applicable to none but the divine Majesty'; to apply it to humans was sacrilegious.[190] While allowing that man could make free choices (subject to the will of God) in respect of things that were 'below him', in respect of those 'above him' – matters relating to salvation or damnation – Luther perceived limited scope for human agency, holding that man 'is a captive, slave, and servant, either to the will of God, or to the will of Satan'.[191] Powerless to effect their own salvation individuals tread a preordained path – like Augustine Luther held that God decides who will be granted the grace to believe and thus who will be saved. John Calvin went even further in arguing that God does not simply select the faithful sheep, but wilfully consigns the goats to damnation.[192] As Gillespie has noted this conception of humanity presents a sharp contrast to the image put forward by Pico. Lacking free will or creative capacity human beings are weak, pitiful creatures, mired in sin and utterly dependent on the benevolence of their creator.[193]

Given this pessimistic view of human nature it is unsurprising that Protestant theology placed a particularly heavy emphasis on the corrupting effects of original sin on every person.[194] Luther's theology significantly de-emphasised the sacramental power of the Church; logically he could not accept that baptism had the power to sanctify, although he believed that the sacrament removed the *guilt* for original sin.[195] As Wiley explains, Luther's reconceptualisation of original sin represented a departure from established doctrine in other important respects. Medieval theologians held that original sin had not *completely* corrupted human nature; man retained the 'image of God' inherent in his nature, but lost the 'likeness to God' signified by 'original righteousness'; Luther did not make this distinction between image and likeness – hence for him the loss of 'original righteousness' represented the obliteration of the divine in man's nature.[196] Augustine had maintained a (tenuous) distinction between original sin and concupiscence, a distinction strengthened by Aquinas, however Luther conflated the two.[197] For Luther concupiscence – understood in terms of 'self-centredness' – was a real sin, not merely the propensity to sin and it was the defining characteristic of human nature after the Fall.[198]

There were important points of difference between Protestant reformers on the question of original sin. Unlike Luther Calvin did not believe that original sin *completely* destroyed the image of God in man,[199] however in most respects his views on the nature and capacities of postlapsarian humankind are regarded as even more negative.[200] Despite the slight remnant of the divine image the effects of original sin on human nature are such that not only can man not will the good, he cannot *not* will the bad.[201] In terms of the sanctifying effects of baptism Calvin's doctrine diverged from that of Luther in that he viewed the rite as mainly of symbolic importance (the sign rather than substance of the 'covenant of grace'); infants who had not been baptised would not be barred from heaven on that account.[202] In other respects Calvin's doctrine concurred with Luther in that remission of original sin was understood as a purging of the *guilt*, rather than the sin itself.[203] For Calvin as for Luther even the youngest child is thoroughly corrupted by sin – in Calvin's terms the nature of the new-born infant is a 'seed of sin'.[204] Pitkin notes that this view of the young is not associated with negative attitudes towards children or callous child-rearing methods; children – like adults – may have been flawed and sinful, but they possessed a degree of innocence which adults had lost.[205]

Until they reached the age of reason children were not deemed capable of personal sin. From Luther's perspective, although the essence of the child's nature, sin lay dormant in the young child and gradually 'stirred' as children matured.[206] Protestant pedagogical thought retained the threefold division between *infantia*, *puerita* and *adolescentia* which had informed ancient and medieval thought of childhood.[207] With progression from *infantia* to *puerita* at about the age of seven children were accorded a greater degree of accountability for their actions, it is from this point that, unless kept in careful check, that the 'seed of sin' in the child's nature will begin to bloom.[208] Adolescence and the onset of puberty opened up a whole new arena of temptation, from which the young must be safeguarded.[209] It is important to note that the boundaries between adolescence and adulthood were much less distinct for girls, who were deemed ready to assume the responsibilities of marriage at a much earlier stage than their brothers.[210] Luke notes the horticultural metaphors deployed to explain that girls' apparent superiority was actually inferiority – like 'weeds' girls matured quickly, but in the long run male intellectual and moral capacity far outstripped the female.[211]

The distinctive emphasis which Protestant theologians placed on the doctrines of original sin, justification by faith and predestination had important implications for how children and child-rearing were viewed. If children were of the elect their salvation was assured, their sinful nature notwithstanding. Conversely if children were predestined to damnation, a moral life could not help them to earn the divine grace necessary for faith and redemption. Luther and Calvin taught that the individual could attain absolute certainty regarding his position among the elect, but while Christian parents could feel reasonably confident that their offspring were among the chosen, certainty was not possible.[212] Visible signs of faith and piety were the only evidence available that a child was of the elect; while faith could not be instilled by human effort, it was essential that children received religious instruction as well as guidance in the rudiments of moral behaviour.[213] The influence of humanist pedagogy is evident in the use of horticultural imagery to represent this process of moral and religious training. The Stoic concept of the 'seeds of virtue' so prominent in the humanist literature was in Protestant teaching displaced by the 'seeds of faith'.[214] The 'seeds of faith' were bestowed on the elect by the Holy Spirit during the sacrament of baptism; these seeds had to be carefully nourished so that the sinfulness and depravity at the root of human nature could be overcome.[215] Protestant reformers placed a strong emphasis

on the parental duty to instruct and guide their offspring, while children had a corresponding duty to honour and obey their parents.[216] Fear of one's parents was represented as a necessary preliminary to fear of God, however it was not deemed appropriate that children should be governed *entirely* by fear of parents – love was important too.[217] The aim was to strike the middle ground. Permissive parenting was roundly condemned; the young were to be closely monitored and behaviour tightly controlled.[218] Luther advised parents not to 'spare the rod' but he also evinced disapproval of overly harsh parental discipline.[219] 'Breaking' the child's will did not mean brutalisation, but instilling the internal discipline necessary to live a godly life.[220]

As noted earlier, the term 'breaking the will' is particularly associated with Puritan child-rearing precepts and practices. The term Puritan was first used – pejoratively – in early modern England to refer to the most enthusiastic promoters of religious reform in the Anglican Church, staunch Calvinists in the main, who wished to see a more thoroughgoing transformation of doctrine, rites and ecclesiastical structures than had taken place under Henry VIII.[221] Puritans were distinguished by their antipathy to 'popery' and preoccupation with probity; they wished to impose a greater degree of discipline on their church at the organisational and individual levels.[222] Faced with hostility some of the most radical Puritans (those who had broken away from the Anglican Church) left for the Netherlands in the early seventeenth century, from where some travelled to the New World of the Americas.[223] As the political and religious climate in England became less favourable towards Calvinism under the reign of Charles I further groups of English Puritans crossed the Atlantic.[224] Propelled by fealty to the sacred covenant into which they had entered these colonists sought to create 'godly' communities in the New England they had founded.[225] Those Puritans who remained in, or had returned to, their native land played a pivotal role in the conflicts which led to the fall of the monarchy and the establishment of a commonwealth in 1649.[226] This was succeeded by a protectorate in 1653 under the administration of the Puritan Oliver Cromwell, who ruled until his death in 1658 which precipitated the restoration of the monarchy.[227] Efforts to transform 'old' England into a 'godly nation' during the period of the interregnum produced mixed results, stymied by divisions within and without the Anglican Church.[228]

Puritanism is associated with a piety grounded in a particularly acute concern with election, which necessarily shaped child-rearing theory and practice.[229] Parents were anxious to identify and foster 'signs of

godliness' in their offspring, for while they regarded all children as steeped in sinfulness they must also have been keen to find reassurance that their own progeny were of the elect.[230] Strict observation of the Sabbath and regular prayer were the touchstones of godly living and heads of households had a duty to ensure that children (and servants) performed these fundamental duties and that they were suitably instructed in scripture.[231] Beyond this was the need to promote moral probity – to ensure that the young did not succumb to vice by exercising strict control over their conduct and activities and by inculcating virtues. For these reasons Puritanism has been accorded a particularly significant position in the history of childhood and child-rearing, credited with the instigation of a shift towards the household as the centre of spiritual and moral formation (what Hill refers to as the 'spiritualization of the household') and thus placing a new importance on the parent-child relationship.[232] Pointing to the influence of Christian humanism on Puritan social thought, Todd argues that there is limited evidence for a distinctively 'Puritan' approach to child-rearing.[233] She finds that the literature on domestic government produced by Protestants generally and Puritans specifically drew not only on scripture, but on classical and Christian humanist sources. Similar assumptions regarding the impressionable nature of childhood and the importance of early instruction informed the humanist and Puritan literature. As did the writings of Luther and Calvin on the subject, Puritan books on 'household government', evinced the same concern to steer a middle ground between harsh and permissive parental practices which informed humanist pedagogical theory, advocating the use of reason as the preferred response to childish misbehaviour, with corporal punishment to be deployed only as a last resort.[234] Pointing to the veneration of marriage and the family in the Christian humanist literature and the emphasis placed on the importance of the parental role in religious and moral education, Todd suggests that Christian humanism must be credited with 'the spiritualization of the household' and that this was not therefore a specifically Protestant development.[235] By her account Puritan child-rearing precept and practice did not represent a major departure from that of Catholics; instead it was the case that Catholic attitudes underwent a significant change in light of the findings of the Council of Trent (which condemned the beliefs of Christian humanists as well as Protestant reformers) leading to a greater emphasis on the role of the clergy rather than parents as the primary agents of religious instruction.[236]

The Protestant Reformation had not only given fresh impetus to existing efforts to combat abuse and corruption within the Catholic

Church, stimulating root and branch institutional reform; it also contributed to an emphasis on doctrinal discipline hitherto unknown.[237] Between 1545 and 1563 the deliberations of the Council of Trent produced a series of canons which set out in unambiguous terms the position of the Catholic Church on the controversial doctrinal questions raised by Christian humanists and Protestant Reformers.[238] Wiley writes that a major objective of the Council of Trent was to reaffirm the sacramental power of the Church in a manner which countered the accusations of Pelegianism levelled by Luther.[239] In response to the Protestant doctrine of *sola scriptura*, the Council affirmed the authority of tradition as well as scripture and insisted that the authority to interpret scripture was the sole preserve of the hierarchical Church.[240] In response to the doctrine of *sola fide* the Council affirmed the importance of works as well as faith.[241] The Council's exposition of the doctrine of original sin – henceforth elevated to the status of dogma – was intended to provide a secure theological foundation for the crucial role of the sacraments in securing individual salvation.[242] The Council countered the views of humanists by reaffirming – contra to Erasmus – that every human being is born with a soul marked by the actual sin of Adam,[243] while at the same time opposing Luther in its interpretation of the sanctifying powers of baptism. Rejecting Luther's conflation of original sin and concupiscence, the Council of Trent followed the Thomist line, holding that the grace bestowed by baptism cleanses the soul of sin, although it does not remove concupiscence.[244]

The Council of Trent expressly rejected the Calvinist doctrine of 'double predestination'. Holding that God actively reprobates, Calvin believed that divine grace was wilfully withheld from those destined for damnation, hence for those who were not of the elect baptism was an empty ritual. This position had been anathema to the Catholic Church since the Council of Orange in the sixth century.[245] According to Baker[246] the doctrine of predestination expounded by the Catholic Church was somewhat closer to divine foreknowledge rather than the idea that God either actively (per Calvin) or passively (per Luther) condemns certain individuals to eternal torment and thus places a much heavier emphasis on the freedom of individuals to accept or reject God's grace. As set out in the decrees of the Council of Trent, the measure of God's grace received varied according to individual 'disposition and cooperation'.[247] Luther and Calvin believed that once bestowed, divine grace could not be forfeited by sinful act of man (with the exception, according to Luther, of the sin of unbelief).[248] The Council of Trent held that committal of *any* mortal sin resulted in the loss of divine grace.[249] Hence, no less than Protestants, Catholic

parents had ample motivation to exercise a high level of vigilance regarding the spiritual welfare of their children.

Todd writes that the Council of Trent was responsible for 'downgrading' the religious role of the family noting that 'family religious responsibilities are conspicuous by their absence' in the Tridentine canons and decrees.[250] Instead the Council emphasised the responsibility of bishops for the religious instruction of children. This does not mean that Catholic families were regarded as exempt from responsibility for the spiritual and moral welfare of the young. Logan's examination of counter-reformatory treatises finds a strong emphasis on the importance of the family environment, with parents represented as the primary influence on the character and capacities of the mature adult.[251] Drawing on the same classical sources, the tracts examined share the humanist emphasis on nurture over nature,[252] but reflect a preoccupation with 'moulding' the child to a degree which Logan describes as much more oppressive than in the humanist literature.[253] Innate depravity was found to be less of a concern than the threat of contamination from external sources – accordingly mothers were advised to breastfeed their own children and parents were exhorted to supervise children closely.[254] The overarching goal of child-rearing was to curb evil tendencies and to instil the discipline necessary for a virtuous existence – Logan finds a degree of confidence that the frailties in human nature associated with concupiscence could be overcome, but only if parents devoted a great deal of care and attention to the task.[255]

Foucault writes that for Protestantism and Catholicism the post-Reformation period is associated with 'an intensification of the pastorate' which though expressed in quite different ways ('meticulous' versus 'hierarchical' in Foucault's terms[256]) entailed a much greater degree of supervision over the moral conduct of ordinary Christians as well as their religious beliefs.[257] Within the post-Tridentine Catholic Church significant efforts were made to impose discipline over the clergy and religious, so that 'pastors' would in turn exert greater discipline over their flocks, while individuals were urged to make regular – and complete – confessions, to elucidate impure thoughts and desires and not just sinful actions.[258] Within the Lutheran, and, to a much greater extent, the Calvinist/Reformed Churches control was exercised through consistories, councils or other forms of local structure but also through informal monitoring by church members.[259] Gorski writes that within the Reformed church, members were urged to cast a supervisory eye over family, friends and neighbours, noting that 'communally organised church discipline' of this nature is associated with a more

comprehensive, as well as more constant, means of moral regulation.[260] All are at the same time observing and under observation. Reformers had particular anxieties around 'backsliding' – a major task exercised by Protestant consistories was to ensure that parents were raising their offspring in accordance with reformed rite[261] – but Catholic pastors could afford to be no less anxious about the young souls within their flocks.

## Hobbes and the new science

According to Harrison until the seventeenth century study of the natural world was essentially a branch of hermeneutics.[262] During the Patristic period the exegetical methods developed to apprehend the various layers of meaning assumed to exist in scripture came to be deployed to 'read' the signs and symbols embedded in God's creation which could similarly be interpreted on a number of different levels.[263] Influenced by the Platonic notion that the visible world is merely a shadow of the spiritual world, the Church Fathers were interested in created entities for what they revealed about the heavenly.[264] Harrison notes that within the influential exegetical approach developed by Augustine things (rather than words) were symbols to be interpreted – for instance the word lion signifies but one thing, however the beast itself could symbolise a multiplicity of concepts and entities, such as strength, fierceness, a prideful person or a king.[265] For Augustine in order to ascertain what a thing symbolised one should have recourse to scripture. Study of the natural world itself was unnecessary and even dangerous, a position located by Harrison in the context of Augustine's Platonically-derived devaluation of knowledge obtained via the senses, but also to a more generalised denigration of the intellectual and moral capacities of postlapsarian man.[266] Harrison writes that more positive attitudes towards the sensual from about the eleventh century were associated with the view that knowledge of the divine could be accessed through nature as well as through scripture.[267] This was reinforced by the availability of Aristotelian texts in Northern Europe from the twelfth century and their assimilation into Christian doctrine by Thomas Aquinas; investigation of the natural world was from then on dominated by Aristotle's natural philosophy (or the version of it available to medieval scholars).[268]

Schuster notes that varying perspectives exist on whether the 'scientific revolution' which laid the foundations of the 'new science' of the seventeenth century should more properly be regarded as 'a

gradual evolution' (as Rice puts it, in terms of the refinement, reorientation and most crucially the combination of intellectual and methodological tools extant in the Middle Ages – logic, experiment and mathematics),[269] or whether it is more apt to think in terms of 'a truly revolutionary transformation' in thought and practice.[270] Equally he points to differing views as to whether the rise of the scientific method was driven primarily by 'internal' developments – discoveries, inventions, advances in thought – or whether a more satisfactory explanation is to be found through examination of the economic, political and cultural context of early modern Europe.[271] Where Schuster can point to consensus (although even here there is a certain amount of dissent)[272] is in acceptance of the rise of the new science as rooted in the rejection of Aristotelian natural philosophy and its replacement as privileged source of knowledge in the seventeenth century by a mechanistic perspective on the order of the natural world.[273] Attacks on Aristotelianism emanated from many directions during the period of the 'scientific revolution', but Gillespie argues that major wounds had already been inflicted during the fourteenth-century 'nominalist revolution', which had challenged the distinction between substance and form, as well as the teleological concept of 'final causes' central to Aristotelian natural philosophy.[274] The 'new science' was nominalist in orientation, (although Bloch and Reiss write that with the exception of Gassendi few of its leading figures made direct reference to medieval nominalism,[275]), and dispensed with formal and final causes in favour of mechanical explanations.[276]

A main proponent of the mechanistic philosophy, per Gillespie Hobbes's understanding of human nature and of political authority were congruent with his views on the natural world. An unambiguous materialist, Hobbes was notorious for his rejection of the world of spirit – the universe *and* the God which created it were composed entirely of matter.[277] To Hobbes human beings were essentially bodies in motion whose thoughts and desires were the product of 'motions in matter'.[278] Like all motions these had their origins in the complex – and inescapable – chain of causality initiated by God; as Gillespie puts it God's will was in Hobbes's schema, as in that of Descartes and Gassendi, conceptualised as the causality which propelled all motion in the universe and he argues that for Hobbes, man could also be understood as fundamentally a 'willing being', albeit one whose will was necessarily of limited scope.[279] Hobbes's take on the human will is ambiguous in that while it encompasses a deterministic world-view there is also recognition of agency, albeit of a rather restricted sort.

This has made Hobbes difficult to position in relation to the free will/predetermination question. For instance Brooke notes that early adversaries of Hobbes such as Bishop Bramhall, with whom he had a famous debate on free will, attacked what they perceived as Hobbes's Stoic *determinism*, however he finds that Stoic philosophy was later used to challenge Hobbes's *voluntarism* by members of the Cambridge Platonists.[280]

Hobbes did not see the will as a faculty of mind, but as an *appetite*. Appetites and aversions he viewed as more or less involuntary responses to stimulation of the senses; while 'one can, in truth, be free to *act*; one cannot, however, be free to *desire*…'[281] Individuals do not (cannot) act to satisfy every appetite or aversion, but *deliberate* upon their course until they reach a decision on how to proceed, a process of weighing up pros and cons which Hobbes represents in terms of alternating appetites and aversions, with 'the last appetite (either of doing or omitting), the one that leads immediately to action or omission' characterised as 'the will'.[282] To have free will then is to have the freedom to act (or not) in order to satisfy an appetite, but the appetite itself was not under the voluntary control of the individual, a position reminiscent of the proto-compatibilist Augustine. Hobbes also agreed with Augustine that the will was not necessarily rational – 'for if it were there could be no voluntary act against reason'.[283] As Damrosch notes, for Hobbes the deliberation that proceeds wilful action is seen as something engaged in even by irrational creatures such as young children and beasts, each capable of avoiding objects associated with pain or approaching those that bring pleasure and guiding their actions accordingly.[284]

In a world ruled by an omnipotent God the freedom of the individual could be viewed as limited since according to Hobbes the very appetites and aversions which drive action are the consequences of motions initiated by God, while the circumstances in which choices were made were also the product of the divine will.[285] For Hobbes just because an individual was obliged by necessity to make a particular choice, did not mean that it was not thereby a *choice* – there was no inherent discord between liberty and necessity in Hobbes's worldview, a position, which as Damrosch notes, is broadly in accordance with Stoic philosophy.[286] Man freely wills what God has ordained he should do. In a roughly analogous manner obedience to the absolute will of the *Leviathan* was not an infringement on man's liberty. The laws imposed by the Leviathan Hobbes referred to as 'artificial chains' comparable to the chain of causes initiated by God.[287] While acts of

obedience may have been motivated primarily by fear of legal sanctions such as imprisonment or execution they were nonetheless acts of liberty.[288]

The human subjects of Hobbes's philosophy – famously referred to by Bishop Bramhall as the 'tennis balls of destiny'[289] – can appear to be mere bodies in motion pushed this way and that by appetites and aversions which have their origin in external phenomena and events. Is there then, any kind of transcendent self to be found in Hobbes? In direct opposition to Descartes Hobbes unequivocally rejected the notion that the body and the mind or soul were constituted from different substances, criticising the idea of an 'incorporeal substance' as oxymoronic.[290] Hobbes did not believe that people possessed souls which could live on independently after the body had expired; the soul was understood simply as the principle of living rather than any kind of separate 'spiritual' entity or substance.[291] Although Hobbes rejected the notion that human beings were anything other than matter, as Frost emphasises, matter for Hobbes was not 'mindless' but was capable of thought.[292] While in agreement with Descartes that the act of thinking necessarily implied a thinking subject, Hobbes did not accept that the thinking subject was an entity distinguishable from the body. For Descartes consciousness of thought necessarily leads to a self which though not material is still a substance, whereas for Hobbes consciousness was not grounded in a non-corporeal 'thinking thing', but in the bodily motions which constituted the process of thinking.[293]

According to Danziger the term 'consciousness' did not come into common usage until deployed by John Locke in what seemed at the time a revolutionary way of thinking about the self – personal identity as grounded simply in the subject's awareness of his own thoughts and perceptions.[294] Although regarded as derived from the Cartesian cogito, Locke's idea of consciousness is grounded in a rejection of innate ideas – ideas are derived from reflection on sensory data – as well as of substance-dualism, both of which were central to Descartes' conception of self-hood.[295] For Descartes, for whom 'truth' stemmed from the mind rather than the senses, rigorous control over the body was required in order to ensure the ascendancy of the rational over the irrational aspects of the self.[296] The Lockean subject was divided in a different way – self-government was a kind of reflection upon the process of reflection. Though not presented explicitly, Frost argues that a reflexive subject analogous to that of Descartes and Locke is to be discovered in Hobbes's account of sense-perception, which in its treatment of memory – 'he that perceives that he hath perceived, remembers' – she

sees 'a kind of turning upon the self that constitutes a form of self-awareness', but of a 'retrospective' rather than introspective kind. [297] According to Frost the lack of *immediate* control over thoughts and desires means that achievement of self-mastery for the Hobbesian subject thus depends upon an approach to monitoring the self which instead of being focused on thoughts, emotions and actions as they occur must be concerned with the conditions under which they are likely to arise.[298]

In a famous passage in the *Leviathan* on the intellectual virtues Hobbes links intellectual capacity to the strength of individual appetites or desires. Reasoning power stemmed from the desire for either power, riches, knowledge or honour (the last three viewed merely as sub-categories of the first) for 'the Thoughts, are to the Desires as Scouts and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things Desired'.[299] Hence Gillespie sees a shift with Hobbes towards an instrumental view of reason, arguing that for Hobbes reason 'helps us to maximise the satisfaction of our desires, but not to train, direct, or control them'.[300] This, however, would seem to be somewhat of an overstatement of Hobbes's position which fails to recognise the distinctions which, according to Gert, Hobbes made between *rational* desires and *passionate* desires[301] and between instrumental reason and true or 'natural' reason.[302] (Hobbes explicitly refers to the 'laws of nature' or 'right reason' – those principles which guide us in self-preservation – as moral virtues in the *Leviathan*,[303] although he does stress that 'right reason' is not an 'infallible faculty'[304]). It also neglects the strong emphasis which Hobbes placed on the role of education (the acquisition of reason) as a force for curbing and guiding the passions. As noted in Chapter 2 Hobbes equated reason with virtue and as acquired rather than innate. What people had from nature was merely 'sense', a basic instinct to reach for what we desire and shrink from what we fear. As noted earlier, children were driven entirely by their appetites which could lead them to wicked actions (such as striking their parents if thwarted), however they could not be held capable of evil, firstly because of their limitations in terms of *physical* capacity and secondly because having yet to acquire the ability to reason they could not be held morally accountable for their actions.[305] A 'wicked man' was equated to a 'child grown strong and sturdy', an adult in physical capacity, but a child in term of reasoning power; one whose emotional appetites were not safely under the sway of 'good education and experience'.[306] Such were men in the state of nature; unsocialised, amoral and wholly guided by their passions. A commonwealth populated by

such citizens would not prevail for long – Hobbes was clear that the rational discipline provided by education was a necessary precondition of social and political stability and thus one of the most important tasks of government.[307]

Jenks associates the Dionysian child with consensus and conformity and conformity of opinion is the goal of Hobbesian education; to secure the future of the commonwealth every child must accept the same basic beliefs. Bejan writes that the educational process for Hobbes was not conceived according to the horticultural method of bending and moulding the child's character, but in terms of 'imprinting' – a matter of inscribing fundamental principles and precepts on the *tabula rasa* of the child's mind.[308] What this educational programme shares with that of humanists and religious pedagogues (Catholic or Reformed) was the emphasis on the inculcation of authoritative knowledge; the pedagogical process (at least as regards popular education) was predominantly a matter of instruction in incontrovertible *truth*. The root of 'right reason' for Hobbes was self-preservation and the good that which contributes to peace and security. The security of all was best guaranteed by vesting absolute power in the sovereign – which was why the social contract had been created – and the most important function of education was impressing this knowledge upon citizens.[309] Within institutes of higher learning the truth of Hobbes's theories could be demonstrated to the elites, while education of the masses was conceived in terms of indoctrination.[310] Bejan writes that popular education for Hobbes was primarily a means of inculcating a 'love of obedience', a responsibility which fell in the first instance to parents who were to instil a proper sense of filial deference in their offspring.[311] Children were not just to be taught to obey their parents, but also should learn that that the sovereign power originally vested in fathers had been transferred to the Leviathan to whom each child owed unquestioning subservience.[312]

For Hobbes children submit to parents just as the citizens of the commonwealth submit to the sovereign – in order to secure protection.[313] Obedience was ultimately a rational action, something which the educated, at least, would be brought to understand.[314] The ostensible gulf between their respective views on government notwithstanding there is thus a degree of similarity between Hobbes's position and that of Locke. Rejecting the notion of innate ideas, each took as their starting point the idea that the mind of the child represents a blank canvas for the educator. While Hobbes was primarily interested in instilling precepts (although he was eager that those accessing higher

education would understand the rational basis of these), Locke was more concerned with promoting the capacity to reason for oneself. Nonetheless like Hobbes, Locke stresses that obedience is a fundamental goal of the child's education. According to Locke the will of the young child was under the sway of 'unruly and disorderly appetites'[315] which seem to be regarded as innate. Thus it was imperative that from an early age children became accustomed to having their will thwarted. The aim was not to 'break' the will but to render it 'supple'; subduing the will of the child ensured that the will of the future adult would be subordinate to reason, rather than the slave of carnal desires.[316] Hobbes viewed filial obedience as preparation for obedience to the absolute will of the sovereign, but for Locke the child's will must yield to that of the parent in order that the will of the future adult would remain firmly under the yoke of reason. Of course from Hobbes's point of view there was no fundamental difference between the dictates of the sovereign and the dictates of reason or conscience – each tended towards the goal of self-preservation which for Hobbes was the fount of wisdom and morality.

## The government of children and families in early modern states

In his lectures on governmentality, Foucault[317] suggests that the 'pedagogical problem' seems to have been regarded as the most pressing of the questions of 'the conduct of conduct', which were occupying great minds in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As Harrington notes, the increased importance accorded to nurture over nature associated with the humanist emphasis on malleability contributed to a heightened appreciation of the social and political importance of the socialisation process in practical terms. Government of the young also had a profound symbolic significance since the family served as a model for the exercise of power in the political sphere.[318] As discussed in Chapter 1 Foucault suggests that the emergence in the eighteenth century of a concept of 'population' as a kind of natural entity with its own regularities and effects is associated with a transformation in government by which the household or family becomes an instrument of, rather than a model for political power. It must be noted that evidence from the literature suggests that even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the family was viewed as both model *and* instrument of political authority in that the well-ordered household was – to use Pavla Miller's term – the 'basic unit of social discipline' in the early modern

state.[319] Miller reports that strenuous efforts were made in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to prevent individuals from living outside the direct authority of the household with social and legal pressures bearing heavily on young people, the property-less and women.[320]

The early modern period has been characterised as the time when the patriarchal family was at its zenith.[321] Foucault writes that the idea of a public-private divide was but an embryonic feature of European thought at this point in time[322] – instead it was the case, according to Miller, that in many regions efforts to 'consolidate patriarchalism' resulted in multi-level hierarchical arrangements of patriarchal power.[323] As the King both represented and ruled over the multitude of subjects, so the paterfamilias represented and ruled over the individual members of the household: men ruled over households as husbands over wives, fathers over children and masters over servants and apprentices, with a degree of legal responsibility for the actions of their dependents and consequent power and duty to supervise and discipline.[324] Feminist scholarship points to a general trend towards a more restrictive legal status for women from the late Middle Ages as the limited rights attained by women over preceding centuries were gradually whittled away. Weisner writes that, because of its inherent assumptions of female inferiority, the importance of Roman Law in the process of reform and consolidation of continental European legal systems had a regressive effect, with unmarried women and widows reduced to the status of minors (under male legal guardianship) in some jurisdictions, while the rights of married women in respect of their children were restricted in light of the Roman principle of *patria potestas*.[325] English law was similarly rooted in negative assumptions regarding female capacity and under the common law principle of *coverture* a woman's legal personality merged with that of her husband severely restricting her rights in relation to property (restrictions mitigated in practice by the existence of alternative legal avenues such as the Courts of Equity), but also in relation to guardianship of children.[326]

Rejection of the spiritual superiority of celibacy and valorisation of the married state has been linked in the literature to greater esteem for women among Protestants, however Weisner cautions that Protestants attitudes towards *marriage* should not be conflated with attitudes towards *women*.[327] Submissiveness remained the feminine ideal, backed up by ordinances common to Protestant regions which imposed obligations on wives to obey their husbands.[328] In the voluminous 'house-

father' literature on domestic and familial government produced by early modern Protestants it was stressed that wives were not mere servants, but companions and helpmeets,[329] a theme echoed in the equivalent Catholic literature.[330] Women shared responsibility with their husbands for governing the household and were owed a duty of obedience from children and servants. Nevertheless, there could be only one supreme ruler (in theory at least) and although men were urged to exercise their authority temperately, Ruff suggests that there were relatively few legal barriers against male tyranny in either Catholic or Protestant regions, with Calvinist Geneva a notable exception.[331] Laws in many countries recognised the right of men to impose 'moderate' chastisement on their wives, while beating of children and servants within 'reasonable' limits was acceptable in most.[332] Ruff writes that there was a high degree of legal tolerance of violence against women and children, with only the most severe cases likely to appear before the courts, where a relatively lenient approach was likely to be taken.[333] This stands in contrast to the treatment of infanticide (a crime almost always committed by women) which was a major focus of legal reform in early modern Europe. In a number of countries new obligations were placed on unmarried women who fell pregnant to notify the authorities (and provide details of the putative father) with a presumption of infanticide in cases where the product of a concealed pregnancy did not survive.[334] Statistics analysed by Ruff demonstrate that these reforms facilitated a significant increase in prosecutions for infanticide, for which the penalty upon conviction was death.[335]

Tolerance of physical violence against older children reflects prevailing views on disciplinary practices. While the middle way was advocated, for the early modern moralist overly strict parenting was preferable to laxity.[336] A common theme in the domestic and pedagogical literature (whether Protestant or Christian humanist) was the importance of the paternal role in the child-rearing process.[337] Irrational and sentimental, mothers were seen as more likely to indulge their children.[338] Indeed the criticism of 'coddling' which Ariès points to in the sixteenth century could be seen as a devaluation of the traditional affective maternal role and valorisation of the more rational, *disciplined* approach to child-rearing associated with fathers. These themes were not original but were deployed in the classical sources from which early modern pedagogical writers, directly or indirectly, drew inspiration. For instance Foucault points to the use made by Seneca of the contrasting models of permissive mother and severe father.[339] Seneca took for granted a model of child-rearing in which fathers took

responsibility for the education of their sons. In carrying out this role the main objective is to ensure that boys grow up to be sufficiently strong and brave to cope with the vicissitudes to be faced in adult life. Hence the love showed by fathers to sons is not gentle or kind, but is expressed through, what Foucault refers to as, 'pedagogical vigilance'.[340] While Seneca deploys the trope of paternal love as a means of illustrating the kind of love which God (represented as father) has for man, it provides a useful insight into how the socialisation of boys was conceived in Stoic thought – as a process of 'hardening' or toughening up, an important theme in early modern pedagogical discourse, which propounded a rigorous model of socialisation for upper class boys.[341] Fletcher writes that the *telos* of socialisation for both boys and girls from the upper strata was understood in terms of *discipline*.[342] For males this was understood in terms of the dominance of reason over the emotional aspects of the self – Fletcher notes that instruction in Latin was an essential aspect of the process of 'hardening' by which men would develop the mental toughness to exercise mastery over themselves.[343] Girls too needed to acquire self-discipline, less so that they could exercise mastery over themselves but so that they would submit willingly to the mastery of their future husbands.[344] For them the socialisation process aimed at instilling specifically female virtues such as modesty, chastity and humility.[345]

Unfortunately not all fathers could be relied upon to ensure that their children came to maturity adequately equipped for adult life. Harrington notes that within the Reformation literature many were seen as too permissive, while others were undermined by the actions of overly-indulgent wives.[346] Parental failure was a particular source of anxiety within Protestantism which placed a heavier emphasis on the familial obligation for transmission of religious values than the Catholic Church. Concerns about neglectful parents in the Protestant literature were by no means novel, however, but echoed those previously expressed in the Christian humanist pedagogical literature. For instance noting the severe laws punishing abandonment of children, Erasmus decried the dearth of sanctions where parents failed to safeguard children's spiritual welfare, arguing that it was a 'crime against the community' as well as 'a sin against God' to neglect children's education.[347] Hence, as Harrington notes, it is in the literature of the Renaissance rather than the Reformation that we find the shift towards a view of child-rearing as 'social obligation'.[348] It was a theme which was to be significantly expanded in the Reformation literature, which laid a stress upon parental responsibility in a manner that legitimised

erosion of parental authority.[349] Indeed Harrington credits the German Reformation literature with the 'invention' of the now commonplace idea of the 'bad parent', in Foucauldian terms, a subject position produced via discursive 'dividing practices', aimed at sifting the parental wheat from the chaff and so facilitating appropriately directed intervention. It is significant that Harrington identifies one of the first categories of 'bad parent' to be targeted in Reformation Germany as those in receipt of public alms.[350] Protestant reformers were vehemently opposed to the attitude towards individual alms-giving of the medieval church (and retained by Catholics) by which the distribution of largesse to the poor was a 'good work' which would propel the donor closer to salvation.[351] Protestants rejected the association between works and redemption, but also argued that indiscriminate alms-giving undermined individual initiative and encouraged idleness.[352] Pullan writes that Protestant settlements led the way in attempts to organise centralised models of poor relief motivated by the aim of suppressing begging and stimulating industriousness with assistance generally linked to some form of work obligation.[353] Recipients were also expected to be morally upright. It is unsurprising that this particular group was among the first to be subject to investigation of parenting standards and that the major concern dealt was in relation to child-begging.[354] Harrington reports that what most exercised officials was that parents who sent their children out begging were failing to prepare their children adequately for adult-life by neglecting to provide for instruction in a trade or occupation – these children were thus doomed to repeat the cycle of idleness and immorality which had led their parents to depend upon public relief.[355]

Concerns about the capacity of parents to fulfil their obligations were not confined to the indigent, nor was intervention long restricted to this group. Cunningham reports that in 1530 Luther had argued that if the duty to educate was neglected 'children cease to belong to their parents and fall to the care of God and the community', and notes that other reformers went even further, contending that the claims of the community – religious and political – in respect of children were *superior* to those of parents [356] Inherent in these assertions is the emergent notion that parents are directly answerable to religious and civil authorities, who have the right to *insist* that parents live up to their responsibilities.[357] Indeed ordinances had already been introduced to this effect in a number of German towns and cities, imposing obligations on parents to send children to school, among the earliest were those introduced in Magdeburg in 1524 and Eisleben in 1525.[358]

These ordinances – and the wave of national school attendance laws which they prefigured – were instrumental in the gradual shift from a view of the school as a substitute for 'bad parents', to one in which the primary tasks of parenting are to ensure that children are adequately prepared for and supported throughout the various stages of their school careers.

## Schools and schooling

Schools which existed in the Middle Ages primarily catered for those destined for religious life.[359] According to Shahar this group was primarily made up of children from prosperous aristocratic or mercantile families, for whom the Church offered a convenient mechanism for the disposal of unmarriageable, illegitimate or otherwise problematic offspring.[360] What may have been somewhat unpromising material in some cases had to be made fit for God's service; those who were to exercise pastoral authority had first to be instructed and trained. This is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the 'pastoral' mode of exercising power; those who are entrusted with the responsibility of governing others, from civil servants to teachers and parents, must themselves be appropriately educated and guided so that they can effectively exercise control over themselves as well as others.[361] In terms of the prototypical pastor, the priest, countless canons issued by councils in the patristic and medieval periods stressed the importance of an educated, literate and disciplined clergy, well versed in scripture and ecclesiastical regulations.[362] The frequent reiteration of concerns, as reported by Pride, demonstrates that the production of such priests was no simple task.[363]

Ariès writes that until the early Middle Ages the education of future clergy took place in secular schools organised in the Hellenistic tradition, but that from the fifth century the Church took a more active role in preparation for religious life.[364] From about the fourth century to the eighth century the Church had evinced a strong concern with catechising newly converted pagans, but over time as the majority of Christians had been born into the faith the catechetical schools faded into obsolescence and parents and priests took over responsibility for faith formation.[365] From this period Church canons and decrees concerning education dealt primarily with the training of priests; the earliest canons had envisaged a form of apprenticeship under bishops however from the eighth century there was an increased emphasis placed on formal schooling.[366] Two main forms of school existed

within the medieval church. Monastic and convent schools prepared the young for the closely regulated existence of the cloister,[367] while 'song' schools or 'reading' schools attached to cathedrals (and sometimes monasteries) offered elementary education on a day-pupil basis. As the name suggests, the former placed a strong emphasis on singing as the pupils served as choirboys to the church or cathedral to which the school was attached.[368] Apart from singing, pupils attending these schools would usually receive basic instruction in Latin, learning the alphabet and basic reading skills as well as prayers and liturgical responses.[369]

Ariès describes the cathedral school as 'the original cell of our entire scholastic system in the West'.[370] Although some such schools may have already been in existence, the Carolingian Renaissance of the eighth and ninth centuries stimulated expansion of provision; a series of canons from the late eighth century dealt with the obligation of bishops to establish schools 'under learned masters' in cathedral towns.[371] According to Ariès the scope of education in the cathedral school broadened during the Carolingian Renaissance to include the seven 'liberal arts' as well as theology and canon law.[372] The decrees of the Third and Fourth Lateran Councils (in 1179 and 1215 respectively) obliged not just cathedrals but other churches with sufficient means to provide schooling for clerics and 'poor scholars' opening up opportunities for boys from poorer families to obtain the requisite education for religious service.[373] Ariès writes that these decrees also provided for the licensing of private masters offering an alternative to the church schools.[374] It is from about this time that the first European universities were taking shape in France, Italy and England as the more prestigious Latin schools evolved into institutes of higher learning, with a particular focus on canon law and theology.[375] Despite the existence of different types of educational institutions we cannot think in terms of progression through distinct stages of provision as we do today. Individuals generally began formal education at a relatively advanced age by current standards and were instructed in the context of a mixed age grouping.[376] Repetition was an important aspect of medieval education which placed a strong emphasis on memorisation, so while some scholars passed through the 'Latin' or 'grammar' school and moved on to university, they would have returned to the same texts and authors at various points in their educational careers.[377]

Of course most children in Medieval Europe did not attend school, but instead acquired knowledge and skills from their parents or other family members. This was certainly true of the overwhelming majority

of peasants,[378] and Heywood suggests that this was also the case for many of the children of artisans, contending that apprenticeship outside of the family for this class was less common than had been previously suggested by Ariès.[379] Whether carried on within their own family or in another household education for this class was primarily on the basis of experience than institutionalised instruction. Among the wealthier classes children might be educated within the home by a tutor or governess, and perhaps dispatched to another great household to complete their education, something which seems to have been more likely for boys than for girls.[380] Shahar writes that a broadening of occupational opportunities for members of the nobility from about the thirteenth century served to increase the importance of education for boys from elite families leading to increased gender and class disparity.[381]

For various reasons the Renaissance period is associated with an expansion in educational provision – in addition to the pedagogical innovations associated with humanism and the increased importance of literacy following the invention of printing, the upsurge in commercial activity in this period is associated with increased social mobility and hence greater demand for education, as well as with requirements for types of knowledge and skills generally not prioritised in church schools.[382] Grendler records the increasing importance of independent schools of various kinds from small-scale, short-lived establishments carried on by single individuals to endowed schools established by local communities/ parents (common in Central Europe) or on the basis of a bequest from a wealthy individual (particularly popular in England).[383] For the most part attendance at independent schools was restricted to those (generally boys) whose parents could afford to pay, although some endowed schools may have been provided with sufficient funds to bear the entire costs of educating (and in some cases maintaining) at least some of those attending.[384] There was also significant growth in the number of municipal schools, particularly in France and Italy; Grendler writes that these generally delivered a humanist curriculum and aimed at instilling civic virtues in those boys who were likely to occupy leadership positions in the future.[385] Boys at the lower end of the social scale might attend vernacular schools where they received a more vocationally-oriented education than their humanistically educated betters.[386] Girls' education, where available, also tended to be carried on through the vernacular; knowledge of the Latin tongue serving as a marker of gender and class distinctions.[387] The invention of the printing press in the late fifteenth century is asso-

ciated with an enormous increase in available reading material and greater emphasis on literacy skills, but for the bulk of the population literacy was not yet an essential requirement.[388] According to Maynes, most schools provided at least basic instruction in reading, but not necessarily in writing skills, traditionally the exclusive role of guilded 'writing masters' who fought hard to retain control over this aspect of educational provision.[389]

Commenting on the 'laicization of education' in Renaissance Europe, Grendler writes that it was not until the sixteenth century that the religious assumed a major role in delivering schooling.[390] The particular emphasis which Protestantism placed on individual bible-reading is generally regarded as an important impetus for efforts to educate the masses and boost literacy levels in Reformed territories, which in turn served to stimulate Catholic initiatives. Certainly Protestant reformers were enormously interested in education and wished to see reform at all levels of provision. Luther and his followers began with the universities – the breeding-ground of future religious and civic leaders.[391] As Foucault writes neither the Reformation, nor any of the pastoral revolts which preceded it, aimed at abolishing the pastorate, but sought to purify, improve and strengthen the pastorate.[392] An important aspect of strengthening the pastorate was of course the education and training of individual pastors. Protestants did not place anything like the same importance on the mediating influence of the pastor as did Catholics, yet despite the strong emphasis on spiritual equality there was still an assumption that some few would lead and the masses would be guided. It is unsurprising then that reform of higher education was one of the foremost goals of Protestant reformers and the reforms aimed at establishing instruction in scripture as the overarching objective of the university's mission.[393]

As discussed above reformers placed a particular importance on the role of parents (especially fathers) as 'pastors' while at the same time evincing little faith in the capacity of ordinary people to actually fulfil this role.[394] The school represented one possible solution to these dilemmas; by supporting the provision of schooling civil authorities could compensate for the deficiencies of parents, while promoting religious unity and civic obedience, goals then viewed as inextricably intertwined.[395] Melton reports that this stimulated 'a flood of school ordinances' in the Protestant territories of the Holy Roman Empire which led both to the establishment of new schools as well as the reorientation of existing secular schools towards religious instruction.[396] In Elizabethan England laws were passed in the late sixteenth

century providing that each village should have a 'petty school', to teach young children,[397] while across the Atlantic the Massachusetts School Law, 1642 obliged families to ensure that every male child be taught to read, while further legislation in 1647 – referred to, according to Jeynes, as 'the Old Deluder Satan Act' – ordered every town with more than 50 families to appoint a schoolmaster.[398] Only in Scandinavia was schooling de-emphasised – here ordinances adopted from the mid-seventeenth century required families to ensure that children acquired literacy skills, without requiring the establishment of schools or compelling attendance.[399]

Scandinavia excepted, Protestant reformers advocated schooling for children from even the humblest backgrounds and for girls as well as boys, (although Weisner reports that the number of girls' schools established was significantly less than for boys).[400] While radical in certain respects this was not intended as a means of challenging traditional systems of stratification. The peasants who interpreted his message as a call to arms were roundly condemned by Luther, who was reportedly horrified by the use of his teachings as justification for the revolts of the 1520s.[401] A number of authors comment on the noticeable shift in Luther's position regarding individual bible reading from around 1525.[402] Challenging the traditional association between Protestantism, vernacular bible reading and the rise of literacy, Gawthrop and Strauss argue that the first generation of reformers quickly came to believe that study of the scriptures was not necessarily appropriate for the general population. Ideally scriptural study would remain the preserve of those educated sufficiently in the 'biblical' languages of Greek, Hebrew and Latin. Catechism rather than bible-study was more appropriate for the masses and the vernacular schools, beyond which the mass of the population would not progress, aimed to catechise rather than provide a broad education.[403] According to Melton parish schools did not prioritise or even necessarily provide tuition in reading and writing.[404] It seems that literacy skills were more likely to be acquired in the unlicensed schools (*winkelschulen* in German) which, despite official disapproval, flourished in urban areas.[405]

Building on the arguments of Gawthrop and Strauss, Melton contends that the Pietist movement, as opposed to Protestantism generally, was the more important impetus for individual bible-reading, expansion of popular schooling and rising literacy rates in early modern Central Europe. Like Puritanism with which it is frequently compared, Pietism was not a distinct religious denomination, but orig-

inated in seventeenth-century Germany as a movement within the Lutheran tradition which placed a particularly strong emphasis on 'inner spirituality'.[406] The source and support of inner spirituality was the Bible and Pietists were strong advocates of individual engagement with scripture; wanting to move away from a superficial mode of religious observance they emphasised reading and discussion of the Bible, rather than the rote memorisation associated with catechism.[407] Initially resisted by the mainstream Lutheran establishment, upon gaining the support of the Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick William, the Pietist movement gained an enormous amount of influence.[408] In political terms the appeal of Pietism lay in the emphasis on individual and social discipline[409] – Oestreich writes that in this regard Pietism reflects the influence of Neostoic ideas, which were enthusiastically received in Brandenburg-Prussia during Frederick William's Electorship.[410] Pietism promoted a high degree of responsibility for one's own moral and spiritual well-being as well as concern for that of others, which underpinned its mission as a reformist movement.[411] There was a close association made between spirituality and self-control, which Melton reports could be attained only with the assistance of God's grace thus promoting passivity and resignation[412] – hence as in Christian spirituality generally the Stoic association of practices of self-mastery with individual freedom is overridden by the emphasis on subjugation of the individual will to that of God (and the Prince).

The rise of Pietism in Brandenburg-Prussia entailed a significant amount of compromise; as Gawthrop and Strauss explain, the earliest phase of the Pietist movement centred around the conventicle – local groupings by which people could come together in order to read and discuss the Bible and receive spiritual instruction in preparation for the task of instructing and supporting others.[413] The conventicle – along with independence from the state – were the chief casualties of a settlement brokered by Frederick William which brought about acceptance of Pietism by mainstream Lutherans, leading to a shift in emphasis within Pietism towards the school as the chief mechanism for spiritual and moral reform.[414] Major reform and expansion of educational provision could realistically only be achieved through state initiative, but both Gawthrop and Strauss and Melton note the important role of leading figures in the Pietist movement in driving, guiding and overseeing state initiatives and credit Pietism with providing the template for developments in state-funded schooling, which were modelled on the various schools established by Pietists in Halle.[415] According to

Melton the model of schooling developed by the Pietists aimed at once at autonomy and submission – the explicit aim was to 'break' the child's will, which Melton emphasises did not mean terrorising the child into compliance, but rather bringing about a voluntary submission to the pedagogical regime (and ultimately to spiritual and civic authority), which was heartfelt, rather than superficial, via refined, precise methods of control rather than through physical violence.[416] Melton notes that the Pietist emphasis on promoting *internal* motivation coupled with their belief in the intrinsic *moral* value of work dovetailed neatly with contemporaneous Cameralist arguments regarding the superiority of the internalised work ethic to coercive methods for maximising labour productivity; in the context of the declining significance of guilds as well as a shift away from feudal work obligations, Pietist-infused schooling represented a means of infusing the lower orders with the *desire* to work.[417]

The ambition to exercise more effective and efficient control over populations was not unique to Protestant rulers and clerics. As in Protestant regions, expansion of schooling in Catholic territories was undertaken as a means of safeguarding the flock, disseminating doctrine and promoting civic obedience. In some countries – notably in Austria under Empress Maria Theresa – state resources were harnessed in establishing schools and promoting attendance. Melton writes that in the Austrian context this was part of a wider effort to inculcate piety and defend the Catholic faith not just against encroachment by Protestantism, but against threats posed by popular religious practices rooted in ignorance and superstition, which not only distorted Catholic teaching, but promoted disorder and immorality.[418] In other countries, the drive for Catholic schooling was led by religious confraternities (voluntary associations of lay people), orders and congregations. While monasteries and convents were disbanded in Reformed territories and religious confraternities suppressed,[419] the post-Tridentine period saw the establishment of new religious orders and organisations in Catholic Europe, many of whom either adopted a teaching mission or had one thrust upon them. According to Carlsmith, the latter more accurately describes the experience of the most famous of the Counter-Reformation religious orders, the Society of Jesus, founded through the initiative of Ignatius of Loyola in 1540.[420] With an explicit mission to guide souls the Jesuits were an order of shepherds, dedicated to activity rather than passive contemplation – 'contemplation in action'.[421] As Gray explains, for Ignatius spirituality and education were inextricably intertwined – he understood his own

conversion experience in *tutelary* terms as direct instruction from God.[422] Ignatius believed that for each individual there was the possibility of a *personal* relationship with God in order to receive guidance and direction on how best to organise one's existence in accordance with the divine will.[423] The famous spiritual exercises which Ignatius developed were designed as an aid to discerning God's will and this was also the overarching purpose of Jesuit education – to assist the young to access and apply God's teaching.[424]

The *Constitutions* of the Society of Jesus set out in particularly elaborate detail the elements of the education and training of the Jesuit novitiate. As elaborated by Gray these incorporated three 'constitutive operations'.[425] These culminated in *devotion* (brought about by grace) but the foundational operation was *attention* – the novitiate was called upon to cultivate silence in order to facilitate awareness of divine immanence which in turn stimulated *reverence* for the divinely infused reality.[426] Foucault tells us that the 'apprenticeship in silence', a potent theme in spiritual and pedagogical thought has an ancient lineage which he traces back to the Pythagoreans and then to the Stoics, for whom it was particularly important and to the pedagogical writings of Plutarch.[427] As elaborated by the likes of Seneca and Plutarch attention was not passive – it demanded an active orientation towards the *logos* assisted by an alert, erect – but static – posture.[428] A restless body signified a restless soul and unless the soul was calm it could not be receptive to the *logos*.[429] Foucault writes that in Hellenistic thought, in order for the student to advance a dual kind of attention (a 'double and forked attention' in Foucault's terms) was required – as well as attending to the word, one must also pay attention to the self, by testing one's progress in assimilating truth.[430] Although designed with quite a different purpose, this dual mode of attention was built into the process of Jesuit novitiate education in which the three 'constitutive operations' were joined with six experiments or tests designed, according to Gray, to assess the capacity of the novitiate to incorporate the lessons obtained from his own spiritual practices into his role as defender and propagator of the faith.[431]

Carlsmith writes that the first Jesuit school specifically for students not connected to the order was founded in 1547/48, in response to a request from the authorities of the Sicilian city of Messina.[432] According to figures presented by Carlsmith, Jesuit schools numbered 245 worldwide by 1600, rising to 700 a century later. The curriculum utilised in Jesuit schools was broadly humanistic, adjusted in line with Catholic religious sensibilities.[433] The Jesuits were famous for their

distinctive method, initially applying what they referred to as the *modus Parisienses* a pedagogical approach derived from the mode of teaching deployed at the University of Paris, which ultimately evolved into the Jesuit *ratio studorium*.[434] The method placed a strong emphasis on a model of active learning grounded in exercises and tests – for instance students were continually called upon to develop and test their knowledge through *disputationes* or debates and were examined by the teacher at the end of every lesson.[435] The Jesuit method was distinguished by an emphasis on order unusual in prevailing pedagogical practice; students followed a sequentially organised study plan, a novelty for the time.[436] The initial course of study for each student was determined by the results of a compulsory entrance examination and thereafter students progressed on successful completion of each stage.[437] The student body was divided into classes and each class was subdivided into groups of ten (*decuriae*), with a (*decurio*) monitor or captain at its head.[438] Codina[439] suggests that the *decuriae* model was derived from monastic practice, with which Scaglione concurs, while crediting the Brethren of the Common Life with adapting the practice to pedagogical ends.[440] To the Brethren too he attributes the introduction of examining students as a prerequisite to progression, as well as the introduction of rivalry between individuals and groups as a spur to achievement and good conduct.[441] Competition and peer monitoring ('fraternal correction') were important aspects of the Jesuit method, students were encouraged to emulate their peers but also to inform on those who behaviour was less than exemplary.[442] While each *decurio* was entrusted with formal responsibility for monitoring his group, all students were encouraged to supervise and inform on each other.[443] Sanctions were inflicted for infractions, but corporal punishment was a last resort and where necessary this was to be administered by hirelings rather than the members of the order.[444]

Another Catholic order accorded prominence in the history of schooling is the Brothers of the Christian Schools founded by St. Jean Baptiste de la Salle (1651–1719). The prototype for the schools of the Christian Brothers was established by de la Salle and his associates in Reims in 1679, a free school serving poor boys, which precipitated the establishment of the teaching order.[445] De la Salle is credited by Ariès with leading the shift towards vernacular elementary education in France, although the schools provided instruction in Latin, unusually for the time, the boys first learned to read and write in French.[446] Over time the Brothers' educational mission expanded to providing a practical, vernacular form of secondary education for boys from the middle

classes, as an alternative to the classical Latinate model, which was deemed a poor preparation for a future in trade or craft.[447] By 1789 over 36,000 French children were attending schools administered by the Brothers, who had by this time begun to extend their educational mission abroad, having established communities and schools in Belgium, Switzerland and Italy.[448] As will be discussed in greater detail below, the de la Salle schools were pedagogically innovative and indeed are credited as a possible influence on Pietist teaching methods.[449]

The most important *female* teaching order founded in early modern Europe was the Ursulines – Weisner writes that prior to the establishment of the Ursuline order educational opportunities for Catholic females were extremely limited.[450] Founded initially as a confraternity in Italy in the first half of the sixteenth century, by the mid-seventeenth century the Ursulines had evolved into a religious congregation heavily engaged in teaching. The Ursulines tailored their offerings to girls of different social backgrounds offering day schools to those of humble backgrounds and boarding school provision to the high-born, but Weisner writes that, reflecting the limited horizons of the adult female role, convent-based education, even for upper-class girls, prioritised 'piety and morals' over academic knowledge.[451] Catholic girls were no more likely than their Protestant peers to receive instruction in Latin or the liberal arts, which Weisner reports was offered to only a 'tiny elite' of early modern women.[452]

**Pedagogical discipline**

By our current standards the pedagogical practices of many early modern schools were not conducive to efficient instruction.[453] Reliance on the 'individual' method of instruction meant that pupils were unattended for a good portion of the school day; each was called in turn to work for a few minutes daily with the master whose attention was consequently diverted from the mass of pupils for most of the school day.[454] In contrast to the modern 'class' made up of a particular age group all following the same programme, the pupils crowded into the early modern schoolroom varied considerably in terms of age and educational standard, with adults sometimes learning alongside children and adolescents.[455] Ariès writes that from the late fifteenth century pupils were beginning to be divided into 'classes', but that at this point classes were based on the standard of learning attained rather than age and were not allocated to separate rooms but remained 'within the same four walls'.[456] Over time (varying by country, region and town)

these classes began to be allocated a specific teacher and eventually were allocated individual rooms within the school.[457] Finally between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, going hand in hand with the growing importance of what Ariès refers to as the 'penchant for analysis and division' characteristic of the modern *mentalité,* the link between the class and chronological age was strengthened.[458] This of course is associated with the invention of a range of tools to classify and measure normative *development,* a theme to which we will return, but the main pedagogical objective was to enhance efficiency and promote order, the overarching goals of disciplinary modes of power. The advance of a 'utilitarian rationalization of detail' in classroom settings introduced further sub-divisions by a process of continually 'ranking' individual pupils across various dimensions, making it possible for the master to exercise continual supervision over the conduct of *each and all* simultaneously.[459]

Ariès tell us that the rise of discipline in the scholastic sphere went hand in hand with changes in the understanding of childhood.[460] He points to a shift 'as early as the fifteenth century' when what he regards as a 'new' emphasis on the moral weakness of childhood emerged in scholastic discourse in conjunction with a corresponding emphasis on the duty of masters to 'mould their pupils' minds, inculcate virtues, educate as well as instruct'.[461] Closer regulation was facilitated by the gradual evolution of the 'college' into an institution for the accommodation, tuition and *supervision* of scholars. In contrast to the relative freedom enjoyed by scholars in the Middle Ages, students in the colleges in the sixteenth century lived a closely monitored existence predicated on the monastic model, with a growing emphasis on detailed regulation of time as well as conduct and an increase in the use of physical sanctions.[462] Ariès writes that at the beginning of the fifteenth century corporal punishment was beginning to be applied more regularly, but was more or less reserved for the youngest pupils as well as poor students.[463] Over the course of the fifteenth century corporal sanctions were increasingly used against physical violence, however by the sixteenth century corporal punishment was applied in relation to all infractions and to students at all levels of education up to and including university undergraduates.[464] While acknowledging the rise in physical sanctions generally in the age of absolutism Ariès sees something distinctive about their application to the young; corporal punishment of children crossed boundaries of wealth and status thus marking out children as a distinct group as well as blurring the boundaries between childhood and adolescence.[465]

Maynes notes that the school occupied a marginal position at best in the lives of most children throughout the early modern era. Those children who attended early modern schools did so for relatively brief amounts of time (Cunningham suggests that three years was the maximum for most[466]). For many schooling was a weekly rather than daily event, but the school-day was short in any case and most schools were in operation for only a short part of the year.[467] Of course many children, rich and poor, never attended school at all, but availed of alternative forms of education. Drawing on Foucault's references to schooling Deacon insists that the privileged position attained by the school was 'neither inevitable nor planned', but occurred only after pedagogical disciplinary techniques had been developed and refined to the point where their *positive* utility – in terms of the constitution of *obedient* and *productive* subjects – had become clear.[468] The disciplinary innovations of Pietist and Catholic pedagogues were an important part of the gradual process by which the disordered, inefficient early modern schoolroom was transformed into what Foucault calls 'a learning machine'.[469] Credited with the invention of the 'simultaneous method' of instruction, among other innovations, the Institutes of the Brothers of the Christian Schools founded by St. Jean Baptiste de la Salle (1651–1719) have been accorded a particularly important position in the genealogy of pedagogical discipline.[470] In 1695 de la Salle wrote a detailed guide for the conduct of his 'Christian' schools (*Conduite des écoles chrétiennes),* an amended version of which was published in print form in 1720. For Foucault these rules encompass each of the various aspects of disciplinary power identified in *Discipline and Punish – the art of distributions*; *the control of activity*; *the organisation of geneses* and *the composition of forces* – apparently mundane and trivial in the attention to the tiniest detail but for that reason all the more effective as a means of exercising control.[471]

The 'art of distributions' is the means by which disciplinary power acts upon *space*. Foucault writes that this may *sometimes* involve 'enclosure', the separation off of a dedicated 'disciplinary space' such as a school, a workshop or a prison, but what is fundamental to the operation of disciplinary power is 'partitioning', the distribution of individuals in space so that each is rendered more visible and thus more manageable.[472] The proto-typical form of partition is the monastic cell, but the rise of the disciplines in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is associated with the emergence of more fluid models of demarcating and allocating space on the basis of *rank,* with the positions of individuals varying according to performance across a range of

indicators.[473] Foucault writes that de la Salle envisaged a classroom organised on the basis of multiple rankings including 'the pupil's progress, worth, character, application, cleanliness and parent's fortune'.[474] The resulting spatial distribution of pupils, Foucault likens to the classificatory 'table' characteristic of the classical age – at once 'a technique of power and a procedure of knowledge'.[475] By such innovations the school was transformed from a somewhat crude mechanism for simply *imparting* knowledge to a sophisticated technology of government by which whole groups of children could not only be efficiently instructed (as in the case of de la Salle's 'simultaneous method' or the 'zusammenunterrichtsmethode' of the German Pietist schools),[476] but could be continuously supervised, classified and graded.[477] The distribution of pupils in space both facilitated and depended upon the disciplinary 'dividing practices' of *hierarchical observation*, *normalizing judgement* and of course *examination*.

Disciplinary power also acts upon *time*; the most familiar tool for the control of activity is the timetable, another legacy of the cloister which was adapted and refined in the workshops and schools of the seventeenth century.[478] Foucault cites the detailed instructions regarding prayer in de la Salle's rules of conduct for Christian schools as an example of the 'increasingly minute' regulation of daily activities, stressing that this went hand in hand with efforts to intensify supervision and eliminate potential distractions.[479] Detailed temporal control of activity aimed to ensure not just that time was not 'wasted', but that every moment was utilised as 'exhaustively' as possible, both by measuring time in the smallest possible units and by breaking down activities into their smallest component actions and conditioning bodies to carry these out with rigorous precision and regularity.[480] Preoccupation with efficient use of time was also a notable feature of Pietist pedagogy and it is interesting that the analogy of 'merchandise' was deployed by its chief architect Francke in representing time as something to be valued and not 'wasted'.[481] Noting that the concept of 'free time' was an innovation introduced by Francke as a specific category within the school day, Melton writes that this served to underline the idea that all other time should be utilised as 'industriously' as possible.[482]

The 'organisation of geneses' is the means by which discipline operates to 'capitalize' time, by ensuring that individuals achieve maximum 'profit' from time invested in activities.[483] As noted above medieval schooling placed a strong emphasis on repetition; students did not necessarily progress through graduated stages of learning. Foucault traces the modern idea of the sequential educational programme char-

acterised by 'exercises of increasing complexity' to the Brethren of the Common Life, whose approach he suggests, reoriented the ascetic mode of *graduated* progression along the path to spiritual perfection towards secular educational goals.[484] As discussed earlier, the Brethren are acknowledged as an important influence on the pedagogical approach – *modus Parisiensis* – associated with the University of Paris, adopted in Jesuit schools in which studies were organised sequentially and students were promoted upon having demonstrated mastery of a particular stage.[485] The 'graduated programme' was a distinct feature of the schools of the classical age, exemplified by the nine different grades of instruction proposed by de la Salle from the table of the alphabet, through the various stages of learning to read, up to the final grade 'letters written by hand', by way of the Psalter and the book on Christian civility.

Discipline is an individualising mode of power – it is a mode of exercising power which differentiates and categorises, by which it aims at optimising the functioning of the whole.[486] The modern school became a 'machine for learning' by first transforming the undifferentiated mass of pupils into individual elements and then combining these elements – *the composition of forces* – to enhance productivity and efficiency.[487] Foucault writes that the composition of forces depends upon a 'precise system of command', by which orders could be given and received almost instantaneously, with minimal speech required.[488] The system adopted in de la Salle's schools is cited as the exemplar *par excellence* in this regard.[489] The rule of silence was expected to be rigorously enforced in de la Salle's schools, teachers were requested to speak but rarely and to rely instead on a system of signs to communicate with pupils, for most of which an iron instrument, 'the signal', was used. The simplicity of this system left no space for discussion or argument; noiseless command was to be followed immediately by noiseless response.

In de la Salle's schools teachers were expected to deploy a judicious combination of firmness and gentleness in their deportment towards their charges, avoiding severity and harshness (which provoked resentment and recalcitrance) and excessive sympathy (which led to laxness and disorder).[490] Constant vigilance was advocated so that order could be maintained with minimal recourse to punishment. In this teachers were supported by 'supervisors' and 'inspectors' appointed from the pupil-body who reported on the conduct of their peers. The *Rules for the Conduct of Christian Schools* elaborated a system of rewards (for piety, assiduity and ability) as well as a detailed code of corrections

to which teachers were to adhere.[491] While deployment of physical punishments was sanctioned, 'penances' were the preferred approach as 'they repel the pupil less, cause less distress to parents and are much more useful'.[492] Foucault tells us that the distinguishing characteristic of disciplinary punishment is that it is corrective – the aim is to reform and not simply chastise since discipline is concerned less with discouraging prohibited behaviour than with promoting conformity to behavioural norms.[493] The penances imposed in the de la Salle schools, which included physical penances such as kneeling for a specified period of time as well as academic exercises such as learning a piece of catechism or a lesson, were designed to actively engage the pupil in a process of self-improvement, with the aim of bringing about *internal* change. As stated in the rules of de la Salle penances were to be used to 'bring {pupils} to a state of heart to correct themselves of their faults'.[494]

Whereas the exercise of sovereign power is characterised as sporadic and reactive, Foucault characterises disciplinary power as a kind of 'perpetual penality'.[495] In the disciplined schoolroom the teacher does not merely respond to infractions of rules; as we have seen pupils are subject to a continual process of observation, classification and distribution which Foucault observes in itself represents a complex system of reward and punishment.[496] As the teacher regularly marks the relative positions of the pupils as they move up or down the various rankings (perhaps through a change in the seating arrangements), a shift in position can represent either a reward for endeavour or a penalty for failure, operating as a powerful incentive to maintain or increase efforts to meet required standards.[497] The detailed evidence produced in relation to the relative success (or lack thereof) of each individual in adhering to academic and behavioural norms thus is seen to have a *normalizing* effect; pupils are subject to comparison, differentiation and classification in order to promote conformity.[498]

A striking feature of de la Salle's rules is the emphasis placed not just on the behaviour of pupils but on that of the instructors. Teachers were provided with detailed guidance on how to conduct themselves throughout the school-day. On entering the classroom teachers were exhorted to 'walk with great decorum and in silence, not rapidly, but sedately, with great reserve of demeanour and glance'.[499] Teachers were advised to remain seated for most of the day, leaving their place only in 'cases of grave necessity', although the rules make clear that such cases would rarely arise in the well-ordered classroom.[500] Playfulness, laughter or 'do{ing} anything that might excite the pupils' was strictly

forbidden.[501] Teachers were exhorted to comport themselves with 'great seriousness' and 'great reserve in their gestures, in their actions, and in their words'.[502] Such paragons of self-regulation did not enter the teaching profession pre-fabricated but had to be formed and shaped. The teachers of the first schools established by de la Salle lived within a community which was as closely-regulated as a monastery; over time a fully-fledged religious order developed with a novitiate established providing religious and pedagogical training.[503] As noted above, de la Salle is credited with establishing the first training school for lay teachers in France in the late seventeenth century, while Pietists equally placed a strong emphasis on teacher formation, establishing the earliest training schools in Prussia.[504] These pioneers of schooling clearly appreciated that a fundamental aspect of effective government is ensuring that those who will wield authority over others have the capacity to regulate their own conduct.

**Regulation and resistance**

Although not quite 'all things to all people' the early modern school seemed to hold out the promise of accomplishing a number of important tasks more effectively – and more cheaply – than could be achieved by the available alternatives. From the perspective of various members of the religious, political and intellectual elite, schooling represented a mechanism for instilling civic and religious virtues among the mass of the population (parents as well as children), among whom these were sadly lacking. Despite recognition of the benefits of schooling Maynes suggests that ambivalence about popular education was common even among its most fervent advocates, while attitudes of outright hostility were widely held among the propertied classes who feared potentially destabilising effects.[505] As discussed above, while the first generation of Protestant reformers stimulated the passage of school ordinances and establishment of schools their ambitions regarding educational outcomes were limited to religious indoctrination. Maynes notes that most proponents of schooling in the Enlightenment era were motivated by similar concerns as their sixteenth-century predecessors regarding the inability of parents of the poorer classes to adequately socialise their children, concerns heightened in light of the increased emphasis on education associated with widespread acceptance of Locke's sensationalist epistemology.[506] Hence she writes that the gap between advocates of schooling and high-born obscurantists was effectively not too wide – each wished to defend the *status quo* in terms of social relations.[507] Few of its proponents envisaged popular

education as anything other than a means of encouraging conformity and obedience.[508]

Evidence from social historians suggest that for the children and parents who were the targets of educational reforms, the functions of schooling were viewed in somewhat different terms. For parents of young children the school could be a source (albeit very limited) of respite or childcare.[509] More importantly the school was a potential means (one of many) of acquiring the knowledge and skills which would help prepare children for future employment, although in many cases the schooling available had little vocational value. Since sending children to school could involve considerable effort and cost, it is understandable that parents might not do so in the perceived absence of tangible returns. Of course many families depended too much on the labour of their children for schooling to be a realistic option, others lived too far away from the nearest school or simply could not afford the costs involved.[510] Cunningham notes that evidence of demand for schooling from parents, even among the poor, is provided by the various forms of school established by community initiative or commercially-operated establishments which relied upon parental fees.[511] These were more likely to be responsive to local needs and preferences than schools established by religious or municipal authorities, with which pay-schools, often existed in competition in cities and towns. For instance Melton links the popularity of the German *winkulschulen* to the greater emphasis these schools placed on imparting literacy skills than on religious and moral instruction.[512] Efforts to suppress these schools reflect the tension between the respective educational goals of families and civil and religious authorities in Germany, tension which would become apparent across the entire Western world by the nineteenth century, as more states sought to exert greater control over schooling and to impose stricter obligations on parents in respect of their children's education.

## Conclusion

Having examined the emergence of the 'pedagogical discourse' in early modern Europe we can say that the rise of the Dionysian image of childhood as symbolic target of disciplinary power is associated with multiple discourses of childhood which overlapped in certain aspects and conflicted in others. Despite differing perspectives on the question of original sin, there is a degree of commonality between humanist, Protestant and Catholic child-rearing precepts in the emphasis on the

malleability of childhood and the importance of achieving a balance between harsh and permissive child-rearing methods. There was general agreement on the importance of high levels of parental supervision and guidance, with a strong emphasis placed on the paternal role in this regard. Education was conceived in terms of didactic instruction; the aim was the transmission of authoritative knowledge – whether from classical literature, scripture or the political doctrine of Hobbes. It was during this period that serious doubts were raised about the capacity of ordinary parents to rear and educate their children properly. The earliest school attendance laws were an attempt to compensate for inadequate parenting, but the lesson from the literature is that the gradual rise of the school as a disciplinary institution in early modern Europe cannot be seen as a straightforward process – numerous forms of schools existed other than those established to moralise the masses and of course many reached adulthood without ever having attended any form of school. It is likely that most schools were in any case ill-adapted to the task of moral discipline, although by the eighteenth century there had been significant advances in pedagogical technologies which would later be adopted on a wide scale.

# 4
# The Gentle Way in Child Government

This chapter is concerned with the construction and regulation of childhood from the eighteenth century to the late twentieth century. In the eighteenth century the overarching influence of the sensationalist epistemology set out in Locke's *Essay on Human Understanding* and concomitant emphasis on childhood impressionability is associated with an upsurge of interest in the power of education to shape attitudes and morals.[1] Cunningham suggests the 'new sensitivity towards childhood' apparent in the eighteenth century contributed to a long-term shift in approaches to child-rearing away from 'bending twigs to a desired shape' towards 'giving free rein to growth'.[2] This is attributed to the influences of Locke, Rousseau and Romanticism, in particular.[3] Taking Rousseau's *Émile* – credited by Jenks with the 'formalization' of the Apollonian child – as a starting point this chapter examines Rousseau's ideas on education and the nature of childhood in conjunction with those of Locke, before exploring Romantic and then utilitarian ideas in relation to childhood and education. The remainder of the chapter focuses on developments in relation to child welfare and education in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A brief discussion on liberal government of the family is followed by examination of legislative and policy developments in relation to child labour and compulsory schooling. There follows a discussion on youth justice and child welfare and protection. Drawing in particular on the work of Nikolas Rose and Kurt Danziger the final sections of the chapter are broadly concerned with the rise of developmental psychology in the context of child welfare and education policy and provision.

## Rousseau and Locke

Grounded in the assertion that the political and social arrangements of the day were morally corrosive,[4] on publication in 1762 Rousseau's *Émile* appeared as a significant departure from prevailing wisdom on preparation of the young for adulthood. The most influential text on education in the eighteenth century was Locke's *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* published in 1693 and Locke and Rousseau could be said to have shared a common goal, the production of a rational, self-governing citizen (in Rousseau's terms one under 'no sway but that of reason'[5]). At the same time there were significant differences in their respective understandings of precisely what this goal entailed – the essence of Lockean citizenship was private property,[6] Rousseau's citizen was conceptualised in terms of public responsibilities – as well as the means by which it could be achieved.

Locke's rational subject was one whose desires were kept in check, his will subordinated to reason via a model of socialisation which emphasised filial obedience. Rousseau also takes the will as his target, but his aim is to limit rather than suppress desire. The constraints on Émile's actions were (ostensibly) set by the laws of nature, not the will of adults; this would assist him to bring his desires into harmony with his powers, the path to true happiness, according to Rousseau, as it would avoid dependence on others.[7] Under Locke's approach children were to be conscious of the yoke of adult authority which gradually lightened as they grew older and became capable of rational self-government. Locke did not envisage the socialisation process as an ongoing battle of wills between child and adult, he strongly recommended that educational and leisure activities be attuned to the interests and disposition of individual children and that due regard be accorded to the particular characteristics of childhood as a life stage. ('I consider them as children that must be tenderly used, that must play and have playthings'.)[8] At the same time subjugating the will of the child to that of the parent was a central aspect of his pedagogical approach. By contrast Rousseau's approach was designed to maintain the 'pretence of freedom' and relied instead upon the 'yoke of necessity', a mode of intervention infinitely subtler, dependent upon manipulation of the child's environment, rather than *explicit* subjugation of the will.[9]

Rousseau's 'discipline through necessity' is bound up with the distinction he makes between the forms of self-love which motivate human action – *amour-de-soi-même* and *amour propre*.[10] The solitary

man of nature possessed 'neither vices nor virtues',[11] his actions motivated by *amour-de-soi* or the simple desire for self-preservation, the primal impulse of the Stoics.[12] He was happy because his needs were thus confined to the basic necessities of life which he could satisfy without aid. By contrast the desires of the civilised man of society generally far outstrip his capacities -since the ambitions of most go far beyond mere self-preservation –and he is therefore enmeshed in corrupting relations of dependency.[13] In this context, *amour-de-soi* mutates into *amour propre,* the individual's assessment of his worth in the eyes of others.[14] Rousseau's arguments here have been read as a direct response to the Epicurean/Augustinian position expounded in Mandeville's *Fable* which emphasised the self-interested basis of *all* human action – Force notes that while Rousseau viewed civilised man as motivated by *amour propre*, unlike Mandeville (and the Epicureans) this was not viewed as man's *natural* disposition.[15] For Rousseau (somewhat like Augustine) man's selfish passions are a result of corruption, however unlike Augustine he viewed civilised society as *cause*, rather than *consequence* of man's corrupted state.[16]

Brooke writes that Rousseau did not see *amour propre* in completely negative terms, in the context of civil society it was both unavoidable and necessary, but it was important to delay its emergence as much as possible and ensure that it was not 'inflamed'.[17] According to Rousseau most children of his era were inadvertently taught early in life that in order to satisfy their wants they must either charm or tyrannise those around them.[18] Émile's educational programme was designed to avoid this outcome in that refusal of the child's requests were to be grounded in (ostensible) necessity rather than the will of the one refusing. In the same vein Rousseau urged that children's actions be governed by consequences rather than either flattery or censure.[19] By contrast the subject of Locke's educational programme was to be exposed early to the force of social opinion, in that 'esteem' and 'disgrace' were the tools to be deployed in actively guiding children's behaviour. Where a child's conduct had fallen short of expected standards, his parents (and ideally everyone else in the household) were required to maintain an attitude of coldness until the child had repented of his errors. Parents were also to ensure that various privations attended the 'state of disgrace'; the child would thus quickly learn that the pleasures of life were reserved for those 'in a state of reputation'.[20]

Danziger suggests that Locke's position shifted over time from a conception of moral action as connected to transcendent rational principles towards a 'privatized' notion grounded in pleasure and pain.[21] As

just discussed an important aspect of the moral formation of individuals in Locke's view was fostering a solid association between wrongdoing and uncomfortable or unpleasant *feelings*; though the original cause of those unpleasant feelings was external to the individual, this was not in a traditional sense. Although Locke acknowledges that the 'true principle and measure of virtue' is God-given, the approbation of others 'is that which comes nearest to it' and therefore posited as the most appropriate guide for children's behaviour until they had reached an age at which they could judge such matters for themselves.[22] This grounding of conscience in *amour propre* Passmore regards as indicative of the gulf between Locke and religious views of virtue and morality, whereas Rousseau's view is regarded as closer to the more traditional view of *amour propre* as the root of sin, rather than the foundation of conscience.[23] By Roche's reading Rousseau's *amour propre* is the basis of what the Stoics referred to as 'reason of a sort', the debased reason which stems from vanity and acquisitiveness, in contrast to the divinely bestowed 'perfect reason' which attunes us to the laws of nature.[24] Unlike that of Locke, the Rousseauian conscience is in Bloch's terms 'a latent, but innate faculty' grounded in *amour-de-soi*.[25] It develops in late adolescence,[26] providing of course that the child's natural development has not been obstructed. At this point the child's instinctive desire to safeguard himself from harm expands to encompass other human beings (Brooke notes that Rousseau's account of this development is explicitly modelled on the Stoic account of *oikeiōsis*).[27] As the individual develops the capacity to identify with the suffering of others, pity is kindled and for Rousseau (per Force, drawing on *and* countering Mandeville) 'from {pity} alone flow all the social virtues'.[28]

> Do to others as you would have others do to you, inspires all men with that other maxim of natural goodness a great deal less perfect, but perhaps more useful, Consult your own happiness with as little prejudice as you can to that of others. It is in a word, this natural sentiment, rather than in fine-spun arguments, that we must look for the cause of that reluctance which every man would experience to do evil, even independently of the maxims of education.[29]

The roots of Rousseauian morality thus lay in instinct, rather than instruction, the path to moral excellence not the internalisation of norms of behaviour, but the gradual *development* of wholesome passions, something which proceeds in tandem with development of the capacity to reason. The aim of the educator is thus to create the

appropriate environment for moral and intellectual development to progress naturally. Sharing Locke's sensationalist epistemology[30] Rousseau developed an approach to education that relied initially on the senses, reserving until adolescence forms of knowledge that required abstract reasoning. Spiritual matters could not be comprehended by the child tied as he was to the knowledge of the senses – for this reason religious instruction was not a part of the child Émile's education.[31]

Bloch writes that Rousseau was concerned to avoid the materialism and determinism associated with sensationalism and to this end espoused Cartesian dualism.[32] In contrast to that of Descartes, Rousseau's does not appear to be a model of self-government in which the subject was divided against himself.[33] Descartes emphasised the necessity of subjecting the passions to reason, but he saw human reason as but a pale reflection of that of God, asserting that it is the human will – which knows no bounds – which is the divine element in man.[34] For Rousseau, as for the Hellenistic philosophers from whom he drew inspiration, virtue and happiness depended upon curbing that potentially infinite will, so that it did not surpass the limited physical and intellectual powers which humans possess. In this way the individual remained whole, reason and passion in harmony, rather than in conflict. There are those such as O'Hagan who detect ambivalence in Rousseau's writing on self-government, in that *mastery* over the passions rather than *harmony* is in places advocated. O'Hagan suggests that Rousseau's work is marked by a tension between two competing visions – the first, 'a unified, integrated life (a life of goodness), in which inner conflicts are at a minimum and the goal is happiness', the second 'a divided life (a life of virtue) whose goal is self-mastery' grounded in a perceived conflict between duty and inclination.[35] For O'Hagan this tension is linked to conflicting accounts of the origins of evil to be found in *Émile* and the *Discourse on Inequality*, the former attributed to man's *will* and the latter to man's *circumstances*. Douglass's reading of the *Discourse on Inequality* is that evil arose due to choices made by men in the context of particular circumstances and indeed that circumstances arose at least in part due to men's choices[36] (for instance the *choice* to enclose a patch of land and declare it private property).[37] The key message from *Émile* is that circumstances can be manipulated so that conflict between duty and desire is minimised (although probably not eliminated altogether); as Douglass suggests, for Rousseau there was no *necessary* tension between goodness and

virtue – it was possible (in theory at least) to align individual desire with religious or political duty.[38]

## Romanticism

Within the history of education a more or less direct line is generally drawn from Rousseau's *Émile* to the Romantic pedagogies of educators such as Pestalozzi and Froebel. Although neither regarded Rousseau's programme as a workable model,[39] there is a broad affinity between Rousseau's model and the 'child-centred' pedagogies of Pestalozzi and Froebel in which children are actively engaged in the learning process. An important aspect of Rousseau's 'radicalism' emphasised by Cunningham was his (qualified) praise of mothers for prioritising their children's present happiness and condemnation of the corrupting effects of paternal ambition for their progeny.[40] Steedman writes that the foundation for the Romantic pedagogies of Pestalozzi and Froebel was the 'instinctive' relationship between mother and child; like the 'good' mother, the 'good' teacher nurtured the child during the educational journey.[41] Romantic 'child-centred' education was above all a natural education – as Cunningham writes, the aim was not to shape or mould, but to support the natural developmental process of the child.[42]

The veneration of nature at the heart of the Romantic ethos, elevated children – significantly female as well as male – to a position representative of the most virtuous qualities of humanity.[43] In the work of Romantic poets such as Wordsworth (1770–1850) and Blake (1757–1827), children were represented as pure, angelic and above all 'natural' beings.[44] From a Romantic perspective children were not born tainted by original sin,[45] but as they matured were in danger of corruption from a society in thrall to a conception of progress which served to alienate man from the natural world and his own true nature.[46] Hence the journey to rational adulthood was conceptualised in terms of the loss of prelapsarian wholeness – Kirschner writes that rearticulated in secular terms, in Romantic thought the Fall was no longer viewed in light of humanity's relationship with the divine, but 'in terms of an estrangement of self and nature, or subject and object'.[47]

The images of childhood depicted in Romantic art and literature symbolise the primal innocence of mankind, a state characterised by a wholeness or unity which 'civilised man' had lost, but could potentially regain.[48] The German concept of *bildung* was an important means

of conceptualising the path travelled by individuals – and societies – in turning away from and returning to wholeness; Kirschner suggests that in Romantic thought it was used to represent a progressive journey from the unselfconscious innocence associated with a natural existence, towards the objectification of the natural world and divided interiority which accompanies intellectual development, and finally the attainment of a higher state of consciousness in which the faculties of *thinking* and *feeling* have been integrated so that 'lost unity' has been restored.[49] According to Gailus the understanding of *bildung* which informed Romanticism had been shaped by the appropriation and 'organicisation' of the concept by the life sciences, an emerging field of study in the late eighteenth century which was both influenced by and influential upon Romantic thought.[50] The significance of the Romantic child is thus much greater than its role in stimulating a more sentimental or caring attitude towards children. Steedman explicitly links the Romantic treatment of the child-figure to two major inter-related themes explored by Foucault – the gradual emergence of 'life itself' as object of scientific inquiry and target of power from the late eighteenth century (the rise of *biopolitics*) and the increasing emphasis on understanding – and regulating – the *interior* world of individuals in the nineteenth century.[51] In doing so she underscores the importance of the Romantic child to transformations in the exercise of power/knowledge at this time.

Romanticism is generally agreed to encompass a multiplicity of perspectives, but what these shared was a degree of scepticism towards the Enlightenment faith in the capacity of reason to advance human progress and an aversion to the mechanistic approach which underpinned Classical science.[52] Kirschner writes that Romantics were also critical of Kantian idealism on the grounds that it was predicated upon a division between the self and the natural world, but also on a division *within* the self.[53] The development of the Romantic *mentalité* is associated with the circle which formed in late eighteenth-century Germany around the literary critics Friedrich Schlegel and his brother August Wilhelm, founders of the journal *Athenäum*.[54] A key assumption of these early Romantics was the notion of the unity of knowledge, which entailed a rejection of any necessary disconnect between art and philosophy or science.[55]

Romantic scientific thought was underpinned by the notion of the 'unity of nature', the guiding principle of German *naturphilosophie* which was heavily influenced by Romanticism.[56] Steedman highlights the significance of *naturphilosophie* in the shift from the study of *being*

to the study of *life* described by Foucault in *The Order of Things*, a transition central to the rise of liberal governmentality.[57] With this change in focus the taxonomic classification of living beings characteristic of natural history gave way to an over-arching concern with the *functions* of the organism associated with the notion of 'the mysterious, invisible, focal unity' of life forms.[58] Hidden from view the force which moved living beings was 'apprehendable only in the efforts it makes here and there to manifest and maintain itself'.[59]

The notion that what unites living beings are analogous organic processes of *development* was hugely important for *naturphilosophie* and Romantic science.[60] According to Steedman this was supported by research findings in the field of embryology in the mid-eighteenth century, which suggested that the physical maturation of embryos occurred in successive stages. These findings served to undermine the theory of *preformation* which posited that each life form is present, to some extent already formed, in the reproductive cell of the parent.[61] Significantly, the demise of preformationism represented a nail in the coffin of the doctrine of original sin. As Harrison explains, taken to its logical conclusion preformationism supports the theory that the entire human race had *literally* shared in the sin of Adam.[62] Widespread acceptance of the theory that embryos developed, rather than merely increased in scale bolstered the alternative *epigenetic* view that a new life was created at the moment of conception, laying to rest the notion that the germ of every human being who had ever existed had been in Adam's loins when he tasted the forbidden apple.[63] It also directed scientific attention towards the mysterious interior force now believed to drive the developmental process.[64]

By Steedman's account the scientific focus on 'life itself' is associated with a shift in orientation of power/knowledge not just from exterior to interior, but also from mature to immature entities.[65] In order to apprehend the life force the scientific gaze had turned to the smallest constituent particle of living beings – the cell – but also to the earliest phases of the life-cycle. According to Steedman, children – like other young organisms – were of interest because of the potential insights child-study offered into the process by which the organism attained maximum maturity followed by the period of decay and eventual death. Her central argument is that the resultant positioning of children as the embodiment of 'the problem of growth and disintegration' led to an association between childhood and interiority so powerful that the child-figure ultimately came to represent the interior world of the adult individual.[66] This was to occur by way of the development

and deployment of the concept of the 'unconscious' in psychoanalytic theory in a way which positioned this newly discovered realm as 'the child within', a move prefigured in Romantic literature and science.[67]

## Utilitarianism

As discussed in Chapter 2 Foucault identifies two paths taken in the eighteenth century in response to the problem of establishing appropriate juridical limits to the exercise of political power. Rousseau's 'revolutionary' approach starts from the juridical concept of rights, whereas the 'radical' approach takes *usefulness* or utility as its starting point. As presented in the work of its greatest exponent, the British philosopher and reformer Jeremy Bentham, the essence of utilitarianism was the Epicurean notion of happiness – conceptualised in terms of pleasure and pain – as the basis of law and morality. The overarching object of government was to promote 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number', hence the laws of the land should operate to maximise pleasure and minimise pain.[68] While Bentham's main preoccupation was with legislative reform, he did not neglect the other main instrument of government – education ('government acting by means of the domestic magistrate'),[69] the chief aim of which was to promote congruence between the private interests of individuals and public happiness.[70] Foucault views utilitarianism as a 'technology of government' characterised by permissiveness – one which says 'yes' to desire[71] – nevertheless, like Rousseau, utilitarian philosophers such as Bentham and J.S. Mill grappled with the question of somehow *shaping* desire through education so that individual desire was in alignment with the greater good.

An important aspect of Bentham's plans for educational reform was the prototypical school set out in his *Chrestomathia* ('conducive to useful learning'[72]) intended as a model for middle-class education.[73] According to Bentham since most middle-class parents were too busy to superintend education, their children were left under the care of indifferent servants or sent to day-schools, which were fit merely to keep the young out of mischief, not to promote intellectual or moral advancement. The chrestomathical school would not only provide education of higher quality than that offered by the day-schools of the time, but in a much more economical fashion.[74] Bentham envisaged that a thousand children could be educated in a single institution, the scale of provision made possible through the panopticol architectural design and use of the pedagogical techniques deployed in the famous

'monitorial' schools established by Lancaster and Bell in the late eighteenth century.[75] The monitorial approach could not lay claim to complete originality; it was prefigured by the *decuriae* system utilised in the schools of the Brethren of the Common Life and those of the Jesuits, but the monitor at the head of each group was responsible for *instructing*, as well as supervising his fellows. Each monitor was expected to maintain a detailed daily register of the pedagogical tasks accomplished, the means by which a solitary master could exercise surveillance over any number of students.[76]

Apart from its low cost the appeal of the monitorial school to utilitarian sensibilities lay in the methods employed to encourage industry and good conduct. Miller records that Lancaster advocated *utilising*, rather than *repressing* the passions; desire was to be stimulated and channeled as a spur to achievement.[77] Corporal punishment was eschewed in favour of rewards such as tickets, purses, toys and pens and small amounts of money.[78] Miller writes that the organisation of the monitorial school was a cause of concern for some contemporary critics who feared the effect on children's morality of a system so blatantly designed to encourage self-interest.[79] Bentham, by contrast was concerned simply to improve the efficiency of the model, obviating the necessity for expenditure on prizes through 'place capturing' by which a move upwards or downwards in the ranks was to be its own reward.[80]

Due to the superiority of the model Bentham assumed that chrestomathically educated children would make rapid progress. Like Rousseau, he argued that it was misleading to judge human capacity by the products of prevailing practices of education. While Rousseau's methods tended towards extension of the period of childhood, Bentham envisaged that a young person's education would in essentials be completed by the age of fourteen. From Bentham's perspective lack of appropriate stimulation was serving to unnecessarily prolong the period of childhood and retard 'the growth of the mind'.[81] In effect Bentham anticipated the arguments of twentieth century children's rights campaigners to the effect that 'childishness' is not simply a natural attribute of children, but is directly related to social and cultural arrangements.

The *Chrestomathia* set out an ambitious programme of study on the basis that the wider the scope of study, the more occupations a young person would be fit for. The curriculum departed from the classical model offered in grammar schools and placed a heavy emphasis on 'useful subjects'. Bentham laid great stress on the superiority of his

system in respect of the prioritisation of instruction – in accordance with the 'order of utility' – proceeding from the most generally useful to least generally useful – and the 'order of facility' which entailed progressing from learning which appealed to the senses (the study of nature or the physical world) to learning which depended on the faculty of understanding such as moral and political theory.[82]

Bentham's views on education were grounded in an account of human nature derived from the associationist psychology of David Hartley.[83] Following Locke, Hartley viewed the mind as a receptor of impressions caused by external objects, which through association formed ideas of progressively increasing complexity.[84] Hayden notes that Hartley eschewed the Lockean concept of 'reflection', instead positing pleasure and pain as the impetus for the process of association and therefore presenting an even more passive conception of the mind than that of Locke.[85] For Hartley the contents of the mind were divided into two classes of 'internal feelings' – 'senses' and 'ideas'.[86] Ideas were further subdivided into 'ideas of sensations' and 'intellectual ideas'. Hartley held that all of these internal feelings were accompanied by either pleasure or pain, although often at a barely perceptible level. Seven 'general classes of pleasure and pain' were put forward from lower to higher – sensation, imagination, ambition, self-interest; sympathy, theopathy and moral senses – as the primary motives for individual action. This is associated with a 'mechanistic' account of human action, individual action resulted from the stimulating force of motive – action was not possible without the force of motive and motives were frequently 'hidden' or unconscious. Thus for Hartley free will was understood in quite narrow terms.[87] Similarly Bentham famously referred to the 'sovereign masters' of pleasure and pain, arriving at fifteen categories of pleasure and eleven categories of pain in his attempt to identify the overarching drivers of action,[88] a conception of human nature in the Epicurean/Augustinian tradition.[89] While Bentham roundly rejected the doctrine of original sin, which he characteristically derided as 'original nonsense',[90] his associationism also ruled out any notion of innate virtue.

Bentham has frequently been criticised for his impoverished notion of virtue, not least by his erstwhile successor John Stuart Mill.[91] Like Bentham's Mill's conception of selfhood was grounded in associationist psychology and his moral philosophy was grounded in the utility principle as the ultimate yardstick of right and wrong.[92] Mill was, however, considerably more attentive to qualitative differences between sources of pleasure or pain than was Bentham, placing a par-

ticular emphasis on the distinction between 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures.[93] Mill stressed that there were some goods which humans valued highly regardless of the pains associated with them. In particular he argued that no intelligent human would exchange his intellect for a trouble free existence as a fool, nor would a person of conscience swap his scruples for the more immediate pleasures associated with knavery. The highest pleasures are associated with exercise of the 'higher faculties' of intellect and morality which tends towards the conclusion that in order to maximise happiness it was necessary to promote cultivation of these faculties to the greatest extent possible.[94]

Mill's utilitarianism was tempered by Romanticism, he credited the poems of Wordsworth for his recovery from a depression he believed to be caused by his rigorous utilitarian education and described Samuel Taylor Coleridge as one of the two greatest minds of the age (the other being Jeremy Bentham).[95] Reason alone could not lead the individual to happiness or virtue; the passions and also the imagination played their part. Accordingly what Valverde refers to as the 'despotism over the self' associated with Mill's liberal moral philosophy cannot be understood simply as the subjection of the passions to reason. For Mill the individual conscience was grounded in sentiment – 'a mass of feeling'[96] – rather than rationality. Similar to Lockean 'uneasiness',[97] Mill's internal guide to moral conduct was a 'pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty'.[98] Mill did not view the conscience as an innate part of human nature however it was 'a natural outgrowth from it…capable in a certain small degree of springing up spontaneously'.[99] In this respect Mill could be viewed as closer to Rousseau than to Mandeville, in that his account of moral development resonates with the former's account of sympathy as the impetus for progression from egoism to altruism.[100] Stewart notes that Mill foregrounds the imaginative leap required to sympathise with the plight of others, a feat of which children were not yet capable.[101]

While the conscience can point us towards the good, it is all too easily ignored unless an individual actively chooses to be led by its direction. Hence for Mill the locus of moral formation was the *will* which he conceptualised as an 'off-shoot' of desire.[102] Whereas for Mill desires are innate and somewhat mechanical – produced in response to stimuli – the will is active and must be *constituted* via a process of uncoupling volition from desire. It is through this breach that the individual becomes a moral agent, with the capacity to complete the second-order task of willing the good, this being whatever promotes the general happiness. Ideally a properly cultivated association

between virtue and pleasure (or vice and pain) would be sufficient to guide moral conduct, however Mill was conscious that such associations could not entirely be relied upon. It was only when a virtuous action had become *habitual* to the extent that the question of pleasure or pain was no longer a consideration could there be confidence that virtue would prevail. For Mill 'will is the child of desire, and passes out of the dominion of its parent only to come under that of habit'.[103] In emphasising the importance of habit in moral formation Mill had no wish to produce 'automatons' who unquestioningly obeyed prevailing norms; habit was viewed as a tool for *furthering* individual liberty, a means of releasing the individual via re-direction of desire, a necessary precondition of autonomy.[104]

Mill argued passionately that individuals should be free to judge for themselves in moral or intellectual matters and to pursue life-goals in accordance with personal preference. The only justification for constraining the liberty of adults was to prevent harm to *others*, but it was legitimate to restrict the liberty of the young in order to protect them against the consequences of their own actions.[105] Hence in making the case that adults (of all classes) should be governed through freedom, Mill explicitly reinforced the subordinate position of children. For Mill, education, rather than legal regulation, was the appropriate means by which to promote virtuous conduct. The purpose of education was not to 'mould' individuals but to equip them with the tools to exercise freedom responsibly through the cultivation of 'character'. Mill placed a particularly heavy emphasis on the importance of individuality – a healthy society was one in which there existed a diversity of beliefs and ways of life. Character was fundamentally an expression of individuality,[106] and, as White notes, was exercised through making choices; thus individual character was essentially an expression of the will.[107] Mill was highly critical of the emphasis in Christian thought and in Calvinism in particular on abnegation of the individual will and consequent restriction of the capacities and attributes which made up individual character.[108] His was a model of virtue which depended on training, rather than subjugating the will, but which required nonetheless, what Rose refers to as, 'a kind of despotism over the child'.[109]

## Better childhoods, better children, better citizens

Predicated on the 'freedom' of the governed, liberal forms of government have a particular interest in the formation of 'virtuous citizens',[110] however liberal government of children and families throws

up particular challenges. As discussed in earlier chapters the development of liberal forms of government is linked to the gradual emergence of particular domains to be governed in accordance with their own particular 'natures', which are regarded as separate from the public realm of juridical rule. Within early modern theories of sovereignty there was no necessary conflict between the sovereignty of the family and the sovereignty of the ruler – the king was perceived as father of all or per Hobbes as having been allocated the pre-existing (contractually-derived) authority of each and every parent upon the creation of the Commonwealth. Ashenden writes that in Hobbes' version of the social contract the sovereignty of the family can be understood as 'a kind of remainder', in the sense that it applies only to aspects of family relations not specifically addressed by the commands of the Leviathan. By contrast she finds in Locke's liberal version of the social contract a 'two-fold conception of sovereignty' in that the 'natural' authority of parents is retained.[111] As discussed in Chapter 1, alternatives to contractual accounts of civil society in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century emphasised the developmental and regulatory dynamics *inherent* in society, here regarded as pre-existing the state. This is associated with the rise of a governmentality which seeks to safeguard the hidden internal processes assumed to regulate the 'population', 'economy' and 'society'. Enhancing the capacities of families to care for and rear the children, so vital to the collective interest, was an important aspect of this governmentality, but, as Ashenden points out, one in which maintaining the balance between governing too much and governing too little – appeared particularly acute. On the one hand, the family is a natural entity whose authority is distinct from that of the state; on the other, a certain amount of supervision of parents appeared to be necessary if adequate standards of child-rearing were to be guaranteed.[112]

Liberal theorists of whatever stripe generally agree that restrictions on parental authority are justified on the basis of the rights of children, or more properly on the basis of the rights of the adults those children will someday become. Ashenden notes that beginning with Locke liberal theory conceptualises individual liberty in terms of autonomy, the capacity to formulate, and follow through on, personal conceptions of the good.[113] For Locke parental authority is derived from the natural obligation which parents have to promote the autonomy of their children and parental authority declines in direct relation to the increasing autonomy of the maturing child.[114] The authority which parents have by this account is directly for the benefit of their

children.[115] It is but a small step from this position to the argument that parents who were not exercising their authority for the benefit of their children should have that authority restricted. Nineteenth-century liberal theorists such as J.S. Mill[116] justified restrictions on parental rights on the basis that the state had a duty to supervise those who exercised authority over others. For the sake of the collective as well as the individual child, parents were to be compelled to live up to their obligations to their offspring. As Mill put it children were not merely the property of their fathers, they were citizens of the state.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, it could be said that children were effectively considered as chattels in law. There were relatively few limitations on parental rights – in most jurisdictions vested in the father as head of family. The interests of children – and indeed those of their mothers – were subsumed under those of the family. In the case of a breakdown in the relationship between married parents, legal control and custody of children automatically reverted to fathers. Therborn describes the shift to what he calls the 'child-centred family' as a two-stage process involving firstly, equal rights to parents and secondly, recognition of the distinct interests of the child as a consideration in family law decisions.[117] The Custody of Infants Act passed at Westminster in 1839 is conventionally regarded as a turning point in terms of the weakening of paternal authority over children in common law jurisdictions.[118] The product of a campaign waged by Caroline Norton, a mother separating from her husband, the 1839 Act granted access to mothers to children in paternal custody, and allowed for maternal custody for children under the age of seven where the mother had not committed adultery.[119] Amending legislation in 1873 raised the age and removed the disqualification of adultery. The Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886 represented the second step towards the 'child centred family', with the introduction of a provision that the welfare of the infant be taken into account in judicial decision making, however not until 1925 was the child's welfare positioned as the 'first and paramount consideration' in English law.[120] Scandinavian countries were earliest to accord statutory recognition to parental equality and the distinct interests of children, with laws passed to that effect in Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Denmark and Finland between 1915 and 1929.[121] The doctrines of parental equality and 'the welfare of the child' were not incorporated into German law until the 1950s and into French law in the 1970s.[122]

Recognition of the distinct interests of children and associated restrictions on parental authority were features of most Western legal

systems long before the 'welfare' or 'best interests' principle became a standard element of family law. Throughout the nineteenth century states passed laws restricting child labour, mandating school attendance and imposing new obligations and restrictions on parents in respect of the care and well-being of their children. While coming to be viewed as separate from those of the family, the interests of children were assumed to coincide neatly with those of the wider society. This was an important theme of efforts to restrict child labour and promote schooling and of those related to other child-related causes which attracted the interest of philanthropists, politicians and state officials in the nineteenth century. 'Saving the children' would promote moral uplift, ensure more productive workers and better citizens in the future while helping to reduce the demands placed on poor relief and prison systems.

The campaigning efforts of the various local and national organisations established to promote the welfare of vulnerable children formed part of a wider endeavour from the late eighteenth century to encourage moral improvement which included the anti-slavery movement, animal welfare organisations, temperance and 'social purity' movements. Many of those involved were motivated by religious fervour – an important wellspring of social activism were what Koven and Michel refer to as the 'activist interpretations of the gospel' associated with religious movements such as Protestant Evangelicism, Christian Socialism and Social Catholicism.[123] Dekker writes that religiously motivated reformers tended to be guided by goals associated with *atonement* rather than *progress*, informed by a less sanguine understanding of human potentiality than their 'modern' contemporaries.[124] The Evangelical movement was associated with the revival of the doctrine of original sin and the intrinsic moral frailty of mankind. The oft-quoted words of Hannah More, founder of the English Sunday School movement, represent a strong counterpoint to the idea of the innately virtuous child

> Is it not a fundamental error to consider children as innocent beings, whose little weaknesses may, perhaps want some correction, rather than as beings who bring into the world a corrupt nature and evil dispositions, which it should be the great end of education to rectify?[125]

Evangelical child-rearing manuals emphasised breaking the child's will and urged parents to adopt stricter methods of child-rearing and there

is evidence that their advice was adhered to.[126] Evangelical discourse did not, however, entail a complete rejection of the 'Romantic Child'; Hendrick suggests that the Romantic emphasis on the distinctiveness of childhood was deployed by Evangelicals for their own ends in moralising the poor.[127] The promulgation of an idealised model of *dependent* childhood was an important element of this effort and Evangelical philanthropists added their voices to campaigns against child labour and were actively involved in promoting and providing schooling.[128] In these efforts religious philanthropists found common cause with utilitarian-minded reformers as well as those whose motivations sprang from Romantic philosophy.

## Putting children in their place

At the turn of the nineteenth century childhood remained highly differentiated, reflecting expectations regarding future roles and responsibilities. Among the middle and upper classes girls' education still prioritised the acquisition of different forms of accomplishment than those offered by the classical, Latin-based model which remained the norm for their brothers. For the children of the poor, whether male or female, entry into 'adult' life generally occurred at a much earlier age than for their better off peers. Historians caution that insufficient data prohibits accurate comparisons across time-periods until relatively recently,[129] however Rahikainen[130] points to a number of factors which tended to increase the importance of children's labour in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In particular, ongoing conflicts and moves towards conscription of adult males into nascent national armies served to reduce the available male workforce, while technological advances in the eighteenth century coupled with changes in the organisation of work made possible employment of even very young children. Many of the houses of industry (of which children and adolescents generally made up a high proportion of inmates) and orphanages set up during the 'Great Confinement' of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries operated as commercial manufacturing concerns, while also providing a source of cheap and compliant labour for the privately-owned workshops and factories of the early industrial period.[131]

In Britain in particular, the textile industry was heavily reliant on 'pauper apprentices' dispatched from urban workhouses to factories in isolated rural settings.[132] By the early decades of the nineteenth century, steam-technology permitted factories to be located in towns

and cities, a development which Nardinelli views as instrumental in the subsequent gradual decline in the numbers of children employed.[133] It is during this period, of course, that pioneering child labour laws were enacted in Britain, the product of protracted campaigns for state intervention to protect young people employed in the textile manufacturing industry.[134] Although factory-work seems to have represented the main source of employment for children in cities such as Manchester, in other places agricultural work, domestic service or manufacturing work in a home or workshop setting were probably more important.[135] There is no consensus among historians that the plight of children in factories was significantly worse than that of other working children; Hopkins[136] suggests that the novelty of factory work and the particular visibility of the children thus employed were the main factors which led to the factory becoming a rallying point for campaigners.

The campaign against child labour is credited by Hendrick with a significant role in the development of a universal conception of childhood in the nineteenth century.[137] The legal restrictions on child labour for which the movement successfully lobbied underpinned the gradual acceptance of a protracted period of protected dependency – guaranteed and overseen by the state – as the norm for children of all classes. Cunningham, and, more recently, Creighton, draw attention to the distinctive sets of images – representing the real and the ideal – which when juxtaposed by campaigners represented a powerful stimulus for change.[138] In terms of the reality of child labour, a comparison was drawn with slavery (also a major focus of campaigning efforts at that time); like the African slaves working on American plantations working children were exploited and abused, worked to the point of exhaustion and beyond, and subjected to cruel punishments. Creighton notes though, that the main purpose of the slavery analogy was to make a more fundamental point, derived from the theories of natural rights which underpinned the emancipation movement, that child factory workers in England were denied the dignity and *liberty* due to *every* human being.[139] For Creighton the factory movement – in particular the Ten Hours Movement discussed further below – thus represents an important moment in the history of children's rights. He enumerates seven categories of rights which the Ten Hours campaigners attributed to children. Apart from the rights to life, health and physical protection, the majority of these rights were peculiar to or particularly relevant to children, including rights to education, play, family life and most radically the right to happiness, represented as the

*natural* state of childhood.[140] As Creighton writes, this conception of children's rights reflects the distinctive manner in which the campaigners linked the language of natural rights to that of Romanticism.[141] The fundamental right which child labour campaigners attributed to children was, as Cunningham suggests, the 'right to a childhood' and he emphasises that the model of childhood to which children were entitled was shaped by Romantic ideas and imagery – a period of innocence, play and, above all engagement with the natural world.[142] Denial of this childhood was an offence both against children and against nature which threatened the normal developmental process.[143]

Cunningham writes that the Romantic image of childhood provided a powerful impetus for the complete liberation of children from the grind of factory work,[144] however this was not the main focus of the factory movement which instead centred on the demand for a reduced working day. It seems that campaigners developed their aims in recognition of the vital contribution which many children made to the family income, (historians suggest that in the early phase of industrialisation children's earnings represented a much more significant proportion of family income than those of women),[145] a pragmatic approach which dovetailed with the aims of upper and middle-class campaigners, utilitarian and Evangelical, to end egregious abuse, raise educational standards among the poor and to ensure that that the young were under the proper authority of their parents.[146] Legislation prohibiting employment of children under nine and restricting the working hours of older children to 12 daily was passed in Westminster in 1819, however this applied only to cotton mills and lacked a mechanism for enforcement.[147] It was not until 1833 that a 12-hour day was prescribed for children working in other textile factories (with the exception of silk mills which were particularly reliant on child labour).[148] In addition the 1833 Act provided for factory inspectors and mandated 2 hours of daily education for child factory workers. Established in 1831 the Ten Hour Movement achieved its aim, after a protracted battle, with the passage of legislation in 1847.[149] According to Hopkins resistance to the 10-hour day was linked to concerns regarding the implications for adult workers whose working day might also be curtailed. It was less disruptive to restrict altogether employment of younger children (who made up a tiny minority of factory workers in any case) than to limit the hours of older children upon whose labour many factories depended.[150] Eventual success came in the context of a slump which had led to reduced working hours in

many factories, so that the legislation merely reflected the situation on the ground.[151]

It was not until 1867 that restrictions were placed on the labour of children in Great Britain employed in workshops or on a farm. Hopkins writes that agricultural work was generally not viewed as harmful or exploitative to children with the exception of gang labour which was the focus of the 1867 legislation.[152] As has been frequently noted in the literature the figure of the child farm labourer – engaged in natural, wholesome activities usually under the supervision of a parent – was of course much more in tune with Romantic and religious sensibilities than that of the factory child. Nevertheless by the 1860s there was growing concern about the impact of any form of work on children's education, and legislation introduced in 1873 mandated a minimum level of school attendance for children working in agriculture, while prohibiting the employment of children under 8.[153] By then child labour laws had been introduced in North America and Continental Europe. In France legislation was passed in 1841 restricting the hours of children under the age of 12 and prohibiting industrial employment of children under 8 years of age, extended to children under the age of 12 by an Act of 1874, which rectified the lack of provision for enforcement in the earlier statute.[154] Similar laws were first passed in Prussia in 1853, in Denmark in 1873, in the Netherlands in 1874, Sweden in 1881 and Belgium in 1889.[155] In the US, southern states lagged significantly behind those of the North in introducing child labour legislation; not until the early twentieth century was protection formally accorded to children in the southern states,[156] while not until 1938 was there effective machinery for regulation of industrial employment at the federal level.[157]

As in the UK early child labour laws in other Western states prioritised protection of children in industry with protection of children in domestic and agricultural forms of employment a much lower priority. Apart from the more positive perception of these forms of employment enforcement of restrictions was much more problematic than was the case for large-scale industrial settings.[158] Partly because of this, it is generally agreed that the development of mass – free and compulsory – schooling was at least as important in reducing child labour, than employment laws. As discussed in Chapter 3, local ordinances compelling school attendance had been introduced across Europe and the United States as early as the sixteenth century, however such laws were limited in scope and reach.[159] By the early twentieth century national compulsory education laws – incorporating provisions for effective

enforcement – had been introduced in most Western states.[160] The first national school attendance law was introduced in Prussia in 1763, where, under Pietist influence, the usefulness of education as a means of inculcating attitudes conducive to civic obedience, piety and industry was recognised early.[161] The General Country School Regulation obliged parents to send children to school for the entire year, three hours daily during the summer months and six hours daily for the rest.[162] The law provided for stricter regulation of school-teachers in terms of their moral conduct as well as their professional duties; schools were to be inspected twice weekly by their pastor, while consistorial inspectors were to visit on an annual basis.[163] Schools were funded primarily from parental fees, but parishes were to direct funds to support the fees of the poorest – Melton notes that the heavy burden placed on communities and clerics coupled with the lack of Crown support for schools or for training and remunerating teachers represented significant barriers to implementation of the 1763 Act.[164] In the following decades the level of financial support from the Crown rose significantly in tandem with increased centralisation of control over schooling.[165] State resources were directed towards the provision of schools and subsidising teacher salaries. More effective government of teachers was a central aspect of these reforms – from 1765 teachers were obliged to carry out detailed reporting of pupils enrolled, attendance levels and educational attainment,[166] there was an expansion of teacher training provision[167] and from 1826 state certification was a prerequisite for teaching employment.[168]

The Prussian lead was followed in other Enlightened absolutist regimes. In Austria the General School Edict of 1774 mandated attendance for children between the ages of 6 and 13;[169] in Denmark compulsory attendance was provided for in 1814, Sweden in 1842 and Norway in 1848.[170] As in Prussia the drive to increase attendance was accompanied by increased state support for, and control over, schools and teaching.[171] Although clerics and religious bodies retained a high degree of responsibility for provision and religious and moral formation remained paramount educational goals, this period in the history of schooling is associated with the influence of ideas promulgated by French theorists such as Rousseau and La Chalotais on the role of education in furthering political goals through the cultivation of a common set of patriotic values and sense of identity.[172] This was a task, which according to the anti-clerical La Chalotais, was possible only in the context of a centrally administered, standardised system of education under Crown control.[173] Writing from a French perspective, at a

time when anti-Jesuit sentiment had led to the withdrawal of the order's teaching remit, La Chalotais had particular concerns regarding potential conflict between religious and secular educational goals.[174] These were less relevant to circumstances in Protestant states, where the respective apparatus of church and state were generally much more closely intertwined. In their analysis of the process of development of mass education systems in the nineteenth century Soysal and Strang differentiate between statist and societally-led models. With the notable exception of the United Kingdom, in Protestant states with national churches (the aforementioned Prussia, Denmark, Sweden and Norway) or in Catholic regimes where state and church formed an alliance (Austria) the state took the lead in the development of mass education, but relied heavily on religious organisational structures and personnel.[175] Elsewhere in Europe expansion of educational provision in the nineteenth century was driven mainly by lay and religious philanthropic efforts; in predominantly Catholic countries such as France and Belgium religious congregations played a significant role in popular education, while in countries such as the UK, US and the Netherlands charitable organisations of various hues were important providers of schooling for the poor.[176]

For most of the nineteenth century in most Western states schooling for the working classes was provided by a diverse mix of providers – religious and charitable concerns, small time entrepreneurs, local communities and municipal authorities. Despite – or because- of the multiplicity of providers there remained significant disparities and gaps in provision. By the closing decades of the century the view that education of the masses, by now almost synonymous with schooling, was a *public* concern was increasingly accepted by almost all Western governments. Schooling was a mechanism for the production of patriotic citizens, disciplined workers and morally upright members of society, concerns no less pertinent in emerging liberal democracies at the close of the nineteenth century than in absolutist monarchies at the beginning of the century. Schooling also represented a response to the potential threat posed by the children of the lower classes and, in North America in particular, the children of immigrants. The 'dangers of idleness' was not a new theme of course,[177] but it took on a particular resonance in industrial societies in the context of changing attitudes towards child labour, population growth and increasing urbanisation.

Although in favour of state intervention liberal philosophers in the nineteenth century had strong objections to mandated state schooling,

preferring to leave the choice of educational option to parents.[178] For Adam Smith competition between schools funded primarily through parental fees was regarded as the most efficient means of ensuring quality provision in that the parents on whom teachers' livelihoods depended would exert considerable influence over the service provided.[179] West writes that J.S. Mill, while not so sanguine about the positive effects of market competition in the educational sphere, was ultimately not in favour of state provision either, except as a model or exemplar.[180] In *On Liberty* Mill made a distinction between 'state education' and 'state enforcement of education'. While state education was inimical to genuine liberty in that it promoted conformity in character and opinion, Mill argued state enforcement was necessary to ensure that parents lived up to their obligations to their children. In order to ensure that parents were providing for their offspring at least a minimum education, children should be tested annually through state-organised examinations. Mill proposed a supplementary system of voluntary state examinations for testing more advanced educational attainment, however he argued that the certificates conferred on the basis of such examinations should not be used as prerequisites for occupational positions – even for teaching.[181]

While the dominant strain in nineteenth-century liberal philosophy emphasised diversity and parental choice, the general thrust of educational developments in most countries was towards standardisation and intensified state control over schools and teachers. In part this was due to concerns regarding the quality of private provision. Jones writes that informal private schools ('dame schools' in English parlance) were targeted by educational reformers fearful of the effects of education unleavened by spiritual or moral instruction.[182] Adoption of the monitorial method of Bell and Lancaster allowed religious charities in England to cheaply provide an alternative form of schooling, which quickly became the dominant form of schooling for the poor.[183] The method was taken up by philanthropic organisations across Europe, North and South America, but the precipitous rise of the monitorial method in the early decades of the nineteenth century was arrested in the 1840s, as the limitations of peer instruction became apparent.[184] In England the two societies most closely associated with monitorial schools – the British and Foreign Schools Society and the National Society for the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church – had been the main benefactors of government funding for schooling, initiated in 1833.[185] With state support came state oversight – an Educational Committee of the Privy Council was

established in 1839 – and reports produced following inspections of monitorial schools were less than commendatory.[186] Elsewhere the fall from grace occurred roughly contemporaneously.[187] In France the spread of monitorial schools was facilitated by state funding under an educational ordinance of 1816 by which communes were obliged to establish schools for the poor, Bowen records that by the 1840s these schools had adopted the 'simultaneous method' of the de la Salle schools, (by far the more significant force in French elementary education at the time), a shift which occurred at roughly the same time elsewhere.[188]

Miller writes that ultimately the monitorial method was discarded because of growing doubts regarding its effectiveness, however she notes that the monitorial schools were the subject of criticism on a number of different grounds.[189] Some observers were concerned about the potentially subversive impact on hierarchical relations of class and particularly, generation, already under threat with the waning of traditional patriarchal authority.[190] For others the competitive ethos upon the discipline of the school rested was inimical to genuine morality and piety.[191] Maynes suggests that the pedagogical efficiency promised (if not delivered) by the monitorial method may not have been particularly appreciated by educational reformers for whom the moral aspects of education were paramount.[192] Ultimately the centralised form of authority associated with the simultaneous method was a more effective means of moralisation, but only if those exercising authority embodied the correct principles and values. As discussed previously the formation of teachers was given particular attention by the Pietists and de la Salle Brothers who pioneered the simultaneous method in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At the turn of the nineteenth century, however, teacher training remained underdeveloped in most countries and a large proportion of teachers possessed no qualifications for their role. Even in Prussia, where the influence of Pietism is associated with early state involvement in teacher training provision, schools were utilised as a source of employment for military veterans in a scheme adopted in the late eighteenth century.[193]

Increased involvement of central government in the training and certifying of elementary teachers as well as in the inspection and regulation of the work which they carried out was an important aspect of the development of national systems of mass education.[194] As noted above teacher certification based upon a state examination was introduced in Prussia in 1826;[195] certification was introduced in England in 1846,[196] and had been introduced in France as early as 1806.[197]

Contemporaneously state supported training colleges and 'normal' or model schools were being established across Europe. Maynes writes that the process of teacher formation followed a similar pattern almost everywhere – the moral and ethical aspects of training took precedence over the academic, teachers were to be learned enough to carry out their duties competently, but not to the extent that they might aspire to social advancement for themselves or their pupils.[198] The aim was to inculcate an 'ethic of service'; teachers must be possessed of the modesty and humility to carry out mundane and tedious tasks associated with elementary education and to serve as a moral exemplar to the pupils under their care.[199] Jones writes that love, rather than fear, was to be the basis of the teacher-pupil relationship; in this way children would internalise the moral guidance provided rather than mechanically obey instruction.[200] The pastoral image of the shepherd leading the flock to salvation comes readily to mind when thinking of the ideal teacher of nineteenth-century thought. The teacher was to be self-sacrificing, in service to, rather than ruling over, the little flock in the schoolroom. Like the shepherd the teacher cared for *each* and *all* of his charges, *omnes et singulatum*. Adoption of the simultaneous method of instruction allowed for the exercise of power in a manner simultaneously individualising and totalising – the class was constituted as a unitary whole, but in a way which facilitated the classification and ranking of each individual.

The authority of the early modern teacher had generally been directly subordinate to the pastoral authority of priest or minister. Teachers in parish schools typically carried out church-related tasks (such as bell-ringing) in addition to their teaching responsibilities and since appointment, remuneration and supervision of teachers took place at parish level, clergy and local communities exercised a great deal of control.[201] Over the course of the nineteenth century, the pastoral power of the teacher was in many countries detached from that of the religious pastorate as teachers became salaried employees of the state.[202] Teachers became answerable to government agencies and local authorities and delivered curricula based on educational objectives aligned with *national* interests.

In the first half of the nineteenth century increased state control over teachers and schools is associated with what Maynes[203] and Miller[204] refer to as a process of 'masculinization' of teaching, resulting from the decline of local informal establishments, many of which were operated by women, and the priority accorded to men in teacher train-

ing. The trend was reversed by century's end. Although represented as a 'loving father', in important respects the construction of the teacher in the nineteenth century – modest, caring, humble, servile – was at odds with dominant conceptions of masculinity and closer to the feminine ideal.[205] In addition many of the tasks involved in teaching young children and girls were regarded as more fitting for women than for men.[206] Miller suggests that perhaps the most important factor behind the growing proportion of female teachers in the late nineteenth century was that women were much cheaper to employ.[207] For instance Bergen finds that in 1896 women made up over two-thirds of the elementary teaching force in England and that average earnings of female teachers were around two thirds that of men.[208]

The rise of the female teacher was supported by the Romantic pedagogical theories of Froebel and Pestalozzi in which teaching was represented as analogous to the 'natural' caregiving role of the mother.[209] Steedman writes that the manner in which child development was conceived in Romantic pedagogy was associated with the prioritising of the affective or emotional aspects of the caregiving relationship over the intellectual.[210] The two-way relationship between the figures of teacher and mother in nineteenth-century pedagogical discourse has been noted by Steedman,[211] Miller[212] and Jones.[213] On the one hand the 'loving mother' represented the model for the professional conduct of the teacher, on the other the teacher served as the model for working-class mothers whose standards of child-rearing left much to be desired.

With effective enforcement of compulsory education laws the tasks of mothering were, in important respects, subordinated to those of the teacher. The introduction of school attendance ordinances in early modern Europe was a response to perceived 'bad' parenting, especially the kind of over-indulgence particularly associated with mothers. The wave of national school attendance laws in the nineteenth century was also linked to negative perceptions of working-class parents, many of whom defied the restrictions imposed. Cunningham writes that parental resistance to mandatory schooling – widespread in the decades after introduction – had more or less faded by the 1920s.[214] Participation in schooling had become the norm for children of all social classes; truancy a strong indicator of deviance in child and parents. Conversely one of the main identifying characteristics of the 'good' mother was the extent to which she – ideologically and practically – supported the pedagogical mission of school and teacher.

## Governing child welfare

One of the central points made by Ariès is that the introduction of mass schooling has shaped a family form increasingly centred on the child and correspondingly cut off from the wider society.[215] This is associated with an intensification of the emotional bonds between children and parents and in Elias's terms the 'informalization' of familial relations.[216] There is broad agreement that the introduction of universal, free and compulsory schooling has been one of the most important factors in the profound transformation of family life over the last two centuries. While no longer economic assets, Viviana Zelizer argues that the 'value' of children has increased considerably.[217] Zelizer conceptualises this shift in terms of the 'sacralization of childhood', arguing that as children's economic value dissipated over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so has their emotional value increased many-fold. The transformation of the general mass of children from workers to scholars was a gradual, uneven and contested process, but Zelizer argues that over time, the Romantic and religious imagery deployed by child welfare campaigners, served to transform the 'useful' child of the nineteenth century into the 'economically "worthless", but emotionally "priceless"' modern child,[218] at once a privileged object of private affection and public concern.

It seems clear from the literature that affection has always been an important dimension of the parent-child relationship,[219] but in the twentieth century the tie between parent and progeny came to be seen almost completely in terms of sentiment and the standard of good parenting conceptualised in terms of how much parents 'love' their children. By the early twentieth century a strict gendered division of labour was firmly established, with mothers viewed as bearing almost exclusive responsibility for the rearing of children and hence, the dispensing of love. Much has been written of the 'cult of motherhood' which emerged in Europe and the United States in the late eighteenth century/early nineteenth century as divisions between the domain of economic activity and that of the family sharpened. The 'cult of motherhood', combined religious, Romantic, and evolutionary ideas in a way which positioned women as morally superior beings, whilst at the same time reinforcing the boundaries between the 'public' spheres of politics and business and an increasingly privatised domestic sphere which was woman's 'natural' domain.[220] Increasingly women, rather than men, were the targets of advice on household management and child-rearing and Smuts writes that women of all social classes were encouraged to think of the domestic role as their 'vocation'.[221]

An acceptable way for women to take on a public role was through involvement in child-related causes in that advancing the cause of child welfare could be represented simply as an extension of women's caretaking responsibilities.[222] A large proportion of those involved in child-related causes in the nineteenth century were women, drawn predominantly from the middle-classes, who came together in exclusively female organisations.[223] In the early nineteenth century attempts to reform society relied upon non-political means – 'moral suasion', but as the focus of reforming efforts shifted towards the political system, women's organisations were at risk of marginalisation.[224] Koven and Michel write that drawing on the authority derived from motherhood represented an effective means of claiming legitimacy for women's efforts to influence policy and effect social change in a way that did not present a direct challenge to existing gender relations.[225] In the words of the American social reformer Jane Addams such work could be regarded as a form of 'civic housekeeping', a task which women were uniquely qualified to pursue.[226]

In their review of maternalist politics in four countries – the United States, Britain, France and Germany – at the turn of the twentieth century Koven and Michel report significant divergence in the results of campaigning efforts both in terms of increased political influence for women and the provision of state-supported benefits and services. They find that in Germany and France where the bureaucratic state was more highly developed there was much earlier and more expansive development of state-backed services such as maternity benefits and childcare provision, however men rather than women were driving policy.[227] By contrast in Britain and even more so in the United States women attained a greater degree of political influence, but concrete gains in terms of welfare benefits and services were less impressive.[228] In all four countries, however, Koven and Michel find that women's organisations were a significant force in the early phase of development of welfare services, but that their demands were most successful where they intersected with 'national' interests (as defined by male politicians and policy-makers) in the military or economic spheres.[229]

There was no neat division between state and philanthropic organisations at this time; many child welfare organisations benefitted from state funding and some were granted statutory functions.[230] As the range of services to children and families expanded and the role of state agencies increased, new kinds of occupational opportunities became available for women, however most of the roles filled by women were at a low-level at the front-line of welfare provision.[231] To use terminology coined by Lynch and Lyons in a different context –

female welfare workers were generally positioned as 'care foot-soldiers' rather than 'care commanders'.[232]

**From safeguarding innocence to salvation through science**

The various child welfare campaigns of the nineteenth century are associated with the 'invention' of various different categories of vulnerable children in need of assistance. Of the diverse child-subjects of welfarist discourse the one which was the focus of the most intense concern was the 'juvenile delinquent'. As Jackson notes, the subject position of the 'juvenile delinquent' was made available at roughly the same time as the Romantic 'innocent child', reflecting the acute concern engendered by the significant section of the child population, who were inadequately protected against exposure to inappropriate information and activities.[233] The dominant constructions of childhood in the nineteenth century positioned children as pre-rational and highly impressionable. Accordingly it was essential that parents safeguarded children against potentially corrupting influences. This was a responsibility that middle-class parents took very seriously, however working-class parenting typically fell far short in this regard. Not only were working-class children more likely to be in paid employment, they were also more likely to utilise the street as a site for social and leisure activities, and thus be exposed to – and potentially become involved in – vice and crime. Hendrick[234] has highlighted the positioning of such children as simultaneously both victim and threat; poorly socialised and inadequately supervised, these children represented the Dionysian converse to the Apollonian ideal.

The gradual demarcation of juveniles from the general category of offenders in the nineteenth century was shaped by an increasing appreciation of the peculiarity of childhood as well as by more general legal and penal reforms.[235] The utilitarian-inspired shift away from the 'inefficient' methods of punishing crime characteristic of absolutist regimes towards gentler, 'corrective' approaches was accompanied by changes in criminal codes expanding the range of offences.[236] Reforms reflected the challenges associated with increased urbanisation – control of behaviour in streets and public places – and placed new restrictions on the behaviour of young people. Within penal systems the prioritising of correction over punishment is associated with the emergence of new systems of categorisation. At first classification focused on demarcating 'hardened' criminals from the less experienced, however this was soon accompanied by age-demarcated differentiation within prison systems as generalised concern with corruption became more focused on corruption of the young.[237]

The particular malleability and impressionability of young people rendered them more vulnerable to evil influences, but also meant their pliable natures were uniquely amenable to correction. Philanthropists concerned about the corrupting effects of the criminal justice and prison system on the minds and morals of children advocated dedicated institutions for children prioritising reform over punishment. The first reformatory school was established in Hackney, London in 1788 by the Philanthropic Society – originally the school catered for children of convicted criminals (boys and girls) as well as boys who had been convicted of a crime, but soon after became an exclusively male institution.[238] A dedicated 'School of Discipline' for girls was established in Chelsea in 1833.[239] Elsewhere in Europe 'farm colonies', inspired by Romantic visions of 'natural childhood'[240] were established – the famous Rauhe Haus school was established in Germany in 1833, while in France the 'agricultural colony' founded at Mettray in 1840 became the 'Mecca to which reformatory devotees all over the world direct their gaze for inspiration and example'.[241]

In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault describes the colony at Mettray as the 'disciplinary form at its most extreme' in that it contained within its organisational apparatus the five distinct models of discipline – family, army, workshop, school and judicial – so that those administering the system had somehow to combine the role of the father, the teacher, the military officer, the foreman and the judge in exercising power ('engineering the conduct') over the inmates.[242] One of the distinctive features of Mettray was the 'normal school' established on its premises so that the superintendents employed could be trained 'in-house'. Foucault suggests that this normal school can be regarded as 'the first training college in pure discipline', in that the explicit aim was to instruct students in the exercise of disciplinary techniques; subjected to a similar regime to that applied to the inmates, aspiring 'engineers of conduct' were themselves disciplined in preparation for the task of disciplining others.[243]

Shore emphasises that the focus on juvenile delinquency of the nineteenth century should not be regarded as a radical departure, in that provision for 'wayward' youth was an important aspect of the early modern 'Great Confinement'.[244] She notes, however, that during the nineteenth century there was a significant expansion in the scale of institutional provision for delinquent children – now explicitly demarcated as 'juvenile delinquents' – facilitated by support from central governments. There was also development of specialised institutions for children considered as '*pre*-delinquent'. One of the major advantages of disciplinary techniques is that, in contrast to juridical

sanctions, they can be deployed pre-emptively. Given the particular malleability of childhood it made sense to target children who had not yet been convicted of a crime but whose way of life was likely to lead them into criminal activity. In Britain the first 'industrial school' was established by local, voluntary initiative in Aberdeen in 1841 catering for boys – typically from homes where the breadwinner was deceased or departed who were resistant to schooling, while a similar institution for girls was founded in 1843.[245] The perceived success of these schools in reducing begging, vagrancy and petty crime was a stimulus to the establishment of industrial schools across the United Kingdom,[246] which were placed on a statutory footing in 1857.[247] Similar institutions for 'pre-delinquents' were established in other European countries[248] and in North America; within their walls young people deemed 'at risk' of criminal activity could receive a basic education, training for manual or domestic occupations and moral and religious instruction.

Hendrick notes that a central concern of philanthropists engaged with the issue of delinquent children was to attempt to reshape these young people in accordance with prevailing understandings of innocent, dependent childhood. Destitute and vagrant children or those engaged in begging or petty crime were children only in form, corrupted by the city streets, they had embarked on a premature, distorted adulthood – it was the aim of reformers to somehow give back to these children the childhood they had lost and restore them to their proper place in the generational hierarchy.[249] Cunningham quotes the celebrated English reformatory school campaigner Mary Carpenter who emphasised the importance of 'love' as the means of transformation – only through experiencing at least an approximation of 'normal' affectionate familial relations could the precocious delinquent become a child.[250]

Juvenile delinquency in the nineteenth century was comprehended in highly gendered terms.[251] For the most part female deviance was regarded in terms of vice rather than crime. Shore writes that while a significant minority of girls who appeared before the courts, did so accused of petty larceny, female delinquency was most commonly understood in terms of sexual immorality and prostitution.[252] As with any category of 'problem' child in the nineteenth century, 'childhood' had to be restored through returning the 'knowing child' to ignorance and dependency,[253] but because of the sexual connotations, the restoration of innocence was regarded as much more difficult for delinquent girls than for their male peers. Chen cites the Canadian child welfare activist John Joseph Kelso who argued that while a 'bad boy'

might with the correct guidance often turn out as one of 'the best kind of men', a 'fallen girl' faced 'an awful descent'.[254] Because of the dangers of 'contamination' girls who had worked in prostitution were segregated from the generality of youthful offenders and placed in dedicated reformatory schools or other specialised institutions.[255]

In the context of a study of sexual abuse in Victorian England Jackson writes that 'juvenile prostitution' appears to have been deployed as a euphemism for sexual abuse;[256] but she finds that in any case children who had been sexually assaulted or exposed to sexual immorality were regarded in somewhat similar terms to children involved in prostitution – as a source of contamination. What Jackson refers to as the 'Christian moral economy', within which the concept of sexual abuse was constituted, positioned the abused child as 'morally corrupted' a characterisation which dovetailed with a medical construction of abuse in terms of pollution. Such children could not be placed in the same institutions as their impressionable peers and so alternatives were required. Jackson writes that in England specialised institutions for 'fallen girls' were established through voluntary initiative from the 1830s, and from the late nineteenth century via dedicated industrial schools. Within such institutions girls were 'taught to forget'.[257] The restoration of innocence was envisaged in terms of wiping the sullied slate clean.

Foucault writes that the precise, carefully calibrated manner in which institutional confinement was carried out in the nineteenth century facilitated the extension of disciplinary techniques along a continuum from the prison at the centre outwards throughout the entire social body.[258] The specialised residential institutions for various categories of deviant or deprived children – reformatories and juvenile colonies; industrial schools; homes for wayward girls; orphanages etc. – were near the core of what Foucault referred to as the 'carceral archipelago'.[259] At the outer edges of the 'carceral circles' were to be found the various philanthropic agencies and organisations dedicated to social improvement which exercised disciplinary power outside of institutional settings.[260] A feature of nineteenth-century philanthropy was the concern to place charitable activity on a more 'rational' footing, 'indiscriminate alms-giving' – whether via the state or private benevolence – was regarded by many influential commentators as likely to perpetuate misery.[261] Only when organised on a rational 'scientific' basis could provision of support to the poor serve as a means of moral and social improvement. Such thinking underpinned the utilitarian-inspired 'New' Poor Laws introduced in Britain in 1834 and the

establishment of 'charity organisation societies' in the latter half of the nineteenth century in many English and American cities. The purpose of these societies was to promote a more coordinated and efficient approach to philanthropic activity as well as to encourage delivery of services in a way which would tend to promote rather than undermine incentives to economic activity and moral probity.[262]

The efforts of social philanthropists were primarily targeted at women – Rose writes that the aim was to act upon the will of the working-class mother, to stimulate the desire to conform to middle-class standards in the administration of domestic and family life.[263] According to Rose the 'moralizing' efforts of philanthropists were supplemented by the 'normalizing' initiatives of the medical professionals with whom they joined forces.[264] Framed by the language of medical expertise, the problems of children and families were increasingly coming to be viewed as issues to be addressed by suitably qualified experts drawing on scientific knowledge and research. Thus Rose points to a shift in the disciplinary strategies applied to families as norms of conduct based on morality and religion were gradually superseded by norms derived from 'biopolitical' data.[265] A symbiotic relationship existed between science and social philanthropy – statistical data produced in relation to issues such as infant mortality delineated the contours of the 'social', foregrounding trends in a manner which translated 'private troubles' into 'social problems'; in turn the efforts of philanthropic organisations generated attention and funding for scientific endeavours as well as demands for further information on the prevalence, causes and potential solutions to social problems.[266]

Over the course of the nineteenth century the gaze of social reformers had widened to encompass almost every aspect of children's lives revealing evidence of widespread exploitation and ill-treatment to a receptive public. In addition to promoting protective employment laws and more humane treatment of child offenders and the 'pre-delinquent', campaigners drew attention to the plight of street-traders and child-beggars and of 'illegitimate' infants placed in private fosterage. Not all of these issues touched directly on the parent-child relationship, but they were viewed as linked in some way to parental neglect, cruelty or exploitation. As a result of pressure from campaigners laws aimed at the prevention of 'cruelty', were introduced in the late nineteenth century first in New York and subsequently in Britain in 1889.[267] Cruelty encompassed violence against children (beyond that deemed 'reasonable' chastisement) as well as 'cruel' neglect, however the laws introduced went further than merely proscribing ill-

treatment, effectively setting out minimum standards of child-rearing. Therborn writes that legislation providing for regulation of parental cruelty was adopted in France in 1889 and in Germany, Switzerland and in the Scandinavian countries in the 1890s.[268]

What was novel about child welfare laws was not so much that cruelty against children was now regulated by law (in theory prosecution of parents for ill-treatment of their children was already possible under criminal codes)[269] but that children could be removed from parental custody. 'Breaking up the family' was not regarded by all reformers as the most satisfactory solution to problems associated with child neglect or abuse.[270] Apart from the difficulties in placing children appropriately, removal of children allowed parents to evade their responsibilities. While there would always be a residual group of parents who were either unwilling or unable to improve, where possible, reforming parents was preferable to rescuing children.[271] School attendance and child welfare legislation set out minimum standards of child-rearing and made it possible to sanction unsatisfactory parents, but the sovereign instrument of law was not the most appropriate mechanism for raising standards of child-rearing, although it facilitated intervention. The law could be used to punish parents and even to compel certain parents to improve their behaviour (such as by giving up alcohol), but ultimately education, guidance and support were more effective tools of 'responsibilization', a view which gained in importance as the twentieth-century progressed, reaching its apotheosis in the period after the second world war.

By the early 1900s most states had taken on at least some responsibility for supporting and regulating families. While philanthropic effort remained important, increasingly volunteers operated in the domain of the social under bureaucratic and/or professional authority. A good example of this, provided by Koven and Michel, is the programme of welfare visiting established in Huddersfield in the north of England at the turn of the twentieth century as a means of reducing infant mortality.[272] The scheme was led by salaried female assistant medical officers, whose initial house-calls were supplemented by visits from female volunteers during which guidance and advice were dispensed. A particularly significant feature of this scheme was that it incorporated a system of notification of births as a trigger for a home visit as soon as possible after a birth. This provision was the model for the Notification of Births Act 1907, by which local authorities were empowered to require medical professionals to notify health visitors of a birth.[273] Reid writes that home visits were viewed as a more effective

tool than educational programmes offered at welfare clinics, because those mothers most in need of advice – the ignorant, negligent or actively cruel mothers of the poorest classes – could not be trusted to attend. The home visit afforded health workers the opportunity to observe the home environment while dispensing advice on matters of hygiene and the care and feeding of infants, allowing for more intensive intervention where there was cause for concern.[274]

The establishment of state-sponsored programmes such as health-visiting targeted at entire populations provide the earliest examples of the adoption by modern states of the pastoral injunction to protect and promote the welfare of 'each and all'. Primarily preventative, rather than corrective, health visiting can be regarded as a mechanism of security aimed at reducing infant mortality and morbidity through channeling (and instilling, where necessary) maternal concern in line with the prescriptions of experts. In relation to the health and welfare of older children the school served as a key site for biopolitical intervention. School inspections initiated in the late nineteenth century measured children against norms of physical development, the relatively poor condition of working-class children, providing an impetus for the introduction of school medical services and provision of meals for needy schoolchildren and the incorporation of physical education into school curricula.[275]

**The mind of the child**

The rise in the school-going population at the turn of the twentieth century is associated with increasing interest in children's *minds*, as significant gaps in academic achievement became apparent, a topic of inquiry which was the particular concern of the nascent field of developmental psychology.[276] First published in 1882, William Preyer's *Mind of the Child* is credited by Cairns as the foundational text of developmental psychology – based on systematic observations of his young son Preyer's study traced the development of the senses, the will and the intellect positing a model in which individuals are born with inherent predispositions of varying intensity, whose later impact is shaped by interaction with environmental influences.[277] Almost contemporaneously G. Stanley Hall was carrying out his first survey of school-children, based upon a questionnaire designed to measure 'the contents of the child's mind'.[278] Baldwin's *The Mental Development of The Child and the Race* was published in 1895; his 'stage' model of cognitive development has latterly been recognised as an indirect influence on the better known theories of Piaget and Vygotsky.[279]

Early child psychology was heavily influenced by evolutionary biology – an important motivation underlying the study of children was the quest for greater understanding of the process of individual development and its relationship to that of the species.[280] Despite wide divergence in many other respects, Cairns and Cairns note that many pioneers of child psychology such as G. Stanley Hall and Sigmund Freud evinced a belief in recapitulation, an idea derived from *naturphilosophie*.[281] The implications drawn from conceptualising development as a largely pre-ordained process were that excessive or clumsy intervention could retard or even 'arrest' a child's development, viewed as a sequential progression through a series of 'stages'.[282] Child-rearing and educational methods should therefore seek to support rather than actively direct the 'natural' developmental process; children required play and exercise more than correction and control.[283] Environmental influences were not discounted, but viewed in the context of their interaction with innate, inherited traits. The biogenetic law was abandoned early in the twentieth century, but Cairns and Cairns write that the relationship between ontogeny and phylogeny was to remain an ongoing concern for developmental psychology, as was the related question of the relative import of nature and nurture in the developmental process.[284]

The emergence of developmental psychology is closely intertwined with movements for social and educational reform – in the US, in particular, maternalist welfare organisations were engaged in consolidating and rationalising their efforts and seeking a more 'scientific' approach to philanthropy looked to the nascent child study movement.[285] Smuts writes that G. Stanley Hall's writings on adolescence were a major buttress to efforts to reform juvenile justice, while the American playground movement drew heavily upon child development theories including Hall's interpretation of recapitulation in campaigning for the establishment of public play and recreation facilities.[286]

As the 'unscientific' approaches of the first generation of developmental psychologists came under fire in the early twentieth century, intelligence tests served as an important means by which developmental psychology achieved legitimacy as a scientific discipline.[287] In the early 1900s the French psychologist Alfred Binet and his colleague Victor Simon developed an instrument to measure intellectual *functioning*, which when taken up and adapted by psychologists in Britain and the US came to be deployed as a measure of intellectual *capacity*, in a manner which posited 'intelligence' as an objective entity amenable to

measurement and ranking.[288] Danziger writes that enthusiasm for intelligence testing in Britain and the United States must be viewed in the context of a shift towards a 'naturalised' understanding of intellectual capacity associated with evolutionary biology from which, first in France, and later in Britain through the work of Herbert Spencer, emerged a conception of 'intelligence' which in contrast to 'reason' was not distinctively human (animals also had intelligence) or linked to a divine or natural order.[289] The concept of intelligence was related to adaptive capacity – the 'fittest' in evolutionary terms were the 'most intelligent'; Danziger here highlights the perceived relationship between intelligence and performance in a life-long test.[290] We find here a quite different conception of the notion of life as a perpetual test to the ancient Stoic conception – for the Stoics testing served to 'harden' the individual, imbuing strength and toughness. By contrast the Victorian evolutionary 'life as test' is associated with a process of differentiation between 'fit' and 'unfit'.[291]

As Danziger writes, the development of methods to systematically measure 'intelligence' was both necessitated and made possible by the advent of rationalised systems of age-differentiated schooling and the associated system of examinations by which educational 'performance' was assessed.[292] The massive expansion in school-going populations from the late nineteenth century stimulated demand for methods of categorising children so that the 'unteachable' could be demarcated from the 'normal' child population.[293] The test developed by Binet and Simon took age as the benchmark for assessment – the test was designed to facilitate comparison between an individual's test scores and the 'normal' levels of performance for children of that particular age.[294] Children who scored below the normal range were to be the subject of specialised interventions. Viewed through the eugenicist lens of the British and American psychologists who adapted and propagated the test, what was measured by the Binet-Simon instrument was an inheritable trait.[295] Low scores indicated poor stock and the fact that ethnic minorities and those living in poverty scored poorly was an indication of their inferiority in evolutionary terms.[296]

### The maladjusted child

Not all childhood problems related to low 'intelligence' – there were numerous children with 'normal' IQ scores who exhibited deviant or delinquent behaviour or experienced difficulty in school. The problems of these children were framed in terms of maladjustment – difficulty conforming to socially accepted standards of behaviour.[297] According

to Jones the concept of 'maladjustment' derived from the holistic 'psychobiological' approach of Adolf Meyer which emphasised the interrelationship between physical, psychological and social factors in explaining mental health or illness.[298] Deployed initially in relation to delinquent and pre-delinquent children the categories of children captured by the term expanded in tandem with the widening scope of child guidance clinics. From their establishment in the early twentieth century child guidance clinics had moved beyond an initial preoccupation with children appearing before the juvenile courts to the management of various categories of troubled children.[299] Horn writes that three main categories were dealt with – firstly, those whose behaviour challenged social norms such as children who fought, lied, bullied their peers or challenged authority; secondly children evincing 'personality problems' such as excessive shyness, fear, sadness or activity and finally children whose presenting problems were linked to 'habit formation' – in this category were bed-wetters, thumb-suckers and masturbators.[300] Child guidance was connected to the broader mental hygiene movement associated with Meyer which emphasised a preventative approach to psychopathology; intervention during the formative years, when the individual was most malleable, was regarded as a particularly effective means of forestalling future problems.[301]

While the pioneers of child guidance posited a multi-causal explanatory model for maladjustment, a great amount of attention was paid to the family environment. This was linked at least in part to the influence of Freud's work on the early child guidance movement and the emphasis therein on unconscious processes.[302] Jones writes that Meyer had acknowledged psychogenic factors as one of the possible roots of maladjustment.[303] Within psychoanalytic theory psychogenic explanations for pathology are foregrounded; instinctual drives are the motor of individual development and the early years of life the crucial period in which most personality development takes place.[304] The manner in which infant desire is managed by caregivers is of pivotal importance as an insensitive response could lead to internal conflict, which though 'unconscious' nonetheless exerted a powerful influence on the individual throughout his or her future life.[305] From this perspective the problems with which maladjusted children presented were not primarily problems of the will; children and adolescents were not *choosing* to subvert social norms, but were acting out of unconscious motives. A therapeutic rather than an explicitly corrective response was required and given the importance of the parental role the child could not be worked with in isolation. The family itself and the affective

relationships between family members were an important focus of intervention.[306]

Psycho-analytic theory laid the foundation for what was to become a central theoretical plank of professional social work in the era following World War II – attachment theory.[307] Developed by John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth attachment theory placed an enormous emphasis on the period of infancy and the relationship between mother and child as key determinants of future well-being. Bowlby viewed the bonds of attachment formed between infant and mother as instinctive and therefore universal – mothers and infants were 'biologically programmed' to behave in ways which created an enduring attachment.[308] The attachment formed laid the foundation for the child's development – Birns writes that attachment theory thus provides an 'inoculation model of parenting' in which maternal love administered in infancy represents a defence against future ills.[309] Conversely, the negative effects associated with lack of love either because the mother was not physically present or because of some deficiency in the mother-child bond would reverberate throughout a child's life. Due to the efforts of Bowlby's colleague Mary Ainsworth attachment was rendered amenable to measurement and categorisation and endowed with predictive value. Birns writes that although to come under serious criticism from later generations of researchers, a raft of studies presented evidence pointing to a direct relationship between the strength of infant attachment and outcomes across a range of indicators.[310]

Rose writes that the influence on social work activity was felt in a number of ways.[311] Removal of children from family situations was to be a last resort with family-based care preferred over institutional care should removal be necessary, while social workers were to be equipped with the requisite psychological expertise to enable them to support parents and children in navigating difficulties. Beyond the 'troubled family', Rose suggests that parents generally were encouraged to think about family life in psychological terms through various formal and informal channels such as radio broadcasts and advice literature, which encouraged adults to become mindful of the impact they exerted on their children not simply in terms of their actions, but in terms of their 'feelings, wishes and anxieties'.[312] If, as Rose suggests, that 'love was no longer merely a moral duty or a romantic ideal, [but] the element in which were produced normal and abnormal children',[313] it behoved all parents to ensure that they were administering love in a manner which promoted psychological and emotional health.

Obviously the main responsibility for production of 'normal' children rested with mothers. The concept of the 'good enough mother' developed by the psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott – to become an important tool in the arsenal of professional social workers – was an attempt to delineate the parameters of appropriate mothering. At one level the idea served to reassure, in that perfection was not to be aimed at, but at the same time it was necessarily evaluative, establishing a minimum threshold of mothering that was not too high to exclude those mothers who, while not ideal, were 'doing their best'. Nevertheless, clearly if mothers could be categorised as 'good enough' some must fall below the threshold as '*not* good enough mothers', while some – mothers who were *too* good – were potentially storing up problems for children whose capacity to cope with future difficulties could be impaired.[314] A delicate balance between mothering 'too little' and mothering 'too much' was therefore to be maintained.

**Guiding families**

Since the invention of the printing press there has been no shortage of 'expert' child-rearing advice in circulation. Hardyment notes that from the earliest days of printing books proffering guidance to parents have been among the biggest sellers. From the late nineteenth century new kinds of child expert such as paediatricians and psychologists have emerged and the range of channels – state-sponsored and commercial – through which advice can be imparted has grown considerably.[315] Based on American sources, Cook's research on the role of the children's clothing industry in shaping constructions of childhood and child-rearing provides a fascinating insight into the manner in which marketing strategies aimed at mothers as consumers of children's goods drew on medical and psychological expertise in advocating a 'scientific' approach to child-rearing in the early twentieth century.[316] Part of this process was the promulgation of an idealised image of the 'self-sacrificing' mother whose love was best conveyed through expenditure on items which experts assured her would help optimise her children's health and psychological development.[317] Since the early twentieth century psychologists have applied techniques of measurement to arrive at developmental norms across a range of indicators, reshaping the way in which the developing child was understood, that is, in terms of attaining, falling short or exceeding age appropriate yardsticks.[318] Childhood norms extrapolated from aggregated data have come to shape the contours of childhood, increasingly regarded in

terms of age-differentiated stages of development.[319] Concomitantly, the role of parenting has been redefined in terms of facilitating 'normal' development along pre-established lines.[320] From the early decades of the twentieth century childhood development has been conceptualised in terms of finer distinctions between developmental stages. Cook points to the manner in which marketing strategies deployed in relation to children's goods contributed to the constitution of developmental categories such as 'toddlers', 'teens' and 'tweens', defined by distinct 'needs' in terms of clothing, toys and other consumer goods.[321]

At any given time a number of competing approaches to child-rearing will inform parenting manuals, but some will be more 'fashionable' than others, more in step with prevailing mores and social conditions. Studies of child-rearing advice suggest a move away from the 'natural' approach advocated by the child-study movement in the inter-war period towards behaviourist approaches which stressed regularity and routine and instilling good 'habits'.[322] Hardyment writes that ideas derived from psychoanalytic theory gradually began to permeate the advice administered in commercially produced child care literature from the 1940s. She notes two distinct approaches to the translation of psychoanalytic insights into precepts for parents – 'astringent' and 'cuddly' – but each shared a basic orientation towards gently guiding the child towards self-regulation by allowing free expression of impulses as children moved through the initial stages of psychosexual development.[323] Ever-present was the caution that failure to sensitively attend to the child's distinct needs at particular stages was to lay the foundations of future neurosis; the central task of parenting was to guard against this danger by ensuring that children received adequate doses of appropriately administered 'motherlove', an imperative which gained in importance as the tenets of attachment theory entered into popular consciousness from the 1950s.[324]

In her examination of parenting advice manuals Hardyment notes that just as there was a considerable time lag between the emergence and popularisation of psychoanalytic perspectives on childhood there was a considerable delay before the other most influential developmental theory of the twentieth century – Jean Piaget's stage model of cognitive development – was rendered into a form suitable for mass consumption.[325] Piaget's influence was felt at roughly the same time as the concept of human capital became an increasingly influential aspect of economic and educational discourse. The influence on educational provision was associated with the development of 'child-centred' edu-

cational curricula in which children were re-positioned as active learners.[326] While this placed a much greater emphasis than hitherto on children's agency, there was also an increased emphasis on the importance of providing a 'stimulating' environment, which enhanced the importance of parents in the pedagogical process. Correspondingly, disparities in educational achievement between social classes were increasingly linked with deficiencies in the home environment.[327] Rose writes that working-class child-rearing practices, influenced by the behaviourist emphasis on 'obedience, tidiness and habit formation', appeared anachronistic, out of line with contemporary mores.[328] Hence programmes of compensatory education for children from lower socio-economic backgrounds developed from the 1960s placed a special emphasis on working with parents as well as children.[329]

Hardyment writes that the shift in commercial parenting advice books towards Piagetian ideas, apparent from the 1960s, is associated with advice which emphasised greater freedom for the developing child. Parents were encouraged to allow their child to explore, which she notes necessitated more extensive parental supervision over children than hitherto.[330] Recognition of the profit potential in 'stimulation' has subsequently led to the development of a huge industry in educational books, toys and games, as parents took on board the exhortations of experts and retailers to take an active role in optimising their children's intellectual potential.[331]

**Safeguarding children**

Rose argues that over the course of the twentieth century, the family became thoroughly 'psychologized', suggesting that by the closing decades of the twentieth century it could be assumed that the majority of parents were capable of self-regulation, imbued with the desire and the capacity to ensure that their children received the necessary emotional and intellectual inputs for successful adulthood.[332] At the same time, Rose notes the growing concern in relation to the issue of safeguarding children which has been apparent since the 'discovery' of child abuse in the 1960s. There has been a huge increase in recorded cases of violence against children which has been accorded a visibility hitherto lacking. In a sense this is the logical outcome of the 'sacralization' of childhood. As the emotional value of children has increased over the twentieth century, it is unsurprising that threats to the welfare of the individual child have come to be regarded more seriously. Increased recognition of child abuse should not, however, be interpreted merely in terms of either more enlightened or more sentimental

attitudes towards children.[333] For instance Hendrick suggests that the issue came to prominence at a time when the post-war welfare settlement was coming under increasing criticism.[334] Concern around child abuse intersected with New Right attacks which implicated the welfare state in a decaying moral order characterised by declining 'family values'.[335] These arguments were competing with alternative – mainly feminist – perspectives which located child abuse in the context of unequal power relations.[336] Feminists have been especially influential in drawing attention to the issue of sexual abuse,[337] however the broad thrust of public and political responses to child abuse was grounded in the need for intensified policing rather than sustained questioning of male/female or child/adult relations.

The 'discovery' of child abuse was driven by a medicalised conceptualisation of the phenomenon which pathologised abusers.[338] Hence, as Rose argues, calls for increased state surveillance of 'problem' families do not necessarily conflict with resistance to state intervention in the 'private' domain of the 'normal' family which has been equally apparent in the latter decades of the twentieth century.[339] The result has been a shift, in English speaking countries at least,[340] to a position where state intervention in the family is to be limited to cases where there is perceptible – generally physical – harm to the child. The recalibration of child welfare work towards children 'at risk' as opposed to 'in need', means that professionals working in the area tread a more delicate balance between the public and the private and their work becomes increasingly defined in terms of legal obligations and proscriptions.[341] Samantha Ashenden's governmentality-inspired analysis of child abuse inquiries in the UK context illuminates the manner in which these inquiries – conceptualised by Ashenden in terms of 'reflexive government' – channel concerns towards the child protection system, with reformist efforts aimed at enhancing the capacity of social workers to 'safeguard' vulnerable children, whilst avoiding unnecessary or excessive forms of intervention.[342]

Given that the discourse of 'safeguarding children' subordinates family support to the right to protection of the individual child, Chen argues that this form of rationality, – 'keeping kids safe' – obscures broader questions of poverty and social disadvantage which received greater attention under the forms of 'society-oriented' rationality which guided 'child-savers' in the past.

> When children were thought of as 'future citizens', children's rights were connected with the interests of society. In contrast, today

> when children are constructed as citizens in the field of child protection their rights are constituted in personal and private terms and are specifically restricted to safety. Society-oriented rationalities for child protection can be criticized, and rightly so, as not really about children. Nevertheless, such social rationalities also allowed the gradual introduction of social services and benefits beyond child protection.[343]

The thrust of Chen's argument is that instead of receiving supportive services, parents who come to the attention of the risk-oriented child welfare system are obliged to engage in a process of 'individual risk management'. While highlighting the manner in which social work practice has become skewed towards a narrow conception of child welfare, Chen's analysis could be regarded as downplaying the importance of generational power relations and the potential for tension between the interests of parents and children, a weakness to which literature on the government of families is occasionally prone. In this regard, it is important to note that children's problems are not always the result of socio-economic disadvantage, and as Hendrick suggests, are also linked to cultural acceptability of violence towards children.[344] This criticism is not, however, intended as an endorsement of risk-oriented rationalities which are as limited in their capacity to address disparities of power as to address socio-economic disadvantage.

## Conclusion

The image of the Apollonian child which in its modern form was 'birthed' by Rousseau and the Romantics is rooted in the idea of 'natural' development and an approach to child-rearing emphasising gentle nurturance so as not to interfere with the 'normal' developmental process. This view of childhood and child-rearing is associated with biopolitical power. As Foucault, and more recently Rose, emphasise the rise of biopolitical power should not be viewed as a top-down, state-led movement but was related to the efforts of various agencies and organisations concerned with the welfare of the population – of which organisations concerned with child welfare were an important part. The rise of biopolitics is associated with a shift in the position of the family from model for government to instrument. Related to this shift mothers, rather than fathers, were accorded central importance in the socialisation process and efforts related to improving the health and well-being of children took mothers as their primary target. The

apotheosis of the Apollonian child occurred in the middle decades of the twentieth century by which time norms related to emotional and cognitive well-being drawn from developmental psychology were in the ascendancy with greater demands thereby placed on parents in terms of promoting stability and optimising potential. This period is associated with welfarist rationalities of rule in which state support for families was positioned as beneficial for society as a whole. Welfarism was subsequently challenged by rationalities which centred both on the necessity for surveillance and supervision of 'risky' families (for the sake of vulnerable children) and the need for privacy for 'normal' families, on whom could be bestowed the privilege and obligation of managing their own risks and challenges.

# 5
# Governing the Responsible Child

In different ways, the Dionysian and Apollonian models of childhood have shaped law, policy and practice towards children in ways which emphasised children's need for protection and exclusion from adult society. In the last few decades, the model of protected, sequestered childhood and the assumptions about children from which it derives increasingly began to be questioned. In this chapter, the main sources of criticism, the sociological literature on childhood and the literature on children's rights, are briefly examined with particular reference to the alternative image of childhood – competent, agentive – with which they are associated. Drawing on recent governmentality literature in relation to childhood, it is suggested that the idea of the child as competent and agentive has been taken up in strategies of exercising power over children, which operate through participation rather than protection as in the past. As a symbol of this mode of exercising power, the model of the Athenian child is put forward as analogous and complementary to Jenks's models of the Dionysian and Apollonian images of childhood.

## Re-conceptualising childhood

Over the last few decades the privileged status of developmental psychology as a source of knowledge on children and childhood has been called into question.[1] Within psychology the emergence of an 'anti-developmental psychology'[2] in the closing decades of the twentieth century is associated with the influence of postmodern and post-structural theories which stimulated critical examination of the foundational assumptions upon which 'developmentalism' was constructed. A key concern for theorists such as Walkerdine was to

'de-naturalise' the figure of 'the developing child', now revealed as discursively constituted and enmeshed in unequal relations of power, tied to long discredited notions of evolutionary progress which posited a particular form of rationality – Western, masculine – as the end-point of the developmental process.[3] The 'stage-model' of development with its inherent assumptions about age-appropriate characteristics and competencies and the statistical norms produced from large-scale developmental studies constructed a version of 'normal' development which, as noted in the previous chapter, could be deployed as a standard for comparison, however the 'normal' child thus constituted was branded by Erica Burman as nothing more than a 'myth' based upon 'abstraction', with no direct relation to children in the real world.[4]

Criticism of 'developmentalism' was perhaps the most important plank of the 'new' sociology of childhood which emerged from the 1980s, the key themes and assumptions of which subsequently spread beyond the discipline, underpinning the rise of what is now referred to as the 'social studies of childhood' or 'childhood studies'. Writing in the 1990s, James and Prout could point to a number of shared assumptions, which despite diverse theoretical foundations and methodological approaches, were contributing to the advancement of a new paradigm in relation to sociological interest in childhood.[5] Among the most significant of these were firstly, the idea that childhood is socially constructed, secondly, that children are social actors, and thirdly, that 'children's relationships and cultures are worthy of study in their own right'.[6] Each of these represented a significant departure from the ontological and epistemological assumptions embedded in what for much of the twentieth century was the dominant perspective on childhood within sociology – socialisation theory – which for the new wave of sociologists was emblematic of an outdated developmental perspective on children as mere 'human becomings'.

Shaped by the concerns and assumptions of structural-functionalism, socialisation theory was not formulated in an attempt to better understand the lives of children. In his classic paper critiquing the model of socialisation developed by Talcott Parsons, Wrong describes socialisation theory as in essence a response to the 'Hobbesian' question of the basis of social discipline, an attempt to illuminate how it is that individuals accept the constraints imposed upon them by society.[7] In addressing this problem Parsons drew heavily on psychoanalytic theory, stimulated by the 'convergence' between Durkheim's conception of the manner in which social constraints impeded individual

action and Freud's account of the development of the superego – each grounded in notions of 'internalization'.[8]

Freud's theory of internalisation was formulated in relation to the Oedipus Complex – resolution of the drama played out during the 'Phallic' stage of psychosexual development is achieved when the (boy) child suppresses his desire for his mother and 'internalizes' the coercive authority of the father.[9] The superego thus created acts as the voice of conscience, but for Freud this does not bring about a final conclusion to the conflict between desire and duty.[10] Wrong argued that when appropriated into sociological theory the concept of internalisation became reduced to a relatively straightforward process of acquisition which – because tied to social and cultural explanations – omitted the emphasis which Freud placed on the conflict between individual desires and societal expectations, thus presenting a view of individuals as effectively 'moulded by society'.[11]

From the perspective of the 'new sociology' socialisation theory was grounded in an impoverished view of children and childhood.[12] Clearly the classic functionalist model of socialisation in which children passively absorb social values and norms contains little by way of recognition of children's capacity for agency. This was a criticism which also applied to critical perspectives concerned with the role of socialisation in 'reproducing' class or gender inequality.[13] James, Jenks and Prout write that the starting point for any account of socialisation, even those drawn from the more 'agentive' perspective of symbolic interactionism, is not the child, but the mature adult that s/he will one day become; hence children are necessarily represented in terms of deficiency – as beings who are 'not yet adult'.[14] Socialisation theory was also criticised for promulgating a view of socialisation as a natural and universal process, hence obscuring the considerable degree of historical and cultural variation in terms of how the process of 'growing up' has been understood and managed.[15]

James *et al* point to four distinct approaches within the sociology of childhood, of which one point of differentiation is whether the emphasis is on childhood/structure or children/agency.[16] Inspired by post-structural and post-modern theory, efforts to 'deconstruct' the assumptions about childhood embedded in the human sciences, but also those underpinning public policy and popular understanding, represent an important strand of 'social constructionist' theory and research. From a starting point of childhood as a constant, although not unchanging, feature of every society, the social structural approach

is concerned with childhood as both 'structured and structuring'.[17] The emphasis here, per Qvortrup, is on how children *as a group* are collectively affected by their common structural position. Of more direct interest to the present discussion is theory and research concerned with the everyday lives of children. A broad (not always clear-cut) distinction can be made between two of these kinds of approach – firstly those inspired by anthropology which draw on ethnographic methods in seeking to shed light on children's 'cultural worlds', and secondly, those, such as the 'child standpoint' approach pioneered by Leena Alanen and Berry Mayall, which aim to give 'voice' to children with the explicit aim of addressing inequalities of power.

Within the ethnographic literature children are represented as meaning-makers, actively engaged in developing customs, norms and values.[18] Wyness points to a long tradition of this kind of research within the sociology of education and within youth studies (the study of 'subcultures'), as well as a body of anthropological literature centred on the 'culture of childhood'.[19] James *et al*[20] as well as Wyness[21] note that topics familiar to developmentally-oriented researchers are construed very differently from an ethnographic perspective; for instance play becomes an aspect of children's culture, schooling approached as a site of regulation and resistance. Socialisation, when viewed through the ethnographic lens of William Corsaro, is reconceptualised as 'interpretive reproduction' a process in which young children actively engage in appropriating and adapting adult-generated norms and values which represent the raw materials from which children's peer cultures are constituted.[22]

While topics such as play and friendship remain popular topics of ethnographic research, in recent years the ethnographic gaze has widened considerably to encompass multifarious aspects of children's lives such as bullying,[23] consumption[24] and children's engagement with technology and new media.[25] James *et al* identify some potential dangers associated with this upsurge of interest in researching children's 'worlds', in particular the potential for positioning children as a group apart from mainstream (adult) society, as well as the possibilities opened up in terms of surveillance and regulation of children's activities, however these are weighed against the contribution which ethnographic research has made in terms of shining new light on children's competence and capacity for agency.[26]

Within the feminist-inspired 'child standpoint approach' that children are competent agents is similarly a fundamental assumption, however here the main focus is the manner in which children's poten-

tial for exercising agency is 'both facilitated and constrained' by the prevailing 'generational order'.[27] In their use of generation, Alanen and Mayall depart from Mannheim's understanding of generation, which Alanen[28] likens to class in the Weberian sense of external relations. From a child standpoint perspective, generation is utilised more broadly to incorporate relations *between* groups akin to the Marxist sense of class relations.[29] A key assumption is that childhood and adulthood are mutually dependent social categories: to be a child is to be 'not adult' and vice versa.[30] The constitution of generational categories is conceptualised by Alanen as a dynamic process referred to as 'generationing' by which is meant the 'complex set of social processes by which people become (are constructed as) "children" while other people become (are constructed as) "adults"'.[31]

According to Alanen examination of generational relations entails adopting a dual perspective which aims to move towards the stance of 'looking down' from the macro-societal level from the starting point of 'looking up' from the vantage of children themselves.[32] This requires carrying out research in a manner which positions children as participants in a meaningful way, so allowing them to express their views on issues which they themselves regard as significant. As with feminist standpoint theory the rationale for listening to children's views is both epistemological and political. Mayall writes that:

> Proper understanding of the social order requires consideration of all its members, all social groups. And children, like other minority groups, lack a voice and have a right to be heard and their views taken into account. It is through working towards better understanding of the social condition of childhood that we can provide a firm basis for working towards implementation of their rights.[33]

This approach then is predicated on a commitment to enhancing understanding in order to promote social change via adopting a rights-based approach. Obviously there is a great deal of common cause between those working within this tradition and children's rights campaigners and researchers and a good deal of overlap in terms of topics of inquiry. Over the last decade or so there has emerged a body of research (from a range of disciplines) examining children's views on among other topics, paid employment and participation in unpaid care-work, understandings of 'child abuse',[34] parental disciplinary practices[35] and parental working hours.[36]

The particular danger which James *et al* associate with the child-standpoint perspective is that differences between children in circumstances and experiences (such as those related to social class, gender or ethnicity) may be obscured by the emphasis on children as a unitary group (a point also made in relation to the social structural approach).[37] Writing of the fault-line within the sociology of childhood between those who advocate focusing on children as a collective and those who argue for greater recognition of diversity in children's lives, James[38] argues for an approach which addresses commonality *and* difference, macro *and* micro in studying children's lives and experiences. Such an approach acknowledges that *all* children in a particular society have certain things in common, while recognising that factors other than the generational order (such as access to economic resources) operate to facilitate and constrain children's capacity for agency. On a related note it is important to be cognisant of the dangers foregrounded by governmentality scholars such as Vandenbroeck and Bouverne-de-Vie, who point to the discursively constructed nature of tensions between the interests of children and those of parents – and their deployment in legitimising intervention in disadvantaged families – in cautioning against examination of generational inequality in isolation from the broader context of power relations.[39]

## From protection to participation

The concept of children's rights is both predicated upon and constitutive of the idea of children as a unitary group united by their position in the generational order. As discussed in previous chapters, use of the language of children's rights goes back to at least the nineteenth century. The 'rights' then accorded to children were an important means by which the contours of childhood were delineated and the role of children in society defined, but more properly referred to extension of state authority to intervene in the family. Earlier I noted Dean's comment regarding T.H. Marshall's deployment of the language of rights – the 'social rights' of citizenship – in reference to aspects of state activity perhaps more correctly comprehended in terms of the exercise of pastoral power. Children's 'rights' can similarly be viewed as an expression of the pastoral power of the state. Typically an analogy is drawn between children's rights and the civil rights accorded to adults in liberal regimes, whereby the protective rights granted to minors are regarded as curbing parental 'sovereignty' in the same manner as civil rights represent a brake on potentially overweening state power. The

protective rights accorded to children in the nineteenth century such as restrictions on paid employment, compulsory education laws and child welfare legislation were based on the notion that the interests of the child could be regarded as distinct from those of his/her parents. In important respects, however, the aim was not so much to de-limit parental authority as to ensure that the authority vested in parents was exercised in line with approved social goals, configuring a direct relay between the pastoral functions of the state and those of the family.

In the 1970s the influence of the Civil Rights Movement and second-wave feminism sparked a 'children's liberation' movement in the United States. Advocates explicitly challenged the protective laws reformers had fought for a century before, in the process problematising the construction of childhood – dependent, pre-rational, vulnerable – which underpinned them. Holt's *Escape from Childhood*, which represented a manifesto of sorts, argued that the understanding of childhood which legitimised restrictive legal and social arrangements was in fact produced by those arrangements; due to their limited status as a mixture of 'expensive nuisance, slave and super-pet' children could achieve their own ends only through the deployment of manipulative tactics, which trapped them in unsatisfactory relations with adults.[40] Child liberationists demanded that children be accorded identical rights to adult citizens, including the right to vote, to work, and to engage in sexual relations – effectively seeking the abolition of childhood as a distinct legal category.[41] The rationale for equal treatment was not children's 'welfare' or moral improvement, but the belief that self-determination was a valuable end in itself.[42] As Freeman writes, the arguments of the child liberationists were not entirely novel and to a certain extent had been anticipated by turn of the century campaigners such as Ellen Key and Janusz Korczak.[43] The demand for *full* legal, political and social equality for children was unprecedented, however and attracted a great deal of derision. Nevertheless, while confined to a small number of 'liberationists', calls for equality for children provided the stimulus for significant debate, necessitating re-examination of the concepts of citizenship, rights, participation and perhaps most significantly, the nature of childhood itself.

### Children's capacities

Liberal theories of rights are in general predicated upon the idea of the rights-bearer or citizen as rational, autonomous and independent, in direct opposition to the dominant construction of the child as immature, dependent and *pre*-rational.[44] At the heart of the debate on children's 'liberation' lies the question of whether childhood dependency

and irrationality is 'natural' or socially constructed. As noted above the liberationist argument was grounded in a view of paternalism as the *cause* rather than the consequence of children's lack of capacity.[45] Holt and his fellow liberationists argued that age was an arbitrary tool in determining competence, suggesting that many adults lack the ability to make rational choices, while significant numbers of children possess far superior competencies.[46] As Federle writes, framed as they were in terms of children's competency, liberationist arguments were easily open to challenge by opposing viewpoints grounded in developmental theories, which emphasised children's gradual acquisition of competency over time.[47] Opponents of children's rights argued that equal rights for children would undermine basic socialisation, (represented in terms of the inculcation of morality and prudence), leaving parents powerless to impart values and nurture the moral development of their children.[48] Rejection of compulsory schooling by liberationists represented a further threat to children's development, which would have a particular impact on poor children.[49] Faced with restrictions on their authority over children, parents could eschew responsibility for children, for whom liberation would serve as a poor substitute for nurturance and support[50] Rights would thus not 'free' children from dependence, but merely increase their dependence on the state.[51]

The fundamental argument put forward by critics of children's rights is that children are a special category of human being with limited capacities, which justify legal restrictions upon their actions. As Archard writes, this 'care-taking' perspective justifies limiting children's autonomy in the present in terms of the protection of the autonomy of the adult he/she will become.[52] Without parental guidance and compulsory education children will not acquire the capacities they need to become competent choosers in the future. The granting of equal rights would limit children's access to guidance and support, and undermine the relationships between children and parents/schools by redefining them in merely contractual terms. This was seen to have serious consequences not just for children, but for society as a whole.[53]

**Children's rights: Interests or choices?**

Sharing with their critics a common conception of rights as grounded in autonomy or choice somewhat limited the ability of liberationists to develop effective counter-arguments. By contrast, thinking on children's rights since the 1970s has in general moved away from a conception of children's rights in terms of choices towards a theory of rights based on interests. While this could be regarded as the reformulation of the 'care-taking' perspective in rights-language,[54] an under-

standing of rights in terms of interests does not *necessarily* entail a rejection of rights as choices. Drawing on J.S. Mill, MacCormick[55] has argued that liberal rights theory (of the utilitarian variety at least) is underpinned by an instrumental understanding of personal autonomy in that for Mill autonomy was important primarily because each man was the best judge of his own interests. For MacCormick the interests-based conception of rights offers an alternative to the 'all-or-nothing' approach implied by will/choice perspectives, facilitating a differentiated approach to the rights of children and adults. Where adult interests might be viewed as best safeguarded through autonomy, the protection of children's interests could be achieved through a varying mix of paternalistic and permissive approaches, depending on age and capacity.[56]

Eekelaar differentiates between three different kinds of interests which children's rights can be seen to protect – basic interests, which include the right to life and care; developmental interests which are protected primarily through access to education and healthcare and autonomy interests or the right to make one's own decisions, to include 'the right to make mistakes'.[57] A key distinction between children and adults is that while for adults, autonomy rights are the primary rights, for children where there is a conflict, basic and developmental rights take priority over the right to make mistakes. Where autonomy interests do not conflict with basic or developmental rights, Eekelaar argues that there is a strong case for promoting them as much as possible.[58] As applied to children, the interest theory thus underpins a pragmatic approach to rights, which recognises that while tensions exist, 'salvation and liberation',[59] or more properly protection and participation, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A balance can be struck, which in the words of Michael Freeman, should recognise children's 'integrity and decision-making capacities' while bearing in mind 'the dangers of complete liberation'.[60] Restrictions on children's autonomy should be kept to the minimum and limited to actions, which would impinge upon future life chances 'in an irreversible way'.[61] Therefore, while advocating a much greater emphasis on children's self-determination than associated with traditional protective approaches, this perspective is nevertheless compatible with restrictions such as compulsory education.

### Children's citizenship

The broad consensus among contemporary child's rights theorists that children's rights should be somewhat different in kind to those of adults can be characterised in terms of a 'child-sized' conception of

citizenship, to borrow Jans's[62] phrase. As discussed above the ultimate goal is to raise the status of children in society, rather than completely abolish legal distinctions between children and adults. While an understanding of childhood as a life-phase requiring special consideration is retained, there is also concern to challenge conceptions of childhood in terms of deficit or lack, which have led to children being regarded as merely objects of concern. Endowing children with rights – positioning them as legal subjects – is regarded as the most effective way of ensuring their protection, as the inferior status of children is regarded as a significant factor in children's vulnerability to abuse and exploitation.[63] As Archard has written the distinction between 'protecting children' and 'protecting children's rights', identified by the liberationist Richard Farson in the 1970s, is no longer regarded as tenable, as the two are now seen as closely intertwined.[64]

For the last two decades or so our notions of what 'child-sized' citizenship should look like have been shaped by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Within a relatively short period after its adoption in 1989 the Convention had become the most ratified international instrument of all time. Primarily protective, the UNCRC sets out the obligations state parties owe to their youngest citizens. Critics of the Convention have pointed out the poor record on implementation and weak mechanisms for enforcement[65] the highly qualified nature of the rights accorded,[66] as well as the ethnocentric assumptions in which many of its provisions are grounded.[67] The Convention is nevertheless, regarded by child-rights advocates as representing an important symbolic and practical tool for efforts to enhance children's legal and political status.[68] Compared to previous declarations, the real novelty of the Convention lies in Articles 12-17, which set out the civil rights possessed by children including freedom of speech, conscience, association and religion, as well as according children a right to consultation in judicial or administrative matters, which directly concern them. The UNCRC does not confer political rights as such, however these provisions, in particular Article 12, serve as the basis for children's 'right to participation', which can be regarded as the core of 'child-sized' citizenship. While there is no precise definition,[69] child participation is most commonly understood in terms of 'voice' and – to a somewhat lesser extent – 'choice'. Article 12, interpreted broadly as children's 'right to be heard', has served as a focus in many countries for the development of participatory fora, which allow children's views to feed into political planning at the local, regional or national levels. As is recognised within the literature,

'child participation' encompasses a broad range of activities, some of which may be tokenistic or instrumental.[70] The challenge as perceived by child-rights advocates is to advance children's capacity to *meaningfully* participate, on their own terms.[71]

## Agentive childhood

Over the last few decades, and in particular since the advent of the UNCRC, the image of the child as competent participant has been reflected in legal and political spheres and children in many jurisdictions have attained the status of (limited) rights-holders. The emphasis on children's participation is reflected within education systems, both in terms of the increasing popularity of children's councils as well as in the growing emphasis on self-directed learning in pedagogical theory and practice. Within the field of psychology there is much greater recognition of the social context of children's development, partly as a response to criticisms from both inside and outside the discipline.[72] The influence of Piagetian ideas – a particular target of criticism – has waned, overtaken by interactionist and 'ecological' approaches.[73] Children are also seen as active participants in the economic sphere, although generally as consumers rather than producers, and the apparent ease with which many children embrace new technologies has been regarded as instrumental in breaking down barriers between childhood and adulthood. Finally, the family domain is regarded as more 'democratic', with ideal child-parent relations based much more on open communication and 'negotiation' than in the past.[74] To a certain extent, then, we can regard children in the West in the twenty-first century as 'liberated'. On the other hand, the extension of rights to children cannot be regarded as 'a simple tale of progress', in which more enlightened ideas about children's capacities have led to children's emancipation. As Vandenbroeck M. and Bouverne-de Bie argue, ideas about childhood and children's rights have been developed and taken up in complex and contradictory ways, and are shaped by various social, economic and political forces, so that increased recognition and freedom for children is intertwined with shifting modes of social regulation and of exclusion and inclusion.[75]

Looking first at parent-child relations, changes in recent decades are associated in the literature with a number of inter-related social, economic and demographic changes. These include falling birth rates and smaller families, declining job security and women's increasing participation in the labour market as well as the rise in family breakdown,

all of which have contributed to changing child-rearing norms, in part because parental time has become much more limited. As Prout suggests, at least some of the appeal of the image of the 'active and socially participative child' rests in its utility to increasingly time-pressed families.[76] On a deeper level, the rise of the 'democratic family' is associated in the literature with declining parental authority.[77] A number of factors are seen to have contributed to this decline in authority, in particular the emotional dependency of parents on children, in the context of the increasing fragility of marital/romantic bonds, which on the one hand increases the urge to protect children, but also allows children considerably more influence over decision-making within the family domain.[78] This tendency towards child involvement in decision-making has also been linked to the development of children's rights and consequent increased role for the state and other agencies in mediating child-parent relations,[79] however it remains the case, as Rose points out, that the vast majority of families are not subject to overt surveillance,[80] but rather that child-rearing norms oriented towards the promotion of autonomy and self-esteem are promulgated through various formal and informal channels.[81]

Cunningham draws attention to the role of commercial pressures in reshaping family relations, as parents come under increasing pressure to satisfy an ever-growing range of demands.[82] In the early part of the twentieth century, advertisers and retailers were remarkably successful in harnessing sentimental images of childhood and motherhood to stimulate consumption.[83] Cook suggests that the idea of the competent child and its associated model of '*laissez-faire* parenting' have also been heavily influenced by marketing discourse. Positioned as competent and sophisticated within advertising strategies, children have been addressed as consumers in their own right since at least the 1920s.[84] In this sense Cook argues that the idea of children as 'active, agentive beings' was produced in the commercial domain, in which children were 'given a 'voice' and a 'right to buy' decades before their rights were asserted in the UNCRC'. Indeed he suggests that 'children's participation in the world of goods as actors, as persons with desire, underpins their current emergent status as rights-bearing individuals'.[85]

The result of these combined emotional, legal, economic and commercial pressures, according to Cunningham, is that 'child-rearing has become a matter of *negotiation* between parent and child'.[86] Building on Cunningham's insight, Vandenbroeck and Bouverne-de Bie suggest that negotiation has come to be regarded as the 'ultimate "good"', to be aspired to by all families.[87] The explanations put forward by social

theorists suggest that this shift in child-adult relations has as much to do with changing constructions of adulthood as much as of childhood. Lee makes this point explicitly, writing that in an era defined by permanent flux, it is not just that children are no longer perceived as 'incomplete adults'; adulthood itself has been divested of the mantle of 'completeness'.

> With regard to being 'grown up', we have entered an age of uncertainty, an age in which adult life is newly unpredictable and in which whatever stabilities we manage to produce cannot be expected to last our whole lives.[88]

Arguing that the kind of 'standard adulthood' associated with secure employment and life-long partnerships, is a relic of a bygone era, Lee suggests that the traditional basis of socialisation has been thrown into question.[89] In a somewhat similar vein Beck has suggested that the disappearance of 'goals or certainties that must be "inoculated into" young people' means that the transition from youth to adulthood today 'is now possible only through "self-socialization"', a shift he conceptualises in terms of the 'individualization of individualization'.[90] As with Lee, Beck's explanation for this shift focuses on broad social, economic and cultural changes, but the picture is a little different from the vantage of the governmentality literature. While similar trends are acknowledged, looked at from this perspective the image of the 'self-socializing' child appears as a form of 'governable child subject' constituted via strategies which aim to draw upon children's capacities for self-regulation.

Scholars working within a governmentality framework see strong parallels between the rise of the 'competent child actor' and the significance placed on such values as responsibility and self-reliance within contemporary rationalities of rule, central to which are the neoliberal concepts of 'competition', 'choice' and 'enterprise'.[91] As Vandebroeck and Bouverne-de-Vie caution, we cannot 'draw a straight line' between changing conceptions of childhood and neo-liberalism.[92] At the same time evidence from research suggests that ideas about children's competence and agency have been taken up – for example in early years provision,[93] 'student voice' initiatives[94] and even in the design of infant toys[95] – in ways which resonate strongly with the neoliberal 'entrepreneurial' ideal.

The idea of the 'competent child' has a long history in pedagogical theory and practice, linked to approaches, which place a heavy emphasis on the child as an active learner.[96] Kryger notes that these ideas

have a particular resonance in the Nordic context, where he suggests they have informed educational developments to a greater extent than elsewhere. He points however to a shift in the 1990s whereby 'children are not only obliged to shape their own learning but also to take responsibility for this shaping'.[97] This emphasis on reflexivity serves to distinguish contemporary approaches from traditional 'child-centred' education, and is reflected in such pedagogical tools as journals and portfolios of learning, which call upon children to actively reflect upon their own learning process.[98]

In contrast to Romantic or progressive pedagogy, the most recent construction of the competent child is part of mainstream educational discourse across the Western world, in which education has become reconceptualised as a life-long, self-directed project.[99] Adults as well as children are to be regarded as engaged in a continual process of learning and self-improvement in the context of contemporary 'knowledge-based' economies. The mantra of 'life-long learning' is supported by scientific research which reveals hitherto unrecognised potential for new learning at even the most advanced stages of the life-span.[100] Consequently the boundaries between adulthood and childhood are seen to be less rigid than in the past. As Kryger suggests 'the learner – regardless of age- (is) seen as *flexible* and *autonomous*' to be facilitated, rather than directed, by teaching professionals.[101] Each individual is therefore increasingly regarded as the author of his or her own circumstances, free to choose, but at the same time personally responsible for the consequences of his or her choices.[102] Vandenbroeck and Bouverne-de-Bie suggest that the discourse associated with the autonomous life-long learner can be regarded as an example 'of how a social problem (unemployment) is reinscribed as an educational problem and subsequently individualized'.[103] Within this discourse the ideal citizen is one who is flexible enough to continually adapt to the vagaries of de-regulated labour markets, by 'investing' in his/her own 'human capital'.[104] The 'entrepreneurial subject' has, as Simons notes, the responsibility not merely for keeping skills and competencies 'up to date', but in ensuring his or her educational 'portfolio' is 'competitive'.[105]

The image of the competent child as pedagogical subject is derived from developmental psychology. In contrast to sociological or children's rights perspectives, from a developmental perspective children's agency is viewed in instrumental terms. Fendler argues that the agentive child-subject – typically framed in terms of the 'whole child' or 'autonomous learner' – underpins a novel means of governing the child's *soul* in that the locus of control has shifted to encompass the

child's 'innermost desires'.[106] The associated mode of governing she describes as *developmentality* – a neologism uniting developmentalism with governmentality, which draws attention to the self-regulating role of the child in achieving the outcomes set out in 'developmentally appropriate' curricula.[107] Fendler views the 'interactive pedagogy' associated with developmentally-appropriate curricula as representing a novel form of 'conducting conduct' predicated on responsiveness – the child's responsiveness to the teacher and the teacher's responsiveness to the child. These pedagogical technologies depend upon and produce a 'flexible' pedagogical subject – who is able and *willing* to monitor and adjust desires and attitudes as well as behaviour in line with educational goals.[108]

Graham suggests that within the new pedagogy the child is constituted as a 'choosing-subject' in a manner which serves to marginalise those children who do not choose appropriately, so that educational or social disadvantage is re-inscribed as a personal or familial failing.[109] Concern in relation to young people who lack the capacity or desire to make the 'correct' choices is manifest in the discourse of 'youth at risk', a broad category which encompasses educational failure, as well as family difficulties, and criminal and anti-social behaviour.[110] Kelly writes that while anxiety in relation to 'youth' is by no means novel, within contemporary rationalities of rule the 'at risk' discourse encompasses a much broader range of characteristics and behaviours, so that all young people can potentially fall under its remit.[111] According to Kelly this is connected to the extension of the rationality of risk and concomitant dependence on expertise to assist in negotiating even the most mundane aspects of everyday life.[112] The increase in the perceived 'riskiness' of human existence has served to enhance appreciation of the possible pitfalls young people face in their path towards successful adulthood. In consequence, there has been a notable expansion in the number of programmes and initiatives, formal and informal, by which children and young people (and usually their parents) are called upon to assume responsibility for risk management by modifying their own attitudes and behaviour.[113] This is apparent, for example, in relation to the 'fight' against obesity,[114] while similar strategies aim to reduce alcohol/substance abuse or promote 'safe' sexual practices.[115] Within these kinds of strategies the idea of child or youth 'participation' is deployed more as a tool for constituting particular kinds of selves – 'prudential' child-subjects'[116] – than promoting a broader role for children in society. Indeed, Kelly suggests that going hand in hand with these strategies of 'responsibilization' has been the development of

new forms of surveillance and regulation of youth (Kelly uses key examples such as electronic surveillance and 'zero tolerance policing', but we could also include youth 'diversion' schemes and anti-social behaviour orders) which affect a much wider proportion of the 'non-adult' population than traditional methods.[117]

## The Athenian child

Cultivating the qualities necessary for success from the vantage of neo-liberal and advanced liberal rationalities of rule requires a mode of socialisation significantly different from those symbolised by either the Dionysian and Apollonian images of childhood. The Dionysian child denotes an approach to child-rearing aimed at producing what White and Hunt describe as an 'upright' moral subject;[118] there is a strong emphasis on the moral welfare of children and the paternal role is prioritised. The Apollonian child represents a 'child-centred' form of socialisation more concerned with producing 'well-adjusted', individuals; the emotional and psychological welfare of the individual child is central, associated with a stronger emphasis on the maternal role. Analogous to the Dionysian and Apollonian models of childhood the 'Athenian' child is here presented as a symbolic target for the relatively novel governmental mode of regulating children via strategies of participation and 'responsibilization'. Named for the Greek goddess of wisdom, the Athenian child is associated with child-rearing norms in which welfare is closely associated with autonomy, so that the child is in a sense a 'partner' in the socialisation process. Daughter of Zeus, Athena emerged from her father's forehead fully grown – she is thus the perfect representative of the (partially) self-governing, 'competent child-actor'.

Just as the Dionysian and Apollonian images of childhood are associated with the political and pedagogical prescriptions of Hobbes and Rousseau respectively, so the 'parentage' of the 'Athenian child' must be clarified. Symbolising a mode of child government directly linked to the ideal of the 'entrepreneurial self' the Athenian image of childhood resonates with the visions of individual action and social relations set out in the writings of the economist Gary Becker. Becker's approach – behavioural economics – is grounded in an understanding of individual conduct as oriented predominantly towards the maximisation of utility. Action is therefore predicated upon calculation of individual costs and benefits. As noted in Chapter 1, this perspective on behav-

iour is understood to be applicable to all forms of human conduct not just those directly linked to economic exchange.

Pierre Force views Becker as heir to the Epicurean/Augustinian hedonistic conception of human nature, arguing for a direct line of descent between the neo-Epicurean/Augustinian understanding of pleasure, Benthamite utilitarianism and the concept of utility as deployed in modern economics.[119] An important aspect of this, per Force, is the idea of pleasure as representing preferences which remain fairly consistent over time – these are the underlying goals that motivate our behaviour such as the esteem of others or physical health.[120] From the perspective of behavioural economics it is the means by which we seek to achieve these goals which varies over time (as incomes and prices fluctuate), but the primary preferences or 'pleasures' remain constant.[121] These preferences are understood as bearing little relation to values or beliefs – Force suggests that for Becker, as for the proponents of original sin, the dominant motives for human behaviour are passions rather than principles.[122] Of course, for Becker there is no judgement involved – pleasure-seeking or 'utility maximization' is a morally neutral activity and *amour propre* – or self-esteem as in present-day parlance – is to be stimulated rather than repressed or stunted.[123] Like health or skills, self-esteem is an aspect of human capital – an asset to its possessor; indeed, one of the tasks of the family as 'factory' for human capital is the production of self-esteem.[124]

Becker's work is concerned with children mainly in the context of parental decision-making. As noted earlier behavioural economics has been applied to the analysis of fertility decisions – the choice whether or not to have a child construed in terms of a weighing of the benefits against the direct and indirect costs associated with child-bearing and rearing. The desire for children represents a primary preference, but decisions regarding whether, when and how many children to have are regarded as shaped by factors related to parental income and to 'price' (for example of day-care services, education, as well as income from employment foregone). This is not to suggest that family relations are regarded as equivalent to those of the market – Becker stresses that a distinguishing feature of family relationships is that they are based on love, care and a sense of obligation. These can however be conceptualised in terms of utility. The relation of parent to child is in Becker's terms grounded in *altruism* – understood in terms of the indirect utility derived by parents from the utility of their child.[125] For instance goods purchased for a son or daughter may bring as much or more pleasure

or satisfaction than an item of personal consumption on the part of a parent.

As noted earlier, from Becker's perspective the care and attention which parents bestow on children can be understood in terms of inputs which contribute to the formation of 'human capital'. In addition to differences in 'genetic endowments', families vary quite a lot in terms of their capacity to boost the human capital of their young – parents differ in terms of the amount of time, energy and money which they can direct towards their offspring. Parents also differ in terms of the extent of their own 'human capital' and hence in terms of the 'quality' of their interactions with their children. Hence children growing up in poor, 'unstimulating' households are regarded as at high risk of reaching adulthood with inadequate levels of human capital, unless governments intervene to provide some form of compensatory educational provision.

The quantity of human capital accrued by any individual is not simply the product of 'inputs' from parents and teachers, but reflects personal engagement in the process of capital accumulation. While this is a process that these days is represented as 'life-long', the most intensive efforts still take place during the childhood years. In most Western countries the period spent in formal education has been extended considerably over the last few decades – the vast majority of young people complete second-level schooling and a significant proportion subsequently progress to higher education. Expansion of second-level and higher education almost everywhere since the 1960s (and resulting 'extension' of childhood) has been strongly influenced by the 'human capital' paradigm of Becker and his associates, with consequent reorientation of educational objectives towards market-related concerns. As discussed above this is associated with a reconceptualisation of learners of all ages as actively engaged in an economic enterprise of *investment* in which the learner is at once *producer* and *capital*.[126]

Like the Epicureans Becker does not view a radical difference between children and adults in terms of the fundamental drivers of conduct.[127] The Epicurean 'cradle argument' represented infants from birth as naturally motivated to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Similarly for Becker, children, like adults, can be understood as 'utility maximizers' basing their actions on the relative costs and benefits involved.[128] Ewald suggests that Foucault was interested in Becker's approach because it represented a perspective on human conduct which dispensed with coercion and (moral) discipline.[129] Instead individual

action is directly under the command of pleasure and pain. Becker's perspective on parental discipline is evocative of that of Bentham's chrestomathic school; the conduct of the young is viewed as responsive to incentive or disincentive effects associated with the interaction between parental altruism and what are referred to as 'merit goods'.[130] These are defined as 'traits or behaviors' particularly valued by parents – for middle-class parents, at least, we can assume that merit goods are closely bound up with success in school. A decline in parental altruism in response to a wayward child's behaviour (reflected for example in poor grades) can serve as a spur to improve conduct.[131] This should be seen as a *rational choice* on the part of the child – an attempt to maximise utility. Influential parenting books resonate with this perspective, advocating that parents govern child behaviour through the use of clearly defined 'rewards' and 'consequences'.[132]

The Athenian child represents a break with older constructions of childhood, however, in certain respects she could be regarded as both produced out of and in relation to them. The Apollonian child – characterised in terms of goodness and innocence – was constituted from an emancipatory discourse which challenged the restrictive child-rearing regime associated with the Dionysian child, instead advocating a form of 'restricted liberty', to use Rousseau's terms. Children were to be raised apart from adult society in a natural setting through methods that sought to develop the child's ability to self-govern, while under discreet, but continual, adult surveillance. In this sense, Jenks suggests that the Apollonian child was 'to be seen but not heard'.[133] The Athenian child is similarly produced from emancipatory discourses, which at the same time represent novel means of 'conducting conduct', this time predicated on children's 'voice' and 'choice' and their (qualified) participation in, rather than complete separation from the adult world.

Kampmann suggests that while participatory forms of government open up new opportunities for children, they are also associated with a form of control, which, because it operates from 'the inside', is at once more insidious and extensive.[134] This apparently contradictory interconnection between freedom and control brings us to the heart of the idea of governmentality. From the perspective of governmentality it is not just that government operates *through* freedom, but that individual freedom is itself a form of control – sovereignty over the self.[135] Traditionally children were not free in this sense; indeed the extension of freedom – in the sense of citizenship rights – to the mass of the adult population in Western states is associated with increasing

external regulation of childhood. Children's 'rights' were understood in a narrow sense in terms of increased state supervision of parents to ensure compliance with child-rearing norms. Acceptance of a broader understanding of children's rights over the last few decades is associated with changing conceptions of freedom and related to this, changing conceptions of the kinds of selves to be governed.[136]

The central insight from the governmentality literature is that subjectivity – the relationship of the individual to the self – is constituted via the multifarious forms of knowledge and expertise deployed in practices of government. In this regard Rose has identified the interrelated domains of consumption and 'psychotherapeutics' as crucial in providing the conceptual resources by which we have come to relate to – and regulate – ourselves in advanced liberal regimes. Central to Rose's argument is the intersection between pop-psychology ideas around individual fulfilment and 'self-actualization' and consumerist notions of 'lifestyle choice', a concept which he suggests has spread out from the domain of purchasable goods to infiltrate the most intimate spheres of human existence.[137] According to Rose the resulting 'regime of the self' has led to freedom becoming more closely associated with a conception of individual autonomy narrowly understood as the 'right to choose'.[138] This is a right increasingly accorded to children.

Cook's work demonstrates that the interaction of psychological expertise and marketing strategies has been of huge importance in constituting the child as an autonomous 'choosing subject'.[139] Representations of agentive childhood in advertising and the media call upon adults – including parents, educators and policy-makers – to relate to children in particular ways and provide important resources through which children come to relate to themselves. As noted earlier, Rose has written that an important reason for the particular potency of the neo-liberal discourse of enterprise is its deep resonance with the psycho-consumerist emphasis on 'self-actualization through choice'.[140] In shifting responsibility for success or failure from society to the individual, neo-liberal and advanced liberal rationalities of rule create the need for reflexive, adaptable, 'enterprising' subjects equipped with the capacity and desire to actively work upon themselves. While this is associated with 'flexible' forms of socialisation, as Fendler suggests, the end goal – the production of 'flexible souls' – is fixed[141] and can be viewed in the context of a concept of success defined in restrictive economic terms.[142]

As in the past the risks of success or failure in contemporary Western societies are far from evenly distributed and the government of child-

hood must be viewed in the context of wider patterns of inequality. Norms such as negotiation and participation, from which the Athenian child is produced, have been described as 'white, western middle-class, norm(s)' by Vandenbroeck and Bouverne-de-Vie,[143] who find a high degree of continuity over time in the way in which child-rearing norms privilege some children and parents while marginalising others. While approaches have varied, a persistent theme shaping the government of childhood over time is the inability of working-class parents to adequately socialise their children. Whether understood in relation to moral, emotional or cognitive deficiency the interventions targeted at 'disadvantaged' or 'deprived' children have typically been framed in terms of 'investing in the future'.[144] Hendrick's work suggests that within the discourse of investment the dichotomous position of the working-class child as simultaneously both 'victim and threat' means that intervention in the lives of working-class families has been viewed primarily as a means of reducing future expenditure on welfare provision and prisons.[145]

Investing in the future remains an important aim of present-day rationalities of government, but with the twist that children themselves are offered an active role in the development of individual human capital. At the same time, alternative tutelary, exclusionary or coercive strategies may still be utilised for those young people and their families deemed unwilling or unable to prioritise long-term goals over short-term gains. Hence we can say that the Athenian child supplements rather than supplants earlier modes of conceptualising/regulating childhood. As Meyer writes, 'the discourse of evil persists and the discourse of rights has not displaced the discourse of innocence or gained the status of supremacy'.[146] Across policy domains – in particular child protection or youth justice[147] – child subjects may yet be constituted in Dionysian or Apollonian terms in strategies which can vary, according to age, gender, class or ethnicity.

While they remain important elements of popular and political discourse, it is important to emphasise that the Dionysian and Apollonian images of childhood may be reconfigured within contemporary rationalities of rule via 'Athenian' strategies of responsibilisation. For instance, the innocent, vulnerable child typical of child welfare discourse has in recent years been expected to shoulder some of the burden of protection. An example of this form of strategy is the kind of 'stay safe' programme designed to enable children to recognise and respond to potentially dangerous situations. While this can bring benefits in terms of increased knowledge and self-confidence,

Kitzinger[148] notes some potential dangers of placing responsibility on children in this way. One concern identified is that the risk of violence against children who resist their abusers could be increased. Also highlighted is the possibility of stimulating feelings of guilt in children who do not resist abuse. Perhaps the most important criticism is that such programmes are limited in their potential to challenge the unequal power relations through which children's vulnerability is produced in the first place.[149]

In a similar fashion, when measured against the Athenian ideal, the 'evil' or 'corrupted' child may be subject to forms of intervention, which seek to make her not innocent as in the past, but *responsible*. A good example is the use of restorative justice as a strategy for inculcating a sense of responsibility not only in young offenders, but usually in their parents as well. While supporting young people and their families to reach their own solutions can be seen as a form of 'empowerment', any approach which deals with youth crime primarily in individual or familial terms can serve to obscure the wider inequalities in terms of resources and opportunities which can lead to some young people becoming involved in criminal behaviour. Other strategies of responsibilisation targeted at young people include the use of such 'technologies of agency' as 'good behaviour contracts' deployed not only within justice systems, but also within school settings to encourage students to take responsibility for regulating their own conduct in 'partnership' with schools and parents.

## Conclusion

As noted earlier Lee suggests that the demise of what he calls 'standard adulthood' in the age of 'flexibility' means that there remains no clearly defined template against which childhood can be measured and managed.[150] Findings from governmentality inspired research suggest that flexibility itself has become the leitmotif of childhood socialisation to be achieved via parenting and pedagogical practices based on negotiation and participation which operate on the basis of children's competence and capacity for agency. The re-conceptualisation of children as competent actors brings potential benefits to children in terms of heightened status and increased autonomy, however the salutary lesson from the governmentality literature is that these ideas can be taken up in ways which can burden or disadvantage children. Enjoined to become 'responsible choosers', within contemporary rationalities of rule children are positioned to a certain extent as self-governing.

Unfortunately, the promise of autonomy which this entails does not necessarily challenge generational inequalities and, as Vandenbroeck and Bouverne-de-Vie, suggest, may serve to stigmatise 'irresponsible' children and their parents in ways which serve both to obscure and reinforce the effects of structural inequalities.[151]

The heavy emphasis placed on independence and autonomy within contemporary rationalities of rule means that success is represented as the product of individual choices and effort. The very real danger here is that if social exclusion is a matter of individuals 'choosing' not to participate, then tackling disadvantage becomes reduced to efforts to modify attitudes and behaviour. Children have always been a popular focus of these kinds of efforts, but in recent years the idea of 'saving the child to save society', to use Popkewitz's[152] phrase, has been extended to encompass a broader range of social concerns and modified so that children are accorded greater responsibility for 'saving' themselves. We thereby find ourselves in a situation in which – somewhat ironically – ideas about children's agency and participation can be deployed in instrumental, future-oriented strategies that potentially act to reinforce rather than challenge inequalities of power.

# Conclusion

As noted at the very beginning of this book, the exercise of power over children requires some way of conceptualising what kind of beings children are. Jenks's work points us to two oppositional modes of thinking about childhood and children – Dionysian and Apollonian – predicated on the theme of good versus evil as the essence of human nature, battles over which echo through the ages in various forms – Manichean versus Pelagian, Luther versus Erasmus, even to some extent Epicurean versus Stoic. In Western thought the figure of St. Augustine has been central to debates and the image of corrupted human nature which he bequeathed to Christianity has cast a long shadow over Western political and pedagogical thought. The Augustinian subject is divided within – caught between the conflicting inclinations of reason and passion – and unable to choose the good without divine assistance. Augustine rejected the promise of perfectibility inherent in Stoic doctrine and his conception of human nature as in thrall to passion is regarded as broadly compatible with the Epicurean emphasis on pleasure as motive force.[1] Thus following Force we can make a distinction between Epicurean/Augustine and Stoic conceptions of human nature, while recognising, as noted earlier, that this distinction is not necessarily always clear cut.

The image of the Dionysian child resonates with the picture of human nature derived from the Epicurean/Augustinian tradition. Within this tradition there is no sharp differentiation between children and adults at the ontological level (although in practical terms children must be kept apart from adult society). By nature children, like adults, are drawn to pleasure, guided by unruly passions which must be checked. The maturation process is not conceived in terms of natural growth, a great deal of adult intervention is required to ensure children

acquire the requisite moral virtues. In effect the elements which differentiate the adult from the child have been superadded through the socialisation process; the adult as moral agent is thus divided within – the conscience a tool to assist in overriding vicious inclinations. The norms which govern child-rearing are drawn from the realms of religion and morality, and education is a matter of instilling authoritative knowledge. A strong emphasis is placed on the role of fathers, particularly in relation to the raising of boys, with the idea of 'hardening' (associated with Stoic precept) deployed as a means of comprehending the means and ends of the socialisation process.

By contrast the Apollonian child is associated with a view of maturation in terms of development, resonant with the Stoic 'cradle argument', albeit with a view of the passions informed by neo-Epicureanism. From this perspective the child at birth is possessed of the seeds of reason and virtue which will come to fruition in due course and there is a qualitative difference between the child and the developed adult. In its modern version the 'developing child' is associated with child-rearing norms drawn from knowledge of the child's 'nature' derived from scientific research. Education, ideally, is child-centred. Mothers take centre stage in the socialisation process – at least until children begin formal schooling – reflecting the strong emphasis on emotional and psychological well-being associated with this model. Ideally sensitive child-rearing will contribute to an integrated personality in which internal conflicts between duty and desire are minimised, however it is possible and even likely that circumstances and experiences may 'corrupt' the burgeoning adult so that coercive means of 'self-regulation' may be required in order that virtue prevails.

From the vantage of the model of the Athenian child the boundaries between childhood and adulthood are blurred once more. In part this is linked to the Epicurean/Augustinian tradition and the view of both child and adult as self-interested utility-maximiser. Children, like adults are regarded as rational choosers and cast as active economic subjects both as consumers and as 'entrepreneurs of the self' engaged in the production of human capital. While children are still viewed as beings in the process of development, increasingly so are adults. Within the discourse of human capital both children and adults are, of course, actively engaged in their own developmental process through various strategies of self-care. The care of selves – whether of children or adults – is conceived in terms of 'inputs' which promise economic return. Guided by considerations of benefits and costs the individual remains untroubled by concepts of duty or obligation – moral

decisions are made on the same basis as those pertaining to the economic realm on the grounds of potential pleasure or pain. Thus while individual responsibility is emphasised this is conceptualised in terms of an understanding of prudence conceived narrowly in economic terms rather than in relation to moral virtue.

The three images of governable child subject – Dionysian, Apollonian and Athenian – are linked via the concept of malleability which positions children as privileged targets of pastoral power. As a mode of exercising power which is both individualising and totalising pastoral power is simultaneously concerned with the salvation of each and the salvation of all – the particular potentiality associated with childhood means that the welfare of the youngest members of the population is regarded as having particularly strong implications for the welfare of the whole. The well-being of children was beginning to be regarded as too important to entrust only to families at least as far back as the sixteenth century, and children concomitantly coming to be regarded as a group with shared characteristics and needs. This was occurring as traditional forms of authority were weakening and attempts were being made up to shore up absolutism using theories of sovereignty grounded in analogy between the political and the domestic realms. What Jenks refers to as the formalisation of the Dionysian child is associated with the most influential of these theories – Hobbes's *Leviathan*. What is striking about this theory is the severing of the 'natural' bonds between the child and the family,[2] but although Hobbes's formulation was unusual he was not alone in his challenge to parental authority over children. As discussed in Chapter 3 leading humanists and Protestant reformers such as Erasmus and Luther were early proponents of the view that parents have obligations to the wider community in relation to the moral and spiritual formation of the young. Analogously Hobbes emphasised the duty of parents in relation to the formation of political subjects – Lutherans argued that the claims of God and the community to children superseded those of parents, for Hobbes the tie between children and the Leviathan was fundamental.

As discussed in Chapter 1 Foucault suggests that the three central themes associated with pastoral power – *salvation*, *obedience* and *truth* – were transformed and secularised within early modern rationalities of rule.[3] The idea of salvation, when formulated in terms of the preservation and strength of a state unshackled from any transcendent/religious ends and conceptualised in terms of an open-ended futurity, became associated with material prosperity which was in turn linked to

the welfare of the people conceived in terms of productivity rather than spirituality. As the strength of the state came increasingly to be linked to the well-being of its citizens, so the health and education of children became a matter of political concern. This is apparent from the sixteenth century, in Protestant regions, in particular, with the passage of educational ordinances, but it is in the nineteenth century – in the wake of the emergence of new objects of government such as 'the population', 'the economy' and 'the social' in relation to which liberal forms of government took shape – that the linkage between the salvation of the state and the salvation of the young was cemented, as issues related to child welfare were taken up by politicians and policy-makers in ways which dovetailed with broader demographic, economic and social concerns.

From the perspective of the pastorate obedience is to be understood as a perpetual 'exhaustive' form of submission to authority. Hence in contrast to the exercise of sovereign power, the exercise of governmental power is not a matter of command and compliance, but must be concerned with attitudes and *beliefs* – political subjects must *willingly* submit to authority. From the pastoral perspective (religious or political) obedience is thus closely linked to truth; as with the religious pastorate, the exercise of governmental power is connected not just with the transmission of truth, but with the extraction of truth from those over whom power is exercised. In relation to the transmission of truth Foucault suggests that within early modern rationalities of rule this was conceived in terms of imparting knowledge in a manner which led people to adjust their *conduct* as well as their *opinions*,[4] (a particularly important concern for Hobbes). Related to this was the notion that education – and schooling in particular – could be a more effective tool than coercion for improving productivity and promoting political obedience. Of course schooling operates as much as a mechanism for producing truth as for imparting truth. As schooling itself was gradually rationalised and disciplined so it became a more effective tool for evaluating and grading, as well as guiding and shaping, pedagogical subjects. Deacon suggests that it was not until schooling had been disciplined to the extent that its positive, productive functions came to the fore that the school attained its now taken for granted status as agency of socialisation for *all* children.[5]

Within liberal forms of government salvation refers to the welfare of the population, understood in terms of a natural entity of sorts governed by its own laws. The related pastoral themes of obedience and truth thus taken on a new meaning in the context of liberal forms of

government – to obey is to adhere to such 'natural' laws and these can only be apprehended via the 'veridical' discourses of the human sciences. The government of children – in families, in schools – is thus predicated on 'truths' which derive from the nature of childhood itself, data gathered from masses of individual children providing the basis for standardised norms of development. There is thus a certain circularity in the relationship between disciplinary and biopolitical mechanisms in that disciplinary techniques of examination and recording provide the basis for the large-scale data sets from which norms to evaluate and regulate individual development are derived. The Apollonian child as symbolic target of power is the product of this circular relationship between discipline and biopolitics – governed in accordance with her own 'nature'.

Foucault asks the question 'why should the lamp or the house be an art object but not our life?'[6] The answer to this question is that it can be difficult to think about our lives, our 'selves' – and the lives and selves of children – in terms other than those offered to us by the human sciences such as psychology and economics. Governmentality scholars such as Rose point to the intersection between the imperative to 'self-actualize' inherent in popular psychological literature and the 'enterprising' *homo economicus* of neo-liberalism; care of the self is thus cast in terms of 'investment', narrowly framed in terms of future productivity. The language of investment has, of course, long been viewed as an especially effective tool for drawing attention to children's issues and attracting resources to fund programmes and services for children and families, the promise of future returns or savings a powerful incentive for state intervention in the spheres of education and child welfare. As Hendrick has pointed out the discourse of investment operates to discriminate between different categories of children, while some are positioned as assets, others – generally those from lower socio-economic backgrounds – represent potential liabilities likely to become a 'drain' on state resources in the absence of appropriate intervention. 'Salvation' thus becomes associated with neutralising the threat posed by these children, which, whether viewed through the lens of morality or psychology, has tended to be associated with parental deficiency.

The challenge as identified by scholars and advocates is to untether childhood from the discourse of salvation. The idea of 'investing in the future' is so potent, however, that it can effectively colonise discourses aiming to counter instrumental views of childhood. The Athenian child as symbolic target of power/knowledge derives from this kind of

colonisation by which the language of children's rights and agency was taken up in the cause of maximising future returns, but from Foucault's perspective this is largely because the discourse of rights – at least as generally understood – is an ineffective tool of resistance. An important theme in Foucault's work was the complex relationship between sovereignty and the pastoral forms of power represented by discipline and biopolitics.[7] For Foucault while theories of rights – grounded in sovereignty over the self – are deployed as the primary means of resisting or limiting disciplinary and biopolitical power, the democratisation of sovereignty was made possible by and in turn supports the exercise of disciplinary power. Since individual sovereignty is inextricably intertwined with disciplinary power, Foucault argues that in order to resist discipline a new form of right is required, of a kind 'that is both antidisciplinary and emancipated from the principle of sovereignty'.[8] These issues are foregrounded in any discussion on children's rights in relation to which the vexed relationship between 'salvation' and 'liberation' is especially prominent. Children's rights cannot, of course, be addressed without discussion of the rights of parents, framed as they are in relation to parental 'sovereignty' and taking practical form in powers exercised over parental decisions and actions. The literature on governmentality has been especially important in highlighting the burden placed on parents – particularly those with limited resources – of efforts to extend 'rights' to children. Emancipating rights from both sovereignty and the pastoral is a necessary step in rethinking children's rights in a way which locates the tension between the interests of children and those who care for them in the context of wider inequalities of power and resources.

# Notes

## Introduction

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## Chapter 1 Conceptualising Governmentality

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## Chapter 2 Subjects of Government

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## Chapter 4 The Gentle Way in Child Government

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14 Bloom refers to this process as a 'doubling' or 'dividing' of amour-de-soi. Bloom, 'The Education of Democratic Man', 142
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## Chapter 5 Governing the Responsible Child

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## Conclusion

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